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Abstract
This thesis is a qualitative research exercise, which tests the explanatory value of the 
international relations theory of neoliberal institutionalism in explaining Germany's 
engagement in the Arctic and in the Arctic Council. The research question further attempts to 
clarify Germany's economic and environmental interests pursued through its engagement with 
the AC.
This thesis analyzes Germany's engagement in the Arctic from a historical point of view up to 
Germany's contemporary interests. Germany's first Arctic engagement started with the period 
of whaling, continued through the age of polar heroes, up to the weather war of World War II. 
After the two World Wars, Germany struggled to restart its Arctic engagement, but nowadays 
enjoys a high reputation as an Arctic player. This is due to the well-known German polar 
research institute, the Alfred Wegener Institut Helholtz-Zentrum fur Polar- und 
Meeresforschung, but also due to Germany's engagement in the Arctic Council. As a result of 
Germany's long history of polar, especially Arctic endeavors, the country became an Observer 
in the Arctic Council at its founding. As global warming has caused significant melting in the 
Arctic, Germany's interest has shifted from environmental concerns in the region to a dual 
emphasis of protecting the environment while pursuing economic opportunities. Today 
Germany pursues several interests in the Arctic, including economic, political, and 
environmental interests. Neoliberal institutionalism argues that cooperation can emerge through 
mutual trust and the building of norms, regimes and institutions. Realism on the other hand 
emphasizes security competition among great powers within anarchy of the international 
system, with the main aim to survive. The results of the analysis suggest that the theory of 
neoliberal institutionalism has better explanatory power for interpreting Germany's motivations 
for engaging in the Arctic Council than the theory of realism.
Table of Contents
Page
Abstract.............................................................................................................................. i
List of Abbreviations.......................................................................................................... iv
Acknowledgement............................................................................................................. v
Chapter 1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1
1.1. Germany ........................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1.1. General Background........................................................................................................................ 4
1.1.2. Arctic Background............................................................................................................................. 6
1.2. Thesis Structure................................................................................................................................ 8
Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework ...................................................................................... 9
2.1. Introduction of neoliberalism theory .............................................................................................9
2.2. Introduction of realism theory ......................................................................................................17
2.3. Application to the thesis ................................................................................................................19
2.4. Research Design ............................................................................................................................. 23
2.5. Case Study ....................................................................................................................................... 25
2.6. Sources of Data .............................................................................................................................. 27
2.7. Interviews ....................................................................................................................................... 28
2.8. Historical research ..........................................................................................................................30
2.9. Limitation ........................................................................................................................................ 31
2.10. Definition of Germany ................................................................................................................. 32
2.11. Definition of the Arctic ................................................................................................................32
2.12. Literature Review .........................................................................................................................33
Chapter 3 Germany's Historical Interest in the Arctic........................................................ 41
3.1 Introduction .....................................................................................................................................41
3.2 Before World War II.........................................................................................................................45
3.2.1. Whaling............................................................................................................................................ 45
3.2.2. The First German Scientific Expeditions to the North ..............................................................51
3.2.3. German North Pole Expedition.....................................................................................................52
3.2.4. The Austro-Hungarian Expedition and the International Polar Year (IPY)............................ 56
3.2.5. The Tragedy of the Schroder- Stranz Expedition.......................................................................60
3.2.6. Max Karl Grotewahl (1894-1958) ...............................................................................................62
3.2.7. Erich von Drygalski (1865 - 1949) ................................................................................................ 63
3.2.8. Germany's Greatest Polar Explorer -- Alfred Wegener ............................................................63
3.2.8.1 The scientist Alfred Wegener............................................................................................................. 63
3.2.8.2. The Greenland Expeditions ................................................................................................................65
3.2.8.3. Wegener's Legacy ...............................................................................................................................70
3.2.9. Zeppelin's Polar Journey............................................................................................................... 71
3.2.9.1. The Count of Zeppelin (1838 - 1917)............................................................................................... 72
3.2.9.2. Aeroarctic............................................................................................................................................  72
3.2.9.3. Germany's interests in the airship flights to the Arctic.................................................................. 76
3.2.10. Germany's Interest in the Arctic during World War II ........................................................... 77
3.2.10.1. The Weather War............................................................................................................................. 78
3.2.10.2. Scientific advancements ..................................................................................................................81
3.2.11. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................83
3.3. After World War II ..........................................................................................................................84
3.3.1. Introduction .....................................................................................................................................84
3.3.2. Stauferland Expedition ..................................................................................................................85
ii
3.3.3. Germany in the field of international scientific research........................................................ 86
3.3.3.1. International Year of Geophysics (1957-1958) .............................................................................. 86
3.3.3.2. The Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum far Polar- und Meeresforschung.................. 87
3.3.3.3. GDR (German Democratic Republic) ................................................................................................88
3.3.3.4. Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) .................................................. 89
3.3.4. History of the AEPS/AC ................................................................................................................. 89
3.3.5. The Formation of the Arctic Council ........................................................................................... 92
3.4. Conclusion...................................................................................................................................... 96
Chapter 4 Germany's Interests in the Arctic in the Contemporary Era............................... 99
4.1. German resource interest ............................................................................................................. 99
4.1.1. Introduction .....................................................................................................................................99
4.1.2. Importance of raw material for Germany ............................................................................... 100
4.1.3. Future Outlook .............................................................................................................................101
4.1.4. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................102
4.2. German shipping interests .........................................................................................................  103
4.2.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 103
4.2.2. Fact and Figures............................................................................................................................104
4.2.3. Arctic Sea Lanes ............................................................................................................................105
4.2.4. Security .......................................................................................................................................... 106
4.2.5. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................108
4.3. German economic interests ........................................................................................................109
4.3.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 109
4.3.2. Germany's expert knowledge.................................................................................................... 109
4.3.3. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................111
4.4. German environmental interests ............................................................................................... 112
4.4.1 Introduction....................................................................................................................................112
4.4.2. Impacts on Germany ...................................................................................................................113
4.4.3. Climate Research ..........................................................................................................................115
4.4.4. German Arctic Research Institute..............................................................................................117
4.4.5. International Cooperation ..........................................................................................................119
4.4.6. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................121
4.5. German political interests in the Arctic ..................................................................................... 122
4.5.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 122
4.5.2. Voices of German Diplomats ..................................................................................................... 124
4.5.3. The Arctic Council ........................................................................................................................ 127
4.5.4. Conclusion .....................................................................................................................................131
Chapter 5 Theoretical Analysis - Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism ....................... 132
Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................... 145
6.1. Germany's Arctic Council Observer Role ...................................................................................147
6.2. Germany's contemporary interests in the Arctic ......................................................................151
Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 155
iii
List of Abbreviations
AC Arctic Council
AEPS Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
AMAP Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
AWI Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum fur Polar- und Meeresforschung
BGR Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe
EU European Union
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GDR German Democratic Republic
IPY International Polar Year
IASC International Arctic Science Committee
IR International Relations
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWP North West Passage
NSR Northern Sea Route
PAME Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (working group)
SAO Senior Arctic Official
SDWG Sustainable Development Working Group
UK United Kingdom
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFS Weather buoy
WW World War
iv
Acknowledgement
Working on a thesis has been a challenging and exhausting process, making me all the more 
grateful to have accumulated knowledge on a topic about which I am still passionate.
I am indebted to many persons for their support, critical feedback and inspiring ideas. First of 
all, I would like to express my gratitude to my committee, Dr. Boylan, Dr. Hirsch, and Dr. 
Ehrlander for their generous guidance, the time they have invested in reading my drafts and 
providing me with helpful feedback throughout the entire process of this thesis. I would 
especially like to thank Dr. Mary Ehrlander, without whose encouragement, support and 
assistance, I never would have entered the Arctic and Northern Study Program and finished 
with a Master's Degree. It has been challenging to study online with about 4,300 miles between 
Alaska and Germany and a 10-hour time difference. Without Dr. Ehrlander, my studies would 
not have been feasible, and therefore I am especially thankful to her.
The Archives of the Alfred Wegener Institute in Bremerhaven also offered me invaluable 
support. I would especially like to thank Dr. Christian Salewski and Dr. Reinhard Krause, who 
provided me with useful information and knowledge. I would like to thank Dr. Kathrin Stephen 
for taking the time to give me an interview regarding her work at the IASS and in the Arctic 
Council. I am also very grateful to Emil Helsper for the time he dedicated to help me finalize 
my thesis and for his ongoing patience, technical support and guidance. He always had an open 
ear for me and provided me with moral support. Further, I would like to thank Achim Bellmann 
for his continuous support, enthusiasm and critical feedback throughout my Master's degree.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Christa and Peter Schley, who have supported me my 
entire life, no matter how crazy my ideas were. I am especially grateful to my father, who has 
v
infected me with the “travel bug,” which eventually brought me to the Arctic, whence my 
passion for the region began.
vi
Chapter 1 Introduction
In recent years the Arctic has transitioned from being a remote area to a region of global 
relevance and significance. The coverage of sea ice and permafrost has been decreasing rapidly 
in the past decades due to climate change. The warming Arctic not only presents economic 
opportunities in the form of newly accessible oil and natural gas stores, but it also opens up new 
sea lanes through the Arctic Ocean. Although the Arctic was a highly militarized zone during 
World War II and especially during the Cold War, much of the world considered it a political 
and economic backwater. Recently, owing to global warming, the Arctic has been transformed 
into an area of intense global interest, regarding issues such as resource development, growing 
concern about the effects of climate change in the region, as well as boundary and sovereignty 
disputes. Consequently, the high North currently holds many challenges and opportunities in 
geopolitical, environmental, economic, and social spheres.
International cooperation in the Arctic started to increase in the late 1980s when Mikhail 
Gorbachev made his famous speech in Murmansk calling for more cooperation in the region 
instead of confrontation. As the region gained international attention, interest increased in a 
system of governance for the Arctic. The regional body - the Arctic Council (AC) - was founded 
in 1996 with a mandate to “provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities 
and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable 
development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”1 Furthermore the Arctic states agreed 
upon solving any disputes in the region peacefully. The AC is a high-level intergovernmental 
1 Arctic Council, “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.” (Ottawa, Canada, 1996):
Article 1, accessed July 23, 2018, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752- 
v2-ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.
1
forum wherein the eight Arctic states collaborate on Arctic issues, in particular, concerns of 
sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. Today the AC addresses 
some of the most urgent concerns of the region and strives to provide effective responses and 
solutions to these new challenges. The Arctic states have acknowledged the need for 
collaboration by agreeing upon using the AC as the main cooperative body for Arctic interstate 
cooperation and as the main legal framework within which to work.2 Therefore the political 
development in the Arctic is now characterized by more than two decades of interstate 
cooperation, absence of war and adherence to international law.3
2 Arctic Council, “Ilulissat Declaration.” (Ilulissat, Greenland, 2008), accessed March 5, 2018, 
https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2008-Ilulissat-Declaration.pdf.
3 Njord Wegge, “The Political order in the Arctic: power structures, regimes and influence,” Polar Record 47, 
no. 241 (2011): 167.
The changing Arctic and the numerous global impacts of conditions and forces within the Arctic 
region have increased the interest of various actors from outside the region in becoming 
involved in Arctic affairs. Although final decision making remains with the eight Arctic states, 
increasing engagement by non-Arctic states and non-state actors as Observers exemplifies a 
shift in AC governance towards more cooperation and enhanced co-production of knowledge. 
Thirteen non-Arctic states, thirteen intergovernmental and thirteen non-governmental 
organizations currently participate as Observers in the AC. The strategies and actions of the 
Arctic states and the policies and guidelines of the non-Arctic states illustrate the complex 
interaction among these international actors in the Arctic.
Attention to the Arctic is increasing more broadly in international relations, as well. On the one 
hand, various actors raise fears with a “race for resources” or an “Arctic scramble,” since global 
warming has revealed new opportunities for trade routes and natural resource development. The 
adjacent coastal waters of the Arctic are territories of states, with unsettled disputes over the 
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extent of continental shelves, as well as questions regarding jurisdiction over new sea routes. 
On the other hand, there is evidence of increasing cooperation in the region. For instance, 
bilateral relations, especially in trade and research, have expanded in the past two decades. 
While the international community does not interfere with the eight sovereign Arctic states, the 
non-Arctic Observer countries have displayed a keen interest in the Arctic for decades now, 
and have slowly developed their own identities, economic abilities and diplomatic connections 
in the Arctic.4 Recognizing the interests they share, the eight Arctic states and the non-Arctic 
states are calling for more cooperation, effective strategies and international frameworks, as 
comprehension of the global impacts of climate change have increased.
4 Heather Exner-Pirot, Lassi Heininen, and Joel Plouffe, “Change and Innovation in the Arctic. Introduction,” 
Arctic Yearbook (2013).
5 Oran R. Young, “Arctic Governance - Pathways to the Future,” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 1, no. 2 
(2010): 174.
Political scientist Oran Young stresses that cooperation and collaborative governance are 
needed in the Arctic due to the opportunities and threats that climate change present to a region 
lacking a strong institutional framework.5 Issues such as environmental protection, sustainable 
development of maritime resources and animals, and the concerns of the indigenous population 
are more relevant than ever. Therefore, the region is expected to generate great opportunities 
and various challenges ranging from increased access to energy, shipping and fishing grounds, 
to environmental and military threats. Hence the Arctic region increasingly is recognized as a 
region of international interest.
The causes and consequences of climate change, which are so clearly global, open up existing 
governance arrangements in the circumpolar North to non-Arctic states seeking active 
participation in the region. These non-Arctic states, such as China, Italy, the Republic of Korea, 
and Germany, try to position themselves as legitimate Arctic players, emphasizing the global 
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rather than the regional implications of melting sea ice and resulting social and environmental 
problems. Arctic issues, especially environmental protection, pose collective action problems, 
which can only be solved by multilateral collaboration and cooperation, based on common 
shared information and data monitoring, including joint research projects. Germany has been 
an Observer since the AC's inception, and displays an active interest in the region and 
institution.
1.1. Germany
1.1.1. General Background
This thesis explores Germany's role as an official Observer to the Arctic Council (AC). When 
looking back at Germany's foreign policy since World War II, Hans Kundani, a research fellow 
at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, who has written much on Germany's 
economic power within Europe, describes Germany as a civilian power, that is, “one that, unlike 
a great power, uses multilateral institutions and economic cooperation to achieve its foreign- 
policy goals, avoids the use of military force except in limited circumstances and in a 
multilateral context, and thus helps to civilize international relations by strengthening 
international norms.”6 After WWII Germany was forced to make territorial concessions and the 
country was divided into two states; meanwhile each state undertook its own foreign policy, 
shaped by the ideological ideas and strategic interests of the Cold War era.7
6 Hans Kundani, “Germany as a Geo-Economic Power,” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2011): 32.
7 Kundani, “Germany as a Geo-Economic Power,” 33.
Former Chancellor of the FRG Helmut Kohl stood among the initiators of European integration, 
which began in 1950. Thus, West Germany was an oiginal driver of the European Union, along 
with some other Western European states - France, Italy, and the Benelux states, and it has 
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been very active since. Today Germany and France are the driving forces behind the European 
Union, in a process that has included the creation of a single market, economic and monetary 
Union, and the beginnings of a joint European foreign policy.
Germany's current chancellor, Angela Merkel, has been nicknamed “Climate Chancellor” for 
her long-standing international engagement in reducing carbon emissions. As Merkel started in 
her fourth term in 2017, doubts have risen as to whether she can live up to that reputation, owing 
to her new government's decision to postpone the national 2020 climate targets and Germany's 
lack of recent progress in cutting greenhouse gas emissions. Yet Germany continues to seek 
influence within multilateral institutions. Germany will take a seat in the UN Security Council 
in 2019.
Due to its economic strength, Germany has become a global player in the last decades, a role it 
exercises, for example, through its membership in the G8 group of leading economies of the 
world. Germany's strong economy elevates its status and influence and affords a certain 
independence in its decision making. Germany is the most populated and most economically 
powerful European country, and has strong economic, social, and political ties with all its 
European neighbors. Germany's economic power depends on close cooperation with its 
European neighbors and the European Union itself, which both enhances and confines the 
country's capability to be a foreign policy actor. Today the European Union struggles more 
than ever, as it addresses challenging new issues, such as the refugee crisis, Brexit, and financial 
crises within member states.
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1.1.2. Arctic Background
Germany's political-economic engagement in the Arctic region is rather new and has been 
renewed through the German Arctic Policy Guidelines published in 2013, acknowledging the 
increasing strategic importance of the region. These Policy Guidelines cover climate change, 
environmental protection, and polar research, but more explicitly they cover geo-economic 
opportunities in the Arctic. The Arctic attracts Germany through its immense hydrocarbon 
reserves and new shipping routes developing due to melting sea ice. The main driving force 
behind Germany's renewed interest in the region seems to be the opportunities and challenges 
deriving from the changes underway in the region.
Germany does not have direct access to the coast or waters of the Arctic region and therefore 
does not possess any legal rights to the development of the Arctic continental shelf. 
Nevertheless, Germany has engaged in polar research for well over a century and can reflect on 
a long polar history. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the famous German 
cartographer August Petermann laid the foundation for German polar research that took place 
150 years ago during the age of exploration in the Arctic. Germany's Arctic interest continued 
into the twentieth century with the age of polar heroes, driven by fascination and the urge for 
exploration and discovery, but mostly pursuit of research in the natural sciences. After WWII, 
Germany lost its military power, and its nationalism died, so there was a need to develop a new 
role in international Arctic policies. Germany did so by emphasizing economic cooperation, 
foreign exploration and scientific collaboration as well as diplomatic connections and bi- and 
multi-lateral treaties. Germany has been committed in various ways to providing the 
international community with relevant data to gain an understanding of the climate system as 
well as with analysis of future developments of the polar region.
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Germany is a long-standing permanent Observer in the AC, has close relationships with all 
Arctic states, and is in economic terms closely connected to many countries in the region 
(especially Norway and Russia). For many decades Germany has seen the Arctic primarily as 
a region of global climate change developments. Therefore, other actors have viewed Germany 
only as an Arctic stakeholder in terms of polar research and in the context of its leadership role 
in efforts to mitigate climate change. Only in late 2013 did the German government officially 
become more interested in the region, by publishing its Arctic Policy Guidelines, entitled 
“Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.” Consequently, Germany's Arctic activities 
shifted to include economic interests, as well. As an Observer in the AC Germany has always 
advocated cooperation in research in order to analyze the drivers and consequences of climate 
change.
This thesis investigates Germany's historical and current interests in the Arctic. It considers 
Germany's expeditions in and research on the Arctic from the beginning of the seventeenth 
century with the era of whale hunting, to the present, with special focus on Germany's role as 
an Observer in the AC. For centuries, Germany, although a non-Arctic country, has been 
actively engaged in Arctic exploration and research, and its participation as an Observer in the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and the AC is an outgrowth of this history. 
Furthermore, the thesis investigates Germany's behavior in the Arctic and analyses whether it 
aligns with the theory of neoliberal institutionalism and whether therefore Germany exerts soft 
power and influences the region.
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1.2. Thesis Structure
The thesis is structured in five chapters. Following the introductory Chapter, which provides a 
general overview of Germany's political and Arctic background, Chapter Two introduces the 
topic of my thesis, states the problem and presents the research question. This second chapter 
builds the theoretical framework used in the thesis to support the findings. I introduce the 
international relations theory of neoliberal institutionalism. In this second Chapter I further 
elaborate on my research methods, clarifying my qualitative and historical data analysis. 
Chapter Three relates and analyzes Germany's historic interest in the Arctic from the 
seventeenth century to WWII. This chapter is followed by a comprehensive overview of 
Germany's contemporary interests in the Arctic. Today's interests are divided into several 
subchapters, such as resources, shipping, economic, environmental and political interests. 
Chapter Five analyzes the data through the lens of neoliberal institutionalism, to determine 
whether this theory can explain Germany's engagement in the Arctic through its Observer status 
in the Arctic Council. The Summary and Conclusion chapter concludes this chapter.
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework
2.1. Introduction of neoliberalism theory
One of the most dominant and widely used theories to analyze international relations is 
liberalism. This thesis uses neoliberal institutionalism to analyze and explain Germany's pursuit 
of its interests in the Arctic, as viewed through its Observer status in the Arctic Council.
John Hobson defines neoliberalism as an approach that views sovereign states as rational actors 
that try to increase their own long-term interests by creating international regimes that enhance 
their global state power.1 Arthur Stein describes neoliberal institutionalism as a “view of 
international institutions as the self-interested creations of states.” As autonomous self­
interested behavior of states can cause conflict, states prefer to construct international 
institutions to deal with numerous concerns. States may also create institutions in order to 
reduce the transaction costs associated with autonomous decision-making.2
1 John M. Hobson, The State and the International Relations. Themes in International Relations (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 104.
2 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism,” in The Oxford Handbook on International Relations, ed. 
Christian Reus-Smit, and Duncan Snidal (Oxford University Press: 2008), 209.
Garry Nagtzaam uses neoliberal institutionalism theory to analyze the making of environmental 
treaty regimes. Even though the AC is generally not considered a regime and cannot pass 
treaties, it is a high-level intergovernmental forum focusing on creating environmental and 
sustainable development standards and norms. As the theory of neoliberal institutionalism is 
often used to analyze international environmental agreements, or regimes, this theory is suitable 
for this thesis, as certain principles and norms within these environmental agreements influence 
the behavior of actors and facilitate cooperation. Nagtzaam states that neoliberal 
institutionalism focuses on intergovernmental negotiations, institution building and regime 
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effectiveness through cooperation. Strategic negotiations between states require cooperation to 
solve mutual problems. According to Garry Nagtzaam, neoliberals regard the state as the main 
focus of regime analysis, with special focus on state interests that shape negotiation processes. 
Furthermore, theorists argue that nation-state activities, such as the creation of international 
organizations, advance states' interests.3
3 Gerry Nagtzaam, The Making of International Environmental Treaties. Neoliberal and Constructivist Analyses 
of Normative Evolution (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), 3-4, 48, 28-29.
4 Robert Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” International Security 
24, no. 1 (1999): 43.
5 Srini Sitaraman, State participation in international treaty regimes (London, New York: Routledge, 2016).
6 Jervis, “Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate,” 45.
7 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 54.
The theory of neoliberal institutionalism is largely based on the assumption that the absence of 
a sovereign authority, which could enforce binding international agreements, incentivizes states 
to pursue their own interests.4 Neoliberal institutionalism accepts that states are rational actors 
and that the international system is anarchic. Neoliberals contend that within the international 
system, states worry about other states taking advantage of them in a state of anarchy.5 
Therefore, neoliberals argue that states “work together to mitigate the effects of anarchy, 
produce mutual gains, and avoid shared harm.”6
In his book After Hegemony, Robert Keohane, one of the leading scholars of neoliberal 
institutionalism, develops a theory of cooperation through international institutions in global 
politics. He describes states as rational egoists, who generally wish to maximize their gains 
from any transaction, while minimizing costs. He claims that discord prevails as often as 
harmony in global politics. According to Keohane, “Without the spectre of conflict, there is no 
need to cooperate.”7 Institutions, rules, and regulations allow for cooperation by decreasing 
transaction costs and increasing the credibility of state arrangements. Neoliberal 
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institutionalists are concerned with the concepts of power and self-interest in the international 
system; they therefore expect states to establish institutions if they believe they will benefit 
from cooperation.
According to Keohane, neoliberal institutionalism clarifies questions about the impact of 
institutions, such as patterns in cooperation and discord. The actors, such as states, must have 
common interests and must believe they will gain from the cooperation, or they will not 
collaborate. As a result, cooperation depends on the institutional arrangement. Keohane defines 
institutions as a set of rules that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activities, and shape 
expectations. International institutions therefore specify how interests are defined and how 
actions are interpreted. On the other hand, domestic interests can trump incentives to engage in 
international institutions. He clarifies: the “open international economic environment, 
characterized by opportunities for mutually rewarding exchange under orderly sets of rules, 
provides incentives for peaceful behavior, but not that it necessitates or ensures such behavior. 
That is, cooperation must be distinguished from harmony. Cooperation is not automatic, but 
requires planning and negotiation.”8
8 Robert O. Keohane, “Neoliberal Institutionalism A perspective on world politics,” in International institutions 
and state power: essays in international relations theory, ed. Robert O. Keohne (London: Westview Press, 1989), 
8.
9 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence,” International Organization 41, no. 4 
(1987): 728, 732.
According to Keohane and Nye, international regimes consist of a set of governing 
arrangements that affect interdependent relationships through which governments regulate and 
control transnational and interstate relations.9 Interdependence between states and institutional 
arrangements are believed to facilitate cooperation “by raising the anticipated costs of violating 
others' property rights, by altering transaction costs through the clustering of issues, and by 
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providing reliable information to members.”10 Therefore regimes are considered to be efficient 
institutions and of value for states, because their rules and principles create bonds between state 
actors to reach mutually beneficial agreements, even though states might have conflicting or 
overlapping interests.11 Regimes facilitate agreements by providing rules, principles and 
procedures.12 Neoliberal institutionalism demonstrates that institutions can actually help in 
resolving problems and come to mutually beneficial outcomes, especially because increased 
globalization has led to more and more interdependence between states' economies, resulting 
in extensive networks of interdependence throughout the world.13
10 Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 97.
Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 97.
12 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” International Regimes 36, no. 2 (1982): 354.
13 Robert Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye, “Globalization: What's New? What's Not? (And So What?),” Foreign 
Policy 118 (2000): 114, 117.
14 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International 
Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 513, 520.
For neoliberals, state preferences are a fundamental cause of state behavior in world politics. 
To motivate conflict, cooperation, or any other costly foreign policy action, states must possess 
sufficiently intense state preferences. Each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under 
varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states. The relationship of states to the 
social context, national or international, have a fundamental impact on state behavior. Societal 
ideas, interests, and institutions influence behavior by shaping state preferences. For liberals, 
the configuration of state preferences is one of the most important matters in world politics.14
Policy interdependence, which refers to the distribution and interaction of preferences, explains 
the link between state preferences and the behavior of other states. Patterns of interdependent 
preferences belong among the most fundamental structures influencing state behavior. Andrew 
Moravcsik defines policy interdependence as “the set of costs and benefits created for foreign 
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societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences.”15 Arthur 
Stein explains that a state's concern that other states would cheat on agreements, can be 
counterbalanced by creating interdependence among states and setting up institutional 
arrangements to facilitate cooperation and find common preferred outcomes.16
15 Andrew Moravcsik, “The new liberalism,” in The Oxford Handbook on International Relations, ed. Christian 
Reus-Smit, and Duncan Snidal (Oxford University Press, 2008): 239.
16 Arthur A. Stein, “Neoliberal Institutionalism,” 208.
17 Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 520-521.
18 Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 521.
19 Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 75, 103.
According to liberal theory, patterns of interdependent state preferences pose a binding 
constraint on state behavior. When state preferences are compatible with those of other states, 
there is a strong incentive for peaceful coexistence, but when underlying state preferences are 
zero-sum or deadlocked, and impose costs on other countries, there is a high potential for 
interstate tension and conflict.17 When issues are conflictual enough to motivate willingness to 
accept high costs and risks, and therefore there is an improvement of the welfare of both parties 
involved, states have an incentive to negotiate policy coordination.18
Keohane argues that in repeated games, where actors have reciprocal contact with each other 
in the future, such a course of action invites retaliation, and it is better for players to cooperate. 
As a result, actors learn to cooperate for mutual benefit. In the prisoner's dilemma game, 
institutions can resolve the common action problem and allow states to reach mutually preferred 
outcomes. If governments fail to comply with the rules, other governments will observe their 
behavior and perhaps take regulatory action, which would damage not only the mutually 
beneficial set of arrangements but also the violator's reputation, and thus their ability to make 
future agreements.19 In short, neoliberals believe that the problem of the prisoner's dilemma 
game can be overcome when games are played repeatedly.
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The behavior of states is therefore not just directed at attaining relative gains but on absolute 
gains (win-win scenario). To achieve gains most states will find they will have to cooperate. 
Cooperation does not necessarily imply harmony, but can also arise out of discord, along with 
the shared belief “that cooperation may take the form of bilateral and multilateral treaties, 
informal agreements, delegation to formal inter-governmental institutions.”20 Therefore 
cooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or organization be brought in 
conformity with one another through a process of negotiation.21 As a result state actors have to 
choose whether to comply and cooperate based on the cost/benefit analysis. State actors often 
try to change their own national preferences through joint scientific research or cultural and 
political exchanges with other actors. As a result, state actors exchange information with other 
actors, “but also their shared beliefs with respect to equilibrium behavior; they change their 
preferences over courses of actions even if their underlying preferences are stable.”22 Neoliberal 
institutionalists believe that cooperation will not occur if states do not have common interest. 
However only having a common interest is not enough to establish cooperation; institutions 
that reduce uncertainty are also necessary.
20 Keohane, and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 256.
21 Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 51.
22 Duncan Snidal, “Rational Choice and International Relations,” Handbook of International Relations (2012):
84.
23 Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” 346.
One reason that international institutions facilitate cooperation is their ability to provide 
information to states. According to Keohane, governments have to open up to one another, 
because international policy coordination and the development of international regimes depend 
not merely on interests and power but on expectations and information. A regime is effective if 
it provides high-quality information to policy makers.23 Therefore information mainly removes 
the problem of uncertainty that states have about others. When examining regimes, neoliberal 
institutionalists argue that norms are an essential part of what constitutes a regime and that 
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norms and principles are the main component of a regime, prescribing state behavior.24 Norms 
therefore shape states' behavior by “matching actors' interests and therefore by serving as a 
“resource” through which to assert their interests.”25
24 Donald Puchala, and Raymond Hopkins, “International Regimes. Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” 
International Regime 36, no. 2 (1982): 247.
25 Henning Boekle, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, “Norms and Foreign Policy: Constructivist 
Foreign Policy Theory,” Tnbinger Arbeitspapiere zur Internationalen Politik und Friedensforschung 34a 
(1999): 7.
26 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power, The means to success in world politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 5, 7.
27 Nye, Soft Power, The means to success in world politics, 31-32.
28 Keohane, After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 243.
Keohane describes soft power as “the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behavior 
of others,” which suggests that it is important to attract others in world politics, and not only to 
force them by threatening military force or economic sanctions. Soft power relies on an 
attraction to shared values to engender cooperation.26 According to Keohane the soft power of 
a country relies on three resources: its cultures, its political values, and its foreign politics. In 
the future soft power will increase, and the countries gaining most soft power are those “with 
multiple channels of communication that help to frame issues, whose dominant culture and 
ideas are closer to prevailing global norm, and whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic 
and international values and policies.”27
Robert Keohane describes another way of achieving mutual policy adjustment: hegemony. He 
states that hegemonic power is widely accepted, by establishing and maintaining international 
regimes that serve their own interests while being compatible with the interests of others.28 
Hegemony reduces transaction and mitigates uncertainty, because hegemony is expected to 
ensure consistency for the system as a whole. As a result, the formation of international regimes 
can ensure legitimacy for the standards of behavior, which hegemony plays a key role in 
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maintaining.29 Hegemony therefore helps to create shared interests by providing rewards for 
cooperation and punishment for defection.30
29 Keohane, After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 138.
30 Keohane, After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 78.
31 Kathrin Keil, “The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas. Cooperation and Conflict,” 
SAGE Journals 49, no. 2 (2014): 162, 164
To summarize, neoliberal institutionalism assumes that all individuals and states are rational 
actors that regulate their relations in a world that is characterized by mutual interdependence. 
Peace, freedom, and economic growth can be achieved through cooperation for the common 
good, especially by increased international cooperation among states, regimes, or individual 
actors. The neoliberal institutionalist theory assumes that states benefit from cooperation and 
enjoy absolute gains.
The theory of neoliberal institutionalism has strong explanatory power regarding Germany's 
interest in the Arctic. In an article addressing the potential that oil and gas development pose 
for both cooperation and conflict in the Arctic, Kathrin Stephen notes the currency of neoliberal 
institutionalism theory in international relations discourse on the Arctic. She observes that the 
theory often is used to analyze environmental treaties or regimes in general, and given the 
increasing stakes in Arctic resources, it applies especially well.31 The AC is the main body 
enabling regional cooperation and policy coordination among Arctic states. The theory of 
neoliberal institutionalism also recognizes the importance of actors other than states, such as 
the AC.
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2.2. Introduction of realism theory
In addition to neoliberal institutionalism, several realist theories explain state behavior and 
interstate relations. Each of them sees states as the central actors in world affairs and emphasizes 
that they coexist in an anarchic social order where there is no central authority to protect them 
from one another. According to John Mearsheimer, an American political scientist and 
international relations scholar, who belongs to the realist school of thought, the principal 
emphasis in realism is on security competition among great powers within the anarchy of the 
international system. In this system, survival is the main goal. Hence, states seek to balance 
power and “compete among themselves either to gain power at the expense of others or at least 
to make sure they do not lose power.”32 In this structure of the international system, states have 
no other choice in order to survive; otherwise, they cannot pursue any other goal such as 
economic benefit or protecting human rights.33 Joseph Grieco states that international anarchy 
fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even 
when they share common interests.34 Stephen Walt argues that realists emphasize the “enduring 
propensity for conflict between states.” He further states that realism provides an explanation 
for war, which is an obstacle to cooperation, because it emphasis on competition.35
32 John J. Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity
Third Edition, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: University Press 2013), 75.
33 Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism”, 75.
34 Jospeh M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal
Institutionalism,” International Organizations 42, no. 3 (1988): 485.
35 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policies 110, Special 
Editions: Frontiers of Knowledge (1998): 30-31.
36 Stephen M. Walt, “Realism and Security,” Oxford Printed Encyclopedia of International Studies (2017): 1.
For realists, the insecurity of states poses the central problem in international relations. In the 
anarchic system, “self-help” is therefore the primary motivation; states must be able to protect 
themselves, as there is no other agency, institution, or actor that can help instead.36 Realism 
does not imply that states cannot form alliances or cooperate if these alliances are useful for 
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dealing with threats or any kind of conflict. According to Walt, realists see intuitions as “tools 
of statecraft” used to advance specific security interests. As a result, for realists, institutions 
“are largely epiphenomenal: they reflect the underlying balance of power and the interests of 
the most powerful states.”37 Therefore, states have no choice but to put their own interests ahead 
of the interests of other states or institutions. As a result, states will balance against any state 
becoming too powerful. For example, a balance of power took place during WWII: When 
Germany became too powerful and occupied other parts of Europe, other alliances stepped in 
and defeated Germany.38
37 Walt, “Realism and Security,” 12, 16.
38 Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” 75.
39 Zachary Karabell, “A cold war is coming, and it isn't China's fault,” Foreign Policy (October 31, 2018), 
accessed January 16, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/31/a-cold-war-is-coming-and-it-isnt-chinas-fault.
In order to analyze Germany's behavior in the Artic and the AC, both realism and neoliberal 
institutionalism are suitable to use as theoretical framework. They are the dominating 
international relations theories, and they can provide explanations regarding state behavior. The 
explanations of realism and neoliberal institutionalism are distinctly different, however, which 
facilitates determining which better interprets Germany's activities in the Arctic. Nowadays 
some scholars fear the return of the Cold War in the world and in the Arctic, as a result of 
shifting political orders in the world.39 The new confrontation politics of the United States; 
human crises, such as the refugee crisis affecting Europe; and Brexit's potential impacts on 
Europe's economy all contribute to uncertainty and potential destabilization. Some scholars 
have already mentioned the “race for resources” in the Arctic, after Russia planted a flag at the 
bottom of the North Pole in 2007. These are all activities that realism would expect to happen.
On the other hand, cooperation has prevailed in the Arctic for decades and is one of the key 
elements of the success of the AC. Therefore, I am applying the theory of neoliberal 
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institutionalism to analyze to what extent this theory explains Germany's behavior in the Arctic. 
Furthermore, I am also looking at Germany's Arctic behavior through the lens of the theory of 
realism.
2.3. Application to the thesis
I analyze Germany's interest and behavior in the Arctic through the lens of neoliberal 
institutionalism and realism. I choose the theory of neoliberal institutionalism because it 
explains state behavior and state interaction while emphasizing cooperation. For centuries, 
Germany has shown a history of cooperation in the Arctic region in various areas. First 
Germany showed cooperative behavior in research and science, when participating in 
international expeditions. Since World War II, Germany has exhibited cooperative behaviors 
in foreign policy and nowadays it engages cooperatively in political and economic affairs in the 
Arctic. Germany is a forerunner regarding climate change, and its behavior serves as an 
example for others. It clearly states that it wants to take responsibility in the fight against global 
warming.
Showing a collaborative attitude towards the eight-member states of the Arctic Council does 
not keep Germany from taking an opposing stance to individual members on specific issues. 
This can be seen in Germany's perception of the Northwest Passage as an international strait. 
Canadian Arctic policy refers to the passage as the “Canadian Northwest Passage” and 
“Canadian internal waters.”40 The United States' Arctic policy, like Germany's, refers to the 
Northwest Passage as a “strait used for international navigation.”41 This disagreement poses an 
interesting conundrum: According to Rule 6 of Annex 2 to the Arctic Council Rules of 
40 Government of Canada, “Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy” (2017): 40, accessed January 30, 
2018, http://international.gc.ca/world-monde/assets/pdfs/canada_arctic_foreign_policy-eng.pdf.
41 George W. Bush, The White House, “National Security Presidential Directive 66, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 25: Arctic Region Policy,” III, B (Washington, January 12, 2009): 5, accessed January 30, 
2018), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did.
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Procedure, the applicant for Observer status should “recognize Arctic States' sovereignty, 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic,” which Germany violates on the question of the 
NWP.
Germany is a dominant political force in Europe and is Europe's biggest economy, globally 
well connected in terms of goods, services, and finance. As a result, Germany benefits from 
globalization and an open, free, and peaceful international political order. At the same time, 
Germany is also extremely dependent on the functioning of this order and therefore extremely 
vulnerable to the disruption of the international order and the free trade of goods and services. 
Nowadays, the international political order is under increased pressure due to numerous 
stresses, such as war, refugee and financial crises, as well as national political issues. Climate 
change further stresses the political order. Through the European Union and NATO, Germany 
is linked to Arctic security developments. Cooperation remains the central characteristic of 
Arctic politics, as reflected in Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines. As an Observer to the Arctic 
Council (AC), Germany has advocated cooperation in research to lay the groundwork for future 
sustainable political decisions. As a partner without any claims to resources in the Arctic region, 
Germany can use its international reputation in polar research to foster collaborative efforts, 
such as the multimillion-dollar MOSAiC project, to study global climate change.42
42 Seventeen countries will participate in this Multidisciplinary Drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic 
Climate (MOSAiC). This will be the first year-round expedition into the central Arctic exploring the Arctic climate 
system.
Neoliberal institutionalism therefore serves best as the theoretical lens through which I analyze 
Germany's Arctic interests. It focuses on states' pursuit of self-interests and on the importance 
of power structures. The theory holds specific expectations of state behavior. States pursue 
power and increase their security by several means, such as developing their militaries, 
20
increasing their national power through economic means, and seeking alliances. States are in a 
condition of complex interdependence with no clear hierarchy. Neoliberal institutionalism 
posits that international regimes like the AC reflect interest in cooperation rather than evoking 
conflict. Therefore, the following assumptions arise for this thesis:1) An opening Arctic would 
result in states pursuing resources and economic development to boost national power. 2) 
Cooperation is driven by the will to achieve a stable and consistent political environment, even 
though such cooperation might involve infringing on other states' sovereignty.
I evaluate Germany's behavior as an Arctic Council Observer, using neoliberal institutionalism 
theory's approach to cooperation and conflict. I aim to determine whether the theory explains 
Germany's presence and behavior in the Arctic. Applying neoliberal institutionalism, one can 
compose the following propositions regarding Germany's developing interest in the Arctic 
region and as an Observer in the Arctic Council: The AC as an international institution 
constrains competition and shapes cooperative behavior in the region for non-Arctic states, such 
as Germany. Germany participates in the Arctic Council because it is concerned with absolute 
economic gains; that is, based on rational self-interested behavior. Cooperation through the AC 
reduces transaction costs for Germany. I expect Germany to act in its own economic interest. 
Furthermore, I expect Germany to cooperate with other states to solve mutual problems and to 
produce benefits, especially in the field of research. Therefore, I expect Germany to pursue 
absolute gains; to achieve a win-win scenario, Germany must cooperate. German has a fast­
growing economy and is dependent on Arctic resources. As a result, Germany is forced to 
cooperate with states such as Russia for oil and gas, for instance. Neoliberal institutionalism 
assumes that economic interests are the driving force behind Arctic affairs. Therefore, I will 
consider whether Germany's economic interests in the Arctic represent a driving force for 
acting in the North.
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Besides the theory of neoliberal institutionalism, I also apply realism to evaluate Germany's 
behavior as an Arctic Council Observer and interest in the North. Realists see states as the 
central actors in world affairs, and they are preoccupied with power and security in order to 
survive in an anarchic system. Opposing neoliberal institutionalism, realists argue that 
cooperation and collaboration are unlikely and instead emphasize the prospect of conflict and 
competition. Germany has the strongest economy in Europe with a GDP (Gross Domestic 
Product) worth almost €3.300bn in 2017, accounting for over a fifth (21.3%) of EU GDP.43 
Germany needs access to Arctic resources, such as oil and gas and rare earth metals to remain 
competitive. Therefore, the theory of realism might explain Germany's interest in securing its 
own economic interest in the Arctic through resource development and stable trade in oil and 
gas with Russia and Norway. In a time of scarce resources, Germany has depended on these 
resources for its economy to function, and therefore clearly states in its Arctic Policy Guidelines 
how important free access to resources and stable trade is. Realists would assume that denied 
access to these important energy sources would result in a threat to Germany's economic and 
security interest and would therefore mean a breakdown of diplomacy. In the worst case, the 
whole Artic region might be threatened and military conflict might erupt. The German Arctic 
Policy Guidelines recognize these possible threats and state that overlapping interests of the 
Arctic countries could result in a geopolitical race for sovereignty rights, or rights to natural 
resources, which “would pose an economic, environmental and security policy threat to stability 
in the region and would also affect Europe's security interests.”44 However, the German 
Government tries to prevent conflicts through cooperation and coordination, which contradicts 
realism theory.
43 European Commission. Eurostat, “Which member states have the largest share of EU's GDP” (2018), 
accessed January 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20180511- 
1?inheritRedirect=true.
44 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities” 
(Berlin, 2013): 10, accessed July, 2018, 
https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/International/Leitlinien-
Arktispolitik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
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2.4. Research Design
The purpose of research is to discover answers to questions through the application of 
systematic procedures, specifically, to learn what drives Germany's engagement in the Arctic. 
According to Creswell “research designs are types of inquiry within qualitative, quantitative or 
mixed method approaches, that provide specific direction for procedures in a research 
design.”45 A research design is therefore a researcher's strategy and structure to answer his or 
her research question. This thesis was conducted as qualitative research based on primary and 
secondary sources. According to Creswell, “a qualitative research design is an approach for 
exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human 
problem. The process of research involves emerging questions and procedures, data typically 
collected in the participant's setting, data analysis inductively building from particulars to 
general themes, and the researcher making interpretations of the meaning of the data.”46 Lune 
and Berg explain that qualitative researchers seek answers by examining various social settings 
and the groups or individuals who inhabit these settings.47 Therefore qualitative researchers are 
most interested in how humans arrange themselves and their settings. I viewed these methods 
as the most suitable for the purpose of this thesis. Since my objective is to understand 
Germany's interest in the Arctic, I used qualitative methods. In this thesis, I discuss and apply 
the two international relations theories of neoliberal institutionalism and realism and collect 
qualitative data to test the explanatory value of these theories. Although I focus on the theory 
of neoliberal institutionalism, I consider whether and to what extent the theory of realism might 
explain Germany's behavior. Therefore, this thesis is a theory-driven thesis with analysis of 
45 John W. Creswell, Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. Fourth 
Edition (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014), 12.
46 Creswell, Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 4.
47 Howard Lune and Bruce L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science. Ninth Edition (New 
York: Pearson, 2017), 5.
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qualitative data. The research method involves data collection, literature analysis and 
interpretation, as well as interviews.
There are different characteristics of qualitative research, such as the emergent design. This 
means that the initial plan for the research cannot be tightly prescribed; some or all phases may 
change after the researcher enters the field and begins to collect data. Another characteristic is 
reflexivity. I am German, fully adapted to the culture and language, so my research might be 
influenced by my background. The third characteristic is the holistic account that tries to 
develop “a complex picture of problems or issues under study and involves reporting multiple 
perspectives, identifying many factors involved in a situation and sketching a larger picture that 
emerges,” according to Creswell.48 I consider multiple perspectives on Germany's interests, 
such as the view of polar explorers during the heroic age or today's interests of Germany's 
government, as well as Germany's role as an Observer in the Arctic Council.
48 Creswell, Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 186.
49 Mathew B. Miles, A Michael Hubermann and Johnny Saldana, Qualitative Data Analysis. A Methods 
Sourcebook. Third Edition (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2014), 11.
50 Lune and Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science, 168.
The strengths of the qualitative research method lie in flexibility, broadness and depth.49 
Qualitative research is a powerful tool as it provides more context, history and meaning than 
any other approach, as it uses multiple sources of data. Qualitative research opens the way for 
discovery and insights that might be pursued in subsequent studies. Furthermore, it provides a 
thorough understanding and analysis about an organization, in this case the AC. It is a useful 
technique for researching relationships, behaviors, and motivation in organizational settings.50
The quantitative method is mostly used to compare data in a systematic way and to identify 
overarching patterns, but I wanted to analyze Germany's behavior in the Arctic, therefore the 
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qualitative research is more suitable for this thesis. The qualitative method is used when a topic 
is new, or little research has been done. Furthermore, researchers use qualitative methods when 
they want people's perceptions and expertise on issues. I chose to conduct qualitative research 
owing to a dearth of information on Germany's interest in the Arctic in general and Germany's 
Observer role specifically. Little research has combined these topics including Germany's 
Arctic history. I am exploring an area that past studies have tended to overlook. Whereas the 
quantitative research takes an approach to theory, investigating a hypothesis and setting up 
strategy, the qualitative method focuses more on participants' behavior, and interviews, to 
understand and analyze experience, ideas and values.51
51 Creswell, Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 54, 59, 64.
52 Creswell, Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 14.
53 Miles, Hubermann and Saldana, Qualitative Data Analysis. A Methods Sourcebook, 28-29.
I used the theories of neoliberal institutionalism and realism to guide me in the data collection 
process. The interviews I conducted and the literature I reviewed most closely corresponds with 
the theory of neoliberal institutionalism. Most of the reviewed literature confirm the cooperative 
behavior of Germany in the Arctic and the Arctic Council. Nevertheless, I remained open to 
learning more information that might fall outside the theoretical framework. In my thesis, I 
therefore, moved back and forth from multiple angles, such as German history, Germany's 
Arctic policy guidelines, Germany's interest of today and analyzing these from the perspective 
of neoliberal institutionalism.
2.5. Case Study
Researchers define the case study variously. Creswell describes a case study as “a design of 
inquiry in which researcher develops an in-depth analysis of a case, event, or process.”52 A case 
may also be defined as an organization, an event, period of time, space and environment.53
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Georg and Bennet describe the case study approach as “the detailed examination of an aspect 
of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to 
other event.”54 In my thesis, I am using the case of Germany to test the theories of neoliberal 
institutionalism and realism. Bogdan and Biklen define case study as a “detailed examination 
of one setting, or a single subject, a single depository of documents, or one particular event.”55 
Lune and Berg define case study a “method involving systematically gathering enough 
information about a particular person, social setting, event or group to permit the research 
effectively understand how the subject operates or functions.”56 Thus, the case study 
systematically investigates an event or a set of related events with the aim of describing and 
explaining these phenomena. Taken together, these various definitions suggest case study is an 
approach capable of examining simple or complex phenomena using analysis varying from 
single individuals to large institutions. The research approach involves an up close, in-depth 
and detailed examination of a subject of study, meaning it is limited in space and time.
54 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bannet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 5.
55 Robert. C. Bogdan and Sari Knopp Biklen, Qualitative Research Education. Fourth edition (Boston, MA: 
Allyn and Bacon, 2003), 54.
56 Lune and Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science, 160.
My research objective is to analyze Germany's interest in the Arctic. I therefore examined 
Germany's polar history with special focus on Germany's historical interests. I analyzed several 
historical events through the lens of historical interest in the region. Furthermore, I examined 
Germany's contemporary existence and projects in the high North. To interpret Germany's 
actions, I used a theoretical framework.
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2.6. Sources of Data
To conduct analysis within a case study, the researcher must collect detailed information using 
a variety of data collection procedures. My data has been acquired through several methods 
including a secondary literature review and a primary document review, including 
intergovernmental documents, scientific articles and reports from various non-governmental 
organizations. Primary sources in qualitative research refer to interviews, focus groups, diaries, 
participant observation, records, speeches and archives. Secondary sources, or document 
analysis, derived from books and academic articles and refer to research conducted earlier by 
other researchers or other purposes such as official statistics, records, statements and accounts. 
I read policy papers, official statements, and formal declarations, agreements and manuals to 
identify Germany's Arctic interests and approach to Arctic development and governance. I also 
searched media reports, press releases, expert articles and unofficial statements, and opinions 
to find different perspectives and narratives concerning current Arctic issues. By using a 
literature review, I integrated what others have said and done, tried to “build bridges between 
related topics and identified a central issue in the field,” as Creswell recommends.57
57 Creswell, Research Design. Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 28.
I have used multiple sources in German as well as books and articles written in English. The 
literature includes official documents from the AC as well as the German government, for 
instance, the German Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, I relied on 
published statements or speeches from conferences, for example the speech of former Foreign 
Minister Guido Westerwelle. I also analyzed more recent developments, especially regarding 
Germany's Observer role in the AC, through newspaper and peer reviewed journal articles, as 
well as video footage. To better understand the dimension of Germany's interest from a 
historical point of view, I read numerous books composed in old German writing. I visited the 
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archive of the AWI multiple times and spent several days looking through unpublished 
materials, including correspondence between officials. I had the privilege of using these 
unpublished documents and letters, which gave a better insight view on what German officials 
thought regarding recent developments in the Arctic during the time the AEPS and later the AC 
were founded. While visiting the archive I also spent days in the library trying to find original 
sources on German research and exploration in the Arctic. Especially helpful was the full 
collection of “Petermann's Mitteilungen” in the AWI archive. “Petermann's Mitteilungen” is 
the oldest German technical journal on geography; all significant geographical discoveries 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were published in this journal. Petermann 
analyzed quite well Germany's interest in the Arctic during the nineteenth century. His journals 
are all in German, so I translated any statements I used in the thesis. Furthermore, I read through 
the original diaries of Alfred Wegener to understand the motives behind his four expeditions to 
the North. The diaries can be found on the Internet. I also read the diary of Karl Koldewey, 
which is published in a book. I had the pleasure to meet Reinhard Krause, an expert on German 
polar history in person while visiting the AWI archive. Krause published numerous articles 
regarding Germany's polar history. I conducted my research on Google, at the library of the 
University of Alaska, on official websites (Arctic Council, German government), and at the 
AWI archive library.
2.7. Interviews
According to Lune and Berg, an interview is defined as “conversation with a purpose.” The 
purpose is to gather information.58 Interviews are particularly useful for gathering the story 
behind a participant's experiences and to further investigate his or her responses. Interviews 
offer researchers the opportunity to uncover in-depth information that is not otherwise 
58 Lune, and Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science, 55.
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accessible. In my case, much of the literature describes Observer behavior in the AC in general, 
but it is difficult to find an inside view on Observers' behavior, especially Germany's. I 
therefore decided to use in-depth, semi-structured interviews as a method to collect data with 
expert involved with German issues in the AC. I interviewed a German Government official59 
and Kathrin Stephen, who works for the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) 
and represents Germany in the AC in the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).
59 I contacted other officials, but no one else agreed to be interviewed.
I developed an interview protocol, where I used semi-standardized open-ended interviews, 
which involved the implementation of a number of predetermined questions on a special topic 
- Germany's behavior, interest and aim in the AC. Due to technical reasons and due to the wish 
of the interviewee, the interviews were not recorded. As the interviews were done in German, 
I later translated them into English.
The advantage of such interviews is that it provides presumably reliable qualitative data, as it 
offers the informants the freedom to give their own personal view and insight of a certain topic. 
Given that the interviews were conducted in German, there exists a risk of error or 
misinterpretation in my translation of the respondents' comments into English. Furthermore, 
respondents' comments will be shaped, to some degree, by the questions asked and the 
conventions about what they can speak about openly. Interviewees will only provide what they 
are prepared to reveal about their perceptions of events and opinions. Furthermore, this 
information might be subjective, as it is shaped by the perspective of the interviewee.
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2.8. Historical research
In order to analyze why Germany became an Observer from the founding of the AC, I analyze 
Germany's polar history with a special focus on Germany's interest in the Arctic. According to 
Lune and Berg, historical research is a method for discovering from numerous accounts what 
happened during the past and offering theoretical explanations for various historical events. 
Thus, historical research is “an attempt to understand and explain social life in historical settings 
as well as the historical context for our present. They elaborate: “Historical research is the study 
of the relationships among issues that have influenced the past, continue to influence the 
present, and will certainly affect the future.”60 Therefore the questions of the past gain relevance 
for questions in the present or future. This is exactly the case in my thesis, as I try to analyze 
Germany's past, thereby explaining its engagement in the Arctic and Arctic Council. As a 
result, the importance of historical research is not only the collection of information, but also 
the interpretation or analysis of the data, which will “uncover unknown aspects and seek 
implications of events from the past and their connections with the present,” as Lune and Berg 
explain.61
60 Lune and Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science, 149.
61 Lune and Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Science, 149.
To sum up, I used data from multiple sources. For the historical research, I mainly relied on 
books and original diaries. For Germany's contemporary interests, I mostly used journal articles 
and government papers. The German Arctic Policy Guidelines were very useful in analyzing 
Germany's behavior and interests in the Arctic and the AC. The two interviews I conducted, 
helped to further advance and confirm my research and data, that the journal articles already 
provided.
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2.9. Limitation
The thesis provides an overview of Germany's endeavors in the Arctic, beginning with the 
whaling period and finishing with its recent activities. The thesis does not cover every 
expedition to the North, nor does it cover every recent research program, or expedition of every 
institution concerning the Arctic. The thesis demonstrates that Germany is not a newcomer to 
the Arctic and has been active in the North for centuries.
Many historical documents used in this research are written in German. I am a native speaker 
of German and therefore fully comprehend these documents. I have translated all text quoted 
in this thesis. Research is often influenced by the author's own experience. My German 
background and experience may have led me to interpret documents differently than others 
would. For example, being German, I might see WWII differently than others. As climate 
protection is such a prevailing issue in Germany, I might take climate protection for granted. 
Access to information, especially historical documents, is often limited, due to censorship by 
officials. Moreover, a large portion of historical documents from WWII have been lost or 
destroyed. While visiting the AWI archive, I was given access to unpublished documents 
regarding letters and statements of AWI officials and ministries. Due to the German archive 
law, I was only allowed to view documents older than thirty years. More recent documents 
covering the last thirty years have not yet been made available to the public. Another limitation 
regarding historical research is the fact that besides diaries, historical documents are often 
shaped and interpreted by others. As I only conducted two interviews, they did not serve as a 
foundation or fundamental basis for my thesis, they only served as an add-on to confirm 
previous found data.
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2.10. Definition of Germany
When using the term “Germany” or “German” before WWII, this thesis considers activities and 
ideas that have emerged from the German-speaking world. Expressed in geographical political 
categories, this means that the term German is not limited to the imperial borders of 1871, but 
rather to the boundaries of all countries of the German Confederation of 1848. After World War 
II Germany was divided into the Federal Republic of Germany and German Democratic 
Republic. Since reunification in 1990 the country is known as the Federal Republic of Germany, 
or shortly Germany. Besides one short paragraph, where I explain East Germany's Arctic 
engagement, I use “Germany” after WWII to refer to the Federal Republic of Germany or West 
Germany.
2.11. Definition of the Arctic
The Arctic may be considered a single region, but it cannot be unambiguously defined. Relevant 
criteria to define the boundaries of the Arctic include geographic, climatic or biological factors, 
as well as political borders.
The most basic and common geographical definition is often delimited by the Arctic Circle 
(66°33'N). A second means to define the region is on the basis of temperature. In this way, the 
Arctic comprises the area north of the 10° C July isotherm. Isotherm is understood as a line of 
geographical locations that have the same or equal temperatures, in this case mean July 
temperature of 10°C. A third definition focuses on the northern tree line. The tree line is the 
northern limit beyond which trees do not grow, it is a transition zone between continuous boreal 
forest and tundra. Another geographical definition focuses on the permafrost line. According 
to this definition the Arctic region comprises all territory that is permanently frozen. Each 
definition on its own usually excludes regions which should be included and comprises areas 
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which should be excepted. Therefore in this thesis, I will apply the definition of the Arctic 
Council's (AC) Arctic monitoring and assessment program (AMAP), which covers all oceans 
and territories to the north of the Arctic Circle, and north of 62°N in Asia and 60°N in North 
America, and modified to include the marine areas north of the Aleutian chain, Hudson Bay, 
and parts of the North Atlantic Ocean including the Labrador Sea.62 This definition connects 
well with the aim to comprehensively explore the interdependencies and cooperation between 
Arctic and non-Arctic states, global developments, and the region's transformation as this 
definition includes all Arctic states and inhabitants of the region. Second, it recognizes the 
region's interdependence with global dynamics and other parts of the world. Third, it allows to 
investigate different issue areas (environmental, economic and political) at the same time.
62 Janine J. Murray, “Physical/Geographical Characteristics of the Arctic,” AMAP Assessment Report, Arctic 
pollution issues (1998): 9-10.
63 Wanda Oesau, Hamburgs Gronlandfahrt auf Walfischfang und Robbenschlag vom 17. - 19. Jahrhundert. 
(Glücksstadt: J.J. Augustin, 1955); Wanda Oesau, Schleswig-Holsteins Gronlandfahrt auf Walfischfang und 
Robbenschlag vom 17. - 19. Jahrhundert (Glücksstadt: J.J. Augustin, 1937).
2.12. Literature Review
The literature I used can be divided into three main categories, books, journals and official 
government papers. For the historical chapters of the thesis, I mainly used historical books in 
the form of diaries. For the analysis of Germany's engagement in the Arctic Council, journal 
articles and official government papers formed the bulk of my resources.
Wanda Oesau wrote two important books about whaling in the Arctic region. She clearly 
explains and defines the expeditions going North, with detailed descriptions of the shipping 
companies and the ships.63 Many other historical books I used were diaries written by the 
explorers themselves. On the Internet archives of the Alfred-Wegener-Institute, I found the 
diaries of the Denmark Expedition from 1906/08 from polar explorer Alfred Wegener published 
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by Reinhard Krause.64 His diary entries have been supported by the book from Mott Greene, 
who wrote a thorough portrait of the scientist Alfred Wegener.65
64 Reinhard A Krause, Alfred Wegener (1880-1930). Tagebuch vom 24. Juni 1906 bis zum 6. August 1908 mit 
sieben Anhängen geführt wαhrend der danischen Nordost-Gronland-Expedition (Danmark-Expedition) unter der 
Führung von Ludvig Mylius-Erichsen (1872-1907), accessed January 2018, http:// 
hdl.handle.net/10013/epic.48063.
65 Mott T. Green, Alfred Wegener, Science, Exploration, and the Theory of Continental Drift (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2015).
66 Karl Koldewey, Die erste deutsche Nordpolar-Expedition im Jahre 1868 beschrieben von K. Koldewey. Mit 
einem Vorwort von A. Petermann (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1871); Karl Koldewey, The German Arctic Expedition 
of 1869-70 and Narrative of the Wreck of the Hansa in the Ice (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Low & Searle, 
1874).
67 August Petermann, Mittheilungen aus der Justus Perthes ’ Geographischer Anstalt über wichtige neue 
Erforschungen auf dem Gesammtgebiete der Geographie von Dr. A. Petermann 11. Band. (Gotha: Justus 
Perthes,1865); August Petermann. Mittheilungen aus der Justus Perthes ’ Geographischer Anstalt über wichtige 
neue Erforschungen auf dem Gesammtgebiete der Geographie von Dr. A. Petermann. 17. Band (Gotha: Justus 
Perthes,1871); August Petermann. August. Mittheilungen aus der Justus Perthes’ Geographischer Anstalt, 
Ergdnzungsheft Nr. 179, H, Philipp, Ergebnisse der W. Filchnerschen Vorexpedition nach Spitzbergen (Gotha: 
Justus Perthes, 1914).
68 David Thomas Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World, A History, 1870-1940 (London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2002).
The same is true for the expeditions of Karl Koldewey, who conducted the first German 
expeditions to the North and kept journals on his experience that were published in two books, 
German - and English.66 Very helpful for the analysis of the expeditions have been Petermann’s 
Mitteilungen, which was the oldest German-language journal specialized in geography in which 
all important geographical discoveries of the 19th and 20th centuries were published.67 Arctic 
expeditions comprised only a small part in Petermann’s Mitteilungen, but this journal 
interpreted expeditions and put them in a geopolitical, geo-strategic and historical context.
Another book covering German polar history upon which I relied heavily is historian David 
Murphy's German Exploration of the Polar World, A History, 1870-1940.68 Murphy analyzed 
the endeavors of well-known German explorers, such as Erich von Drygalski, Alfred Wegener, 
and Wilhelm Filchner, and their expeditions. Murphy emphasizes the hardships German 
explorer faced in the Arctic, and their courage, and puts them in the context of the corresponding 
political regimes. According to Murphy, German explorers started the race for polar glory 
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driven by interlocking motivations, such as personal fame, the romance of the unknown, and 
the vision of wealth at the poles. Furthermore, Murphy explains the perceptions of the German 
public, government and scientific community towards Germany's repeated expeditions at the 
poles. Hugo Eckener, who was a commander of the Zeppelin, provides a fascinating treatment 
of the Zeppelin journeys.69 His memories are a testimony of German aviation history, as 
Eckener himself was the driving force behind the achievement of the airship, having succeeded 
Zeppelin in the enterprise. Reinhard Krause, a science historian working at the German polar 
research institute AWI, whom I met while conducting research in the archives of the AWI, 
published numerous articles on German polar history. For this thesis, I especially relied on his 
article “International Polar Year 1882-1883 digitized meteorological data legacy”70 to 
familiarize myself with the significance of the International Polar Year. Also helpful was the 
work of Cornelia Lüdecke, a German polar researcher, author and professor at the University 
of Hamburg, and one of the leading figures in the history of German polar research, who wrote 
her dissertation on German explorer Eric von Drygalski, a minor figure in the Arctic, who 
specialized more in Antarctic expeditions.71 The journalist Klaus Fleischmann published a book 
titled Zu den Kaltepolen der Erde,72 which chronically traces West and East Germany's 
engagement in the Arctic after WWII to the present, which was helpful.
69 Hugo Eckener, Im Zeppelin über Länder und Meere, Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen (München: Mobiles 
Verlag, 1949).
70 Reinhard A. Krause, Hannes Grobe and Rainer Sieger, “International Polar Year 1882-1883 - the digitized 
meteorological data legacy,” WDC-Mare Reports 0008 (2010).
71 Cornelia Ludecke, Die deutsche Polarforschung seit der Jahrhundertwende und der Einfluss Erich von 
Drygalski (Munchen: Kamloth, 1995).
72 Klaus Fleischmann, Zu den Kaltepolen der Erde - 50 Jahre deutsche Polarforschung (Bielefeld: Delius, 
Klasing & Co. KG, 2005).
Franz Selinger recounts in his two books Germany's Arctic history during WWII: Von Nanok 
bis Eismitte, meteorologische Unternehmungen in der Arktis 1940-1945 and Wetterflieger in 
der Arktis 1940-1944, Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen der Wettererkundungs-Staffeln im Hohen
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Norden.73 He describes the various weather reconnaissance squadrons in the North and the work 
in the stationary meteorological sites, as well as the floating weather buoys. Wilhelm Dege, the 
leader of the last active German weather station code named “Operation Haudegen,” describes 
in War North of 80, The last German Arctic Weather Station of World War II,74 not only the 
mission and the weather observation program, but also the recreational activities, hopes and 
fears of his team until they finally surrendered in September 1945.
73 Franz Selinger and Werner Schwerdtfeger, Wetterflieger in der Arktis 1940-1944, Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen 
der Wettererkundungs-Staffeln im Hohen Norden (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1982);
Franz Selinger, Von Nanok bis Eismitte, meteorologische Unternehmungen in der Arktis 1940-1945 (Hamburg: 
Convent Verlag, 2001).
74 Wilhelm Dege, War North of 80, The last German Arctic Weather Station of World War II (Colorado: 
University Press of Colorado, 2004).
75 Piotr Graczyk, “Poland and the Arctic: Between Science and Diplomacy,” Arctic Yearbook (2012).
76 Timo Koivurova, “Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty - Evaluation and a New Proposal,” Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law 17, no. 1 (2008);
Timo Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic 
Governance,” Polar Record 46, no. 2 (2009).
77 Margaret Blunden, “Geopolitics and the northern sea route,” International Affaires 88, no. 1 (2012);
Heather Exner-Pirot, Lassi Heininen, and Joel Plouffe, “Change and Innovation in the Arctic. Introduction,”
Arctic Yearbook (2013); Oran R. Young, “Arctic Governance - Pathways to the Future,” Arctic Review on Law 
The literature after WWII deals with the foundation of the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy (AEPS), followed by the foundation of the Arctic Council. Few articles describe the 
original participation process of non-Arctic states to become involved in the Observer role of 
the AEPS and the AC. In his article “Poland and the Arctic: Between Science and 
Diplomacy,”75 Piotr Graczyk touches on this process, while focusing on Poland's experience.
Very few articles analyze Germany's role and interest in the Arctic as an Observer. Most articles 
address the non-Arctic states as a whole. Timo Koivurova, director and research professor at 
the Arctic Centre, University of Lapland wrote well-known articles regarding Arctic 
governance, with special focus on the Arctic Council, and the challenges it faces.76 I further 
relied on publications by other well-known Arctic scholars, such as Blunden, Exner-Pirot, 
Lassi, and Young.77 Germany's role as an Observer in the Arctic Council is changing, because 
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new rules for Observers have been implemented, putting various new limitations on Observers. 
Sebastian Knecht published an article “Exploring Different levels of Stakeholder Activity in 
International Institutions: Late Bloomers, Regular Visitors, And Overachievers in Arctic 
Council Working Groups,”78 wherein he analyzes participation levels by various actors in the 
AC, with special focus on Observer states' attendance. He discovered that Germany sent no 
delegation to AC meetings for most the time between 1998 and 2015.
and Politics 1, no. 2 (2010); Oran R. Young, “The Arctic in Play: Governance in a Time of Rapid Change,” The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 24 (2009).
78 Sebastian Knecht, “Exploring Different levels of Stakeholder Activity in International Institutions: Late 
Bloomers, Regular Visitors, And Overachievers in Arctic Council Working Groups,” in Governing Arctic 
Change. Global Perspectives, ed. Kathrin Keil, and Sebastian Knecht (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
79 Smieszek Malgorzata, and Paula Kankaanpaa, “Observer States' Commitments to the Arctic Council: The 
Arctic Policy Documents of the United Kingdom and Germany as case Study,” The Yearbook of the Polar Law 6 
(2015).
80 Helga Haftendorn, “The case for Arctic governance: the Arctic puzzle,” University of Iceland, Institute of 
International Affairs, Centre for Arctic Policy Studies (2013), accessed January 5, 2018, 
http://ams.hi.is/sites/ams.hi.is/files/thecaseforarcticgovernance.pdf.
Another article that addresses Germany as an Observer specifically is Małgorzata Smieszek 
and Paula Kankaanpää's “Observer States' Commitments to the Arctic Council: The Arctic 
Policy Documents of the United Kingdom and Germany as Case Study.”79 This article focuses 
on the German Arctic Policy Guidelines and examines these guidelines in accordance with the 
Nuuk Declaration, and in comparison, with the British guidelines. Helga Haftendorn, a 
Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the Freie Universitat Berlin (FU Berlin), wrote 
numerous articles regarding Arctic governance and Germany's position in the Arctic in 
particular. She analyzed Germany's dependence on Arctic resources and its resulting 
vulnerability. In her article, “The case for Arctic governance: The Arctic puzzle,”80 she argues 
that the various challenges of climate change the Arctic faces today can only be mitigated 
through cooperation and adequate institutions. Haftendorn describes Germany's Observer 
position as first being that of a “bystander” and later becoming an Arctic player thanks to the 
infrastructure of the AWI and Germany's involvement in Arctic science. Steinicke wrote his 
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dissertation on Germany's Arctic engagement from a climatic, economic, and geopolitical view 
of the Arctic. In his dissertation Germany's Arctic Engagement - Between Environmental 
Responsibilities and Geo-Economic Interests,81 he analyzes Germany's interests in the Arctic 
and emphasizes that they are driven by international and domestic developments, such as 
economic needs.
81 Stefan Steinicke, “Germany's Arctic Engagement - Between Environmental Responsibilities and Geo-
Economic Interests” (PhD diss., Universitat der Bundeswehr, 2017).
82 Cecile Pelaudeix and Thierry Rodon, “The European Union Arctic Policy and National Interests of France and
Germany: Internal and External Policy Coherence at Stake?” Northern Review 37 (2014).
83 Kathrin Keil, “The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The case of oil and gas. Cooperation and Conflict,” 
SAGE Journal 49, no. 2 (2014).
Pelaudeix and Thierry's article The European Union Arctic Policy and National Interests of 
France and Germany: Internal and External Policy Coherence at Stake?82 addresses, as the 
title states, European Union Arctic Policy and the national interests of France and Germany. 
The EU is struggling to become an Arctic player as their application to gain permanent Observer 
status in the AC was put on hold, as a result of Brussels' approval of a ban on seal products. 
Germany on the other hand, established its own Arctic policies. Pelaudeix and Thierry conclude 
that the EU is searching for its new role in Arctic governance right now, especially with new 
powerful actors like Asian states entering the geopolitics and geo-economics of the Arctic.
Kathrin Stephen, Scientific Project Leader at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies 
(IASS) in Potsdam and part of the German Observer delegation to the Sustainable Development 
Working Group (SDWG) of the Arctic Council, supported this research through her 
publications and an interview. In one of her articles “The Arctic: A new region of conflict? The 
case of oil and gas. Cooperation and Conflict,”83 she describes the neorealist and neoliberal 
institutionalist explanations for the state and future of the Arctic region. She analyses the 
various levels of interest in the North by stakeholders and the likelihood of confrontation over
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Arctic resources and institutional adjustments. In another article, “German Involvement in the 
Arctic: Policy Issues and Scientific Research,”84 she describes various means of German 
engagement in the High North, such as science, politics, and interdisciplinary collaboration.
84 Kathrin Keil, “German Involvement in the Arctic: Policy Issues and Scientific Research,” The Arctic Institute 
(IASS) (Potsdam, 2015), accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/german-involvement- 
arctic/.
85 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities” 
(Berlin, 2013), accessed July, 2018, https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/International/Leitlinien- 
Arktispolitik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
86 Arctic Council, “Iqaluit Declaration. The First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council” (Iqaluit, Canada 
1998), accessed July 23, 2018, https://oaarchive.arctic- 
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/86/01_iqaluit_declaration_1998_signed%20%282%29.pdf?sequence=1&is 
Allowed=y.
87 Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Eckpunkte fur ein 
integriertes Energie- und Klimaprogramm” (Berlin, 2018), accessed November 12, 2018, http://www.bmu.de. 
service/publikationen/downloads/details/artikel/eckpunkte-fuer-ein-integriertes- energie-und-klimaprogramm; 
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Klimaschutzbericht 2018 zum 
Aktionsprogramm Klimaschutz 2020 der Bundesregierung/Climate Protection Report 2018 on the Federal 
Government's Climate Protection 2020 Action Programme.” (Berlin, 2018), accessed December 18, 2018, 
https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Klimaschutz/klimaschutzbericht_2018.pdf.
In the last part of my thesis describing Germany's contemporary interests, I rely on a number 
of government documents. First and foremost, the Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy titled 
Assume responsibility, seize opportunities.85 In these Guidelines, the German Government 
clearly states its interest in the Arctic region, such as economic opportunities, freedom of 
navigation, environmental protection, and freedom of science. Furthermore, I referred to several 
official documents of the AEPS and the Arctic Council, such as the Iqaluit Declaration, The 
First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council.86 I also refer to numerous documents from 
German ministries, regarding energy or security politics and raw material strategy.87 
Government published data emphasizes Germany's fight to mitigate global climate change, and 
to promote environmental protection and sustainable economic development, which are just a 
few points high on the German Arctic Agenda. German companies see expanded economic 
opportunities in the exploitation of Arctic raw materials. In return Germany provides the Arctic 
with support in form of expert knowledge on research and highly developed technology with 
regards to environmental standards and sustainable economic development. Germany enjoys a 
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strong reputation in Arctic research. Information on the website of the German Polar Institute 
AWI show, that Germany possesses noteworthy research infrastructure, such as the icebreaker 
Polarstern.88
88 Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum fur Polar-und Meeresforschung, accessed November 12, 2018, 
https://www.awi.de.
Most historical sources describe expeditions and their stated goals, without tying those goals to 
greater German political-economic aims. The same is true for much of the literature that 
addresses Germany's engagement in the Arctic Council. Many journal articles describe the 
development of Observers as a whole, but few documents analyze Germany's interactions 
specifically, and the aims it pursues through its Observer status in the AC. Therefore, this 
research project strives to fill the gap in the literature by placing Germany's Arctic engagement 
in historical context and analyzing the various objectives it pursues in the Arctic, as exemplified 
by its engagement in the Arctic Council.
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Chapter 3 Germany's Historical Interest in the Arctic
3.1 Introduction
Humankind's relentless desire to know what lies beyond the familiar has led to exploration of 
the farthest reaches of the planet. Scientific curiosity, the quest for renewable resources, trade 
routes, and markets, and finally the race for the North Pole lured explorers to the Arctic. A spirit 
of adventure, hunger for knowledge, fascination with the polar world, ambition, and national 
pride drove German expeditions to the Arctic. From the outset, science has been in the 
foreground, and the scientific yield of German expeditions in the era 1865 to 1930 is especially 
noteworthy.89
89 In examining German interests in the Arctic, this thesis considers the expeditions sent from Europe's German 
speaking region, rather than restricting itself to the boundaries of the German Confederation from 1848 or of 
today's Germany.
Except for an initiative by the Friesians in the year 1040, German expeditions have been 
recorded only since the middle of the seventeenth century. A series of Greenland and 
Spitzbergen expeditions inspired by interest in whale and seal hunting provided a vehicle for 
polar research. Whale and seal oil offered enormous profits, and the German regions of 
Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg participated especially successfully. The German physician 
Friederich Martens wrote the first scientific reports on Spitzbergen in the 1670s.
The German history of interaction with the Arctic between 1865 and 1880 is one of human 
determination to comprehend the natural world, and of overcoming environmental hardships 
and constraints. Arctic expeditions fostered German pride, validated German scientific 
inventions and fulfilled a German northern destiny. German Arctic science created national 
heroes; men left their fatherland, endured hardship in a hostile environment, and returned 
having fulfilled their missions. They became representatives of a new German national identity 
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in international scientific circles. From the late nineteenth century, Germans came to view the 
polar environment as illuminating thoroughly German qualities. The most striking event was 
found in the accounts of the wreck of the Hansa (1869-70). Germans interpreted the crew's 
survival as proof of German tenacity and discipline. As Eugen von Enzberg wrote in 1898, 
courage, stamina, bravery and enthusiasm were needed to overcome the struggle in the north. 
The Hansa crew's survival demonstrated Teutonic virtue; the Hanse men proved themselves to 
be true Germans.90
90 Eugen von Enzberg, Heroen der Polarforschung (Leipzig: Reisland, 1898), 156.
91 David Thomas Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World, A History, 1870-1940 (London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2002), 20.
August Petermann deserves the honorary title “father of German polar research.” Petermann 
never personally participated in a polar expedition; he remained a theoretician. Petermann 
nevertheless was a man of action, an enthusiastic defender of his own ideas. Petermann's main 
contribution lay in directing German science toward polar research and in melding the German 
nation with this noble pursuit. He believed that the future of German science lay in the polar 
project, and he championed the popular feeling that Germans had both the right and the 
obligation to take part in northern exploration.91 Petermann appealed to German patriotic duty, 
through which Germans could display their national character. For Petermann polar exploration 
was a matter of national duty, a contest of national character.
Germany in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a nation striving to prove itself 
at the poles but failed to do so. For decades Germans went to battle against nature in the polar 
regions, driven by the quest for fame, scientific achievement, and political gain. Usually they 
returned with hopes unfulfilled.
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Despite the fact that Koldewey and Wegener conducted Germany's most famous expeditions, 
and Wegener is seen as a hero today, their expedition didn't fulfill their initial hopes and ended 
in broken dreams, exhaustion and death. Despite their scientific achievements, they failed to 
make important geographical discoveries and they attained none of the most notable “polar 
firsts.” The heroes of German polar research were not bold sailors, but theoreticians such as 
Petermann, Neumayer, and Weyprecht. What has been accomplished on expeditions by 
German men has been many small, details that have distinguished themselves by German 
thoroughness, organizational talent and order. German Arctic expeditions produced a valuable 
body of meteorological, geomagnetic and hydrographic data, as well as new knowledge of 
geological and biological data of Greenland. Wegener and von Drygalski returned with an 
immense quantity of scientific data, although fame eluded them. Germans also mapped an 
extensive portion of Greenland for the first time, bringing attention to natural features such as 
Franz-Josef-Fjord.92
92 Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World, A History, 1870-1940, 63-64.
Wegener concluded the era of polar research known as the heroic period, in which highly 
committed individualists competed for polar achievements or pursued their private research 
goals. Participants' personal performances played heavily in the success of expeditions. This 
era marked the height of German polar exploration of the classical age, when Germany claimed 
greatest success through Wegener's breakthroughs in Arctic meteorology, glaciology and 
geophysics.
The International Polar Year (IPY) in the 1870s, on the other hand, constituted international 
cooperation that Germany initiated to coordinate overarching national plans. The increasing 
internationalization of science can be seen in the organizational development of the IPYs. The
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German government refused to finance a third Arctic expedition, but stressed that polar research 
needed co-operation among nations. Therefore, the German foreign office made enquiries to 
the governments of Russia, Sweden, Norway, Great Britain and the United States regarding 
their willingness to take part in an international polar exploration campaign. As a result of the 
IPY and the agitation of Georg von Neumayer the southern hemisphere was included in the 
program of the first IPY.93
93 Reinhard A. Krause, and Rainer Sieger, “International Polar Year 1882-1883 - the digitized meteorological data 
legacy,” 12.
94 Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World, A History, 1870-1940, 14.
95 Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World, A History, 1870-1940, 211-212.
The polar expeditions between the world wars tested various types of transport-possibilities and 
new expedition techniques. During this time, scientists laid the foundation for modern polar 
research. Technological innovation and scientific achievement characterized German 
commitment to the poles during this era. The polar environment would prove to the world the 
German nation's resilience. The German Zeppelin expedition of 1931 pioneered new complex 
aerial photography techniques and equipment. German expeditions were also notable for their 
creative use of unmanned aviation tools, such as piloted balloons and kites. Furthermore, they 
experimented with mechanical means of overland transportation, such as propeller driven sleds 
and the remote detection and transmission of polar weather conditions during the war.94
Misjudgment in planning, failure of leadership, and simple equipment breakdowns undermined 
German efforts. While men such as von Drygalski, Koldewey and Wegener certainly 
committed errors, their competence, bravery, and stamina can still be compared to counterparts 
from other countries. Germans brought back numerous scientific data, but rarely returned home 
having accomplished their goals.95 The heroic era of German polar research ended on the eve 
of World War II, when polar exploration took a backseat. After Adolf Hitler took over power, 
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Germany pursued different goals, such as the expansion of the Reich. When Germany occupied 
Norway, Sweden declared neutrality, and Finland fought against the Soviet Union, the Arctic 
was used for weather reporting and the “Arctic weather war” began.
3.2 Before World War II
3.2.1. Whaling
Germans officially began to explore the poles nearly a millennium ago. Records state that 
German sailors set out in 1040 to explore the hitherto unknown parts of the northern region. A 
few centuries later the search for new whaling grounds began. Whalers were the first to report 
about the North, and a few scientists used whaling vessels to conduct the first scientific research 
in the Arctic. In Germany, geographers' excitement about the North Pole inspired ship-owners 
with business interests in the Arctic, as well as politicians who sought to strengthen national 
interests by means of German seafaring.96 Germany wanted to prove that it could participate in 
international trade and compete in whaling with other nations, such as the Dutch and French, 
who had been engaged in the industry for decades.
96 Klaus Barthelmes, Die deutschen Interessen am modernen Walfang vor 1914 (Magisterarbeit, Universitat 
Koln, 1989), 55-56.
97 Adam von Bremen, History of the Archbishops of Hamburg-Bremen (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002), 220.
98 Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World: A History, 1870-1940, 17.
99 Adam von Bremen, History of the Archbishops of Hamburg-Bremen, 215.
Adam von Bremen, a German cleric and medieval historian recorded in his book “History of 
the Archbishops of Hamburg-Bremen” that German Frisian sailors set out in the year 1040 to 
explore the Northern sea.97 Researchers believe that the Frisian seamen traveled as far as the 
Faeroes.98 Adam von Bremen's narratives did more than simply document the Arctic; his efforts 
responded to the need for mapping the unknown North. Bremen also described the Church's 
missionary zeal specifically in Norway and Sweden.99
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Whaling first piqued broader German interest in the Arctic. The Basques began whaling in 
northern waters in the tenth and eleventh centuries, and they alone whaled in the northern region 
for almost four centuries. Whale meat and fat were highly prized, and the blubber was used to 
make oil for lamps.100 The Germans began whaling by hiring on Dutch ships.101
100 Leonid Breitfuss, Das Nordpolargebiet. Seine Natur, Bedeutung und Erforschung (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 
1943), 63-64.
101 Wanda Oesau, Hamburgs Gronlandfahrt auf Walfischfang und Robbenschlag vom 17. - 19. Jahrhundert 
(Glücksstadt: J.J. Augustin, 1955), 20.
102 Wanda Oesau, Schleswig-Holsteins Gronlandfahrt auf Walfischfang und Robbenschlag vom 17. — 19. 
Jahrhundert (Glucksstadt: J.J. Augustin, 1937), 31-32.
103 Oesau, Hamburgs Gronlandfahrt auf Walfischfang und Robbenschlag, 66-77, 85.
104 Oesau, Hamburgs Gronlandfahrt auf Walfischfang und Robbenschlag, 86.
Beginning in the seventeenth century, Germany sought new hunting grounds and geographical 
discoveries in the Arctic. Of the several German cities that participated in the Greenland 
expedition, Hamburg stood at the forefront. Other northern German ports of trade included 
Altona, Eckernforde, Elmshorn, Flensburg, Fohr, Glückstadt, Kiel, and Friedrichstadt, but only 
Hamburg gained a port on Spitzbergen, in the northwest at Hamburgbukta (Hamburg Bay), in 
the seventeenth century. German ships first ventured to the area around Spitzbergen and Jan 
Mayan. The Arctic whaling efforts launched from German seaside towns are collectively 
referred to as the Greenland expedition, because many people believed Spitzbergen was part of 
Greenland, and therefore some people called Spitzbergen Greenland. Only at the beginning of 
the eighteenth century did hunting begin in the Davis Strait between Greenland and Baffin 
Island.102 The whaling era developed in waves and was tumultuous, owing to strong 
competition, blockades, numerous wars, and sovereignty claims.103 The heyday of the whaling 
industry lasted from 1650 to 1780. During this period, hundreds of ships sailed annually into 
the waters around Spitzbergen and Greenland. During the years 1643-1861 more than 6,000 
trips to the north were counted.104
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German governments eagerly sought expanding trade opportunities, anticipating revenues and 
profits that would raise the living standard. For many decades whaling produced sizable profits, 
and Europeans and Euro-Americans perceived the Arctic as a resource frontier to be exploited. 
Trade richly benefitted the participating cities, not only providing oil, but many other 
advantages such as employment as ship builders, painters, carpenters, and craftsmen.105 
Hundreds of German families lived off this industry.
105 Oesau, Hamburgs Gronlandfahrt auf Walfischfang und Robbenschlag vom 17. - 19. Jahrhundert, 80.
106 Oesau, Schleswig-Holsteins Gronlandfahrt auf Walfischfang und Robbenschlag vom 17. — 19. Jahrhundert, 
286-287.
107 August Petermann, Mittheilungen aus der Justus Perthes’ Geographischer Anstalt über wichtige neue 
Erforschungen auf dem Gesammtgebiete der Geographie von Dr. A. Petermann 11. Band (Gotha: Justus 
Perthes,1865), 159. Translated by author.
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Whalers journeyed to the far north not only for the meager wages they earned; the industry held 
a certain mystique, as the North was fairly unknown territory. Seamen gained in seaworthiness, 
patience, courage, and intrepidity in the Arctic. They brought home more glory than blubber. 
Deprivation, exertion, torment, and illnesses such as scurvy and frostbite caused agony while 
they built and strengthened character.106 The geographer and cartographer August Heinrich 
Petermann (1822-1878) wrote: “Whaling is the most important branch of all merchant shipping. 
... to show, in peace, the most appropriate means of demonstrating the courage, endurance, and 
spirit of enterprise of the seaman in their truest and brightest light.”107
Many considered the whaling industry a training grounds for future fleets. German governments 
recognized the applicability of such character to military service. Whaling would bring forth 
efficient sailors who could serve in the case of sea war.108 The Prussian King Friedrich the Great 
(Friedrich II) had encouraged whaling in his Reich. In the year 1768 the state financed several 
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expeditions to Greenland and Spitzbergen.109 Later, in the nineteenth century, the naturalist 
Constantin Wilhelm Lambert Gloger (1803-1863) also recognized that whaling could form a 
capable, hardened, well-trained crew for warships and that whaling could therefore be used to 
form a war fleet.110
109 August Petermann, Mittheilungen aus der Justus Perthes ' Geographischer Anstalt über wichtige neue 
Erforschungen auf dem Gesammtgebiete der Geographie von Dr. A. Petermann 11. Band, 159. Translated by 
author.
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27. Translated by author.
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Whalers were the first to report scientific findings from the Arctic. During the Scientific 
Revolution and the Age of Exploration, Europeans' understanding of the natural world 
expanded greatly. Science was certainly not at the forefront of whaling, but it provided the least 
expensive and easiest way to transport scientists into the far north. The surgeon and naturalist 
Friederich Martens (1635 - 1699) 111 produced the first scholarly German report on whaling 
activities in the Arctic. Martens worked on the whaling vessel Jonah in the whale (Jonas im 
Walfisch) under Captain Peter Petersen of Friese (Pieter Pieterszoon von Friesland) starting 
April 15, 1671. During his voyage to the far north, he conducted the first scientific observations 
of the nature, “including the flora, fauna, and climate of Svalbard, and published his notes in 
the book “Spitzbergische oder Groenlandische Reise-Beschreibung (Spitzbergen or 
Greenlandic Travel-Description).” Martens' work has become renowned beyond Germany's 
borders; many researchers consider it the authoritative reference on whaling in the region for 
many decades.112
In the year 1868, two ships left Germany for the far north focusing on geographical science, the 
Bienenkorb and the Albert. These voyages can be better understood as exploration journeys, 
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rather than polar expeditions. They were fishing excursions to the northern Arctic Ocean to 
which a scholar was assigned. The Bienenkorb left on February 21, 1869, with the purpose of 
hunting seals on the island of Jan Mayen and whales on the east coast of Greenland. Ice 
conditions prevented hunting, however. On board the steamer was the physicist and astronomer 
Franz Joseph Dorst from Jülich, who carried out meteorological, astronomical and magnetic 
investigations in the polar sea between Spitzbergen and the east coast of Greenland. On 
Svalbard, today a bay carries Dorst's name, the Dorstbukta, southeast of Heleysund at the north 
coast of Barentsoya.113
113 Hans Szymanki, Die Dampfschifffahrt in Niedersachen und in den angrenzenden Gebieten von 1817 bis 1867 
(Bremen: EHV Academicpress, 1954), 360. Anglicized, these place names are Dorst Bay and Barents Island.
114 Szymanki, Die Dampfschifffahrt in Niedersachen und in den angrenzenden Gebieten von 1817 bis 1867, 360.
115 August Petermann, Mittheilungen aus der Justus Perthes ' Geographischer Anstalt über wichtige neue 
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The second vessel, the Albert, left Germany on May 23, 1869 under the command of Captain 
Hinrich Hashagen. Emil Bessels (1846-1888) from Stuttgart, a zoologist, naturalist, and 
explorer, served as the expedition's scientist. Bessels investigated the Gulf Stream current 
between Spitzbergen and Novaya Zemlya. Albert's Island (Albertsoya), on Svalbard, close to 
the Albertsund, commemorates this voyage.114 Petermann however has never traveled to the 
North, but encouraged scientists on these voyages to gather data to support his research, for 
instance his discovery of the origin of the Gulf Stream.115 He urged Bessels to assist in his 
research by circumnavigating Spitzbergen, visiting Gilesland, and striving to reach a high 
latitude between Spitzbergen and Novaya Zemlya, following the Siberian coast line etc. Bessels 
completed none of Petermann's requests, but Bessels' observations of sea-surface temperatures 
between Spitzbergen and Novaya Zemlya are noteworthy, and they made a name for Bessels in 
the geographic field. Bessels commented that science was conducted during this journey in the 
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“towrope of trade.”116 In his journal Petermanns geographische Mitteilungen (PGM),117 118
Petermann noted that Bessels' results and observations were of considerable value, despite the 
expeditions' double objectives (hunting whales, seals, and walruses as well as scientific 
purposes), and their failure to make any new discoveries or to fulfill any of Petermann's
116 Herbert Abel, and Hans Jessen, Kein Weg durch das Packeis. Anfange der deutschen Polarforschung (1868­
1889) (Bremen: Carl Schneemann Verlag, 1954), 38.
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Geographical Institute concerning important new studies in the whole field of geography, by Dr. A. Petermann). 
PGM was the oldest German technical journal on geography, all significant geographical discoveries during the 
19th and 20th century were published. Furthermore, Petermann reported on physical, bio-geography, geology, 
natural phenomena, ethnography.
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Erforschungen auf dem Gesammtgebiete der Geographie von Dr. A. Petermann. 17. Band (Gotha: Justus 
Perthes,1871), 345. Translated by author.
118instructions.
Therefore, whaling may be considered a pillar of polar research, at a time when scientific 
research was just beginning in the region. Martens, Bessels, and Dorst brought back significant 
scientific results, including reports about climate, flora and fauna. These scientists embodied 
the initial quest for scientific solutions to practical problems. Petermann used whaling to 
transport scientists to the north to test his hypotheses and develop theories. The legacy of 
German scientists on board whaling vessels and their contributions to geographic knowledge 
in the Arctic can be seen in the German place names in the region: Hamburg Bay, Dorst Bay, 
and Albert Sound.
Oesau explains the end of German participation in whaling not as a result of a lack of prey or 
lack of crews, but because of a lack of foresight, commitment, and entrepreneurial skills, and 
owing to the transition from the sailing ship to steamship and from hand to cannon harpoon. 
She states bluntly that German shipping companies were backward. While the Norwegian, 
Swedish, and English ship-owners-built ships specially designed for the Greenland cruise,
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German ship-owners were satisfied with their traditional merchant ships. Interested in short­
term profits, they resisted investing in new equipment. Their lack of foresight meant that their 
goals did not materialize.
Regardless of the lack of German foresight, the profitable trade in whaling had begun to decline 
in the early nineteenth century, owing to massive over fishing in the region. Furthermore, 
petroleum and synthetic materials gradually replaced blubber as lubricants, and electricity 
replaced oil in lamps. In 1861 the German Greenland expeditions ended.119
119 Oesau, Hamburgs Gronlandfahrt auf Walfischfang und Robbenschlag vom 17. - 19. Jahrhundert, 86.
120 Reinhard A. Krause, “Hintergrunde der deutschen Polarforschung von den Anfangen bis heute,” Deutsches 
Schifffahrtsarchiv 16 (1993): 7.
3.2.2. The First German Scientific Expeditions to the North
The geographer and cartographer August Heinrich Petermann is often referred to as the father 
or founder of German polar research.120 The foundation for German polar exploration was laid 
during the Geographers' Meeting in Frankfurt in 1865. Here, Peterman found a suitable forum 
to prepare his plans for a first German North Pole expedition. He organized and defined the 
research programs of the first and second polar expeditions. These expeditions would prove his 
hypotheses about the navigability of the Arctic Ocean and the land extension from Greenland 
to the North Pole.
Petermann began his efforts to establish German polar research in 1865 during a period of 
extreme political unrest. The German nation state did not yet exist. Petermann's efforts to 
organize a government-funded polar expedition failed, and therefore he organized an expedition 
privately. Logistically and financially the Bremer Committee for the German North Polar 
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Cruise (Bremer Komitee fur die deutsche Nordpolarfahrt) supported Petermann and his 
plans.121
121 Reinhard A. Krause, “Die Gründungsphase deutscher Polarforschung, 1865-1875,” Berichte zur 
Polarforschung 114 (1992).
122 Krause, “Hintergrunde der deutschen Polarforschung von den Anfangen bis heute,” 13.
123 Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World, A History, 1870-1940, 25-27.
Petermann's interest in the polar region lay in the idea of the navigability of the North Polar 
Sea. He developed several hypotheses including an open navigable North Polar sea surrounded 
by an icebelt and an extension of Greenland past the central Arctic to northwest of the Bering 
Strait. His theories were based on limited observation data and scientific ideas developed 
through various expeditions. Further polar exploration proved the invalidity of his 
hypotheses.122 Nevertheless, Petermann's foresight and initiatives inspired much research in 
the Arctic. He is therefore called the founder of German Arctic research.
The Austro-Prussian War in the summer of 1866 produced feelings of national virtue in Prussia 
and throughout northern Germany. Petermann believed the time was ripe to expand and protect 
German economic interests, especially in the North. A united Germany convened at Gotha in 
October 1867 and agreed, based on Petermann's urging, to undertake a trip to northeastern 
Greenland.123 German Arctic exploration outlined by Petermann began with a small-scale 
expedition by a single ship, followed by a large-scale expedition with two ships.
3.2.3. German North Pole Expedition
In 1868 the first German North Pole Expedition took place under the command of Karl 
Koldewey, a thirty-one-year-old civilian navigator trained in Bremen under the flag of the 
North German Confederation founded in 1866. On 24 May, 1868 Koldewey left Bergen, 
Norway on the ship Gronland. Petermann had laid down “instructions for the commander of 
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the expedition”124 in thirty-eight paragraphs of goals for Koldewey to pursue. The main aim 
was to sail to the highest possible latitude on the eastern coast of Greenland and then proceed 
further northward. Petermann anticipated open water near the coast and was hoping that the 
ship would be able to attain the vicinity of the Pole. Failing this, Petermann instructed 
Koldewey to proceed to Spitzbergen.125
124 Instruktion für den Oberbefehlshaber der Expedition.
125 Krause, “Hintergründe der deutschen Polarforschung von den Anfangen bis heute,” 14.
126 Karl Koldewey, Die erste deutsche Nordpolar-Expedition im Jahre 1868 beschrieben von K. Koldewey. Mit 
einem Vorwort von A. Petermann (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1871), 54.
The expedition encountered a series of frustrations due to bad weather. Early on they 
encountered thick ice; they tried in vain to find a way through the fields of ice floes at the coast 
of Greenland. Eventually the crew left Greenland and turned towards Spitzbergen, where they 
mapped parts of the coast. On October 10, 1868, the crew returned to Bremerhaven. Koldewey 
stated himself that the expedition returned without having achieved major goals or contributing 
new scientific knowledge, and it could therefore be considered a failure. He noted, however, 
that “the meteorological observations, the observations of temperature and currents of the sea, 
the maps on the east coast of Spitsbergen, the collections made there provided a good, albeit a 
small insignificant contribution to the knowledge of the polar regions and are not completely 
without value for science.”126
The Gronland had reached 81° North latitude, a not insignificant feat. Despite its limited 
success, the public treated the crew as heroes in the wake of their homecoming. Koldewey won 
international acclaim for German science, and Germany had shown that it belonged in the ranks 
of the great seafaring nations. As Koldewey stated: “What is more important than the 
insignificant scientific results is the fact that Germany has finally entered the ranks of the great 
seafaring nations in this field . In having made a start on this, although having returned 
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unsuccessfully for this time, . . . we have maintained the honor of our young North German flag 
in every way, which alone is already a success.”127 The expedition had expanded geographical 
knowledge and provided practical experience in the polar oceans for future polar expeditions.
127 Koldewey, Die erste deutsche Nordpolar-Expedition im Jahre 1868 beschrieben von K. Koldewey. Mit einem 
Vorwort von A. Petermann, 54.
128 Karl Koldewey, The German Arctic Expedition of 1869-70 and Narrative of the Wreck of the Hansa in the Ice 
(London: Sampson Low, Marston, Low & Searle, 1874), 2-4.
129 Koldewey, The German Arctic Expedition of 1869-70 and Narrative of the Wreck of the Hansa in the Ice, 24, 
64-79, 265, 574.
Soon after the return of the Gronland, a second German expedition to the Arctic was launched 
in 1869 using the vessels Hansa and Germania. Petermann again wrote thirty-one paragraphs 
of instructions. The expedition's purpose was to be scientific as well as nautical. The Germania 
was to land on East Greenland, build bases for further winter operations, and discover, survey, 
and investigate eastern Greenland; while the Hansa was to strive to reach the highest latitude 
possible.128
The Hansa and Germania left Bremerhaven with great public support, including that of the 
King of Prussia Wilhelm I and the Prime Minister of the North German Federation Otto von 
Bismarck, who waved them off. One month into the expedition, the two ships became separated 
due to the misinterpretation of a signal. The Germania explored the region around Sabine Island 
at the west coast of Greenland, where they overwintered. On sledges, they reached 77°N 
latitude, a record for land-based exploration, and in the summer of 1870 the crew discovered a 
magnificent system of fjords and mountains on the western coast of Greenland. The greatest 
achievement was the discovery of the fjord that came to be known as Franz Josef Fjord. On 
September 11, 1870, the Germania returned to Bremerhaven with a broken engine.129
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Despite the absence of the Hansa, which greatly reduced the expedition's personnel resources, 
the Germania's crew conducted extensive exploration, observations, surveys, collection of 
specimens. Many German names on the map of west Greenland still bear witness to this 
expedition, which represents a significant pioneering achievement in the exploration of East 
Greenland.130
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Meanwhile, in September 1869 the Hansa was crushed by ice off East Greenland and sank on 
October 22. The crew overwintered on the drifting sea ice and finally managed to reach the 
Moravian Herrnhut mission at Friedrichstahl in Greenland, from where they returned to 
Germany in September 1870.131
The Second German North Pole Expedition was considered a great scientific success, despite 
failing to find a route to the pole along the coast of Greenland. The crew returned with a wealth 
of scientific data on a region previously almost unknown to the outside world. The expedition 
returned with several geographical discoveries in northeast Greenland and cartographic surveys 
of the region. The crew collected scientific data, including geological, glaciological, 
geomorphological, zoological, botanical and archaeological observations; and they carried out 
geophysical, meteorological and hydrological measurements as well.
According to Koldewey, one goal of the expeditions was to extend “German inquiry to open 
up new domains, in order to show that German sailors are as qualified, as bold, and as 
persevering as those of other nations.”132 Koldewey hoped that the expedition would “reawaken 
interest in Arctic exploration, and spur a new expedition to allow the German flag its due share 
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in all scientific discoveries in the North Polar region.”133 The expedition marked a decisive step 
towards the goal of confirming Germany's reputation as a seafaring nation, as the scientific, 
nautical and national significance of the expedition garnered praise.
133 Koldewey, The German Arctic Expedition of 1869-70 and Narrative of the Wreck of the Hansa in the Ice, 
580.
134 Reinhard A. Krause, “Das erste Internationale Polarjahr (IPY) 1882/1883: Die Entwicklung der Beteiligung 
Deutschlands,” Polarforschung 77, no. 1 (2008): 18, 25.
3.2.4. The Austro-Hungarian Expedition and the International Polar Year (IPY)
The inspiration for the IPY is attributed to the determination of the Navy officer Karl 
Weyprecht. Together with army officer Julius von Payer, he led the Austro-Hungarian 
Expedition of 1872-74, which would inspire Weyprecht's proposal several years later of 
unprecedented international cooperation in the Arctic to advance scientific knowledge of the 
region. Weyprecht recognized that given the vastness of the region, only a series of Arctic 
stations operated by scientists from multiple nations could accomplish the monumental task of 
exploring, monitoring and recording a variety of phenomena of interest to the scientific world. 
Up to that time, expeditions had been stimulated by a competitive nationalistic urge to explore 
the unknown and to discover the most possible tract of unexplored globe. Weyprecht believed 
that the study of science, rather than purely geographical exploration, should be the dominant 
motivation of polar exploration. In preference to isolated expeditions, which could only view 
limited scientific results, Weyprecht envisioned a number of nations conducting scientific 
research in several simultaneous expeditions to different places around the North.134
Karl Weyprecht and Julius von Payer, both officers of the Austro-Hungarian Navy, led the 
Austro-Hungarian North Pole expedition of 1872-74 on the ship the Tegetthoff. Weyprecht, 
born in Darmstadt, Germany joined the Austrian navy in 1853. Julius von Payer born in the 
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Austrian Empire, was a cartographer, a professor at the Theresian Military Academy, and a 
mountaineer who conducted several ascents in the Alps.
The expedition explored the Arctic Ocean northwest of Novaya Zemlya and discovered an 
archipelago at 80 degrees North latitude that they named Franz-Josef-Land, after the Austro- 
Hungarian emperor. Although their ships sank, the entire crew reached Novaya Zemlya, where 
a Russian vessel rescued them. The expedition returned with various data in the fields of 
meteorology, astronomy, magnetism, and zoology.135 Recognizing the limited value of the data 
they had collected from such a small sector of the Arctic region, Weyprecht declared to the 
Geographical Society in London in 1875 as he presented the results of the expedition and stated 
that decisive scientific results can only be attained through a series of synchronous expeditions, 
whose task it would be to distribute themselves over the Arctic region and to obtain one year's 
series of observations made according to the same method.”136
135 Krause, Grobe and Sieger, “International Polar Year 1882-1883 digitized meteorological data legacy,” 11.
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In 1870 strong supporters of German polar research founded the Bremer137 Polar Association 
(Bremer Polarverein). After the foundation of the German Reich in 1871, the Bremer Polar 
Association tried to break away from the financing model of a citizens' initiative and to garner 
state sponsorship. As early as 1871, the Bremer Polar Association expressed the aim of building 
from the successes of the previous expeditions of Koldewey. Therefore, the association 
submitted a proposal to the government of the German Reich in 1874-75 asking for support of 
a third polar expedition, which the government denied. The government concluded that polar 
expeditions were eminently important for the progress; however, Germany alone could not 
conduct the exploration and data gathering needed. In order to obtain useful results,
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international cooperation would be necessary. German polar research was only possible with 
international partners.138 Only large-scale simultaneous observation could lead to the desired 
scientific success.139
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139 Reinhard A. Krause, and Rainer Sieger, “International Polar Year 1882-1883 -the digitized meteorological 
data legacy,” WDC-Mare Reports 0008 (2010): 12.
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Beginning in the mid-1870s geophysicist Georg von Neumayer figured prominently in German 
marine research. Independently of Weyprecht, Neumayer developed the idea of an IPY and 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of simultaneous bipolar observations. Neumayer's main 
idea was to compare results from both polar regions, with special emphasis placed on 
simultaneous readings taken from a network of observation stations.140 After the second 
international meteorologists conference in Rome in 1879, an International Polar Commission 
was founded. Neumayer, who was director of the Reichsinstitut of the German naval 
observatory at the time, was elected president of the Commission, with responsibility for seeing 
the initiative through. The aim of the International Polar Year, as it was called by then, lay in 
synchronous meteorological investigations in the Arctic for development of weather and storm 
prediction in Europe and the United States.141 The International Polar Year took place from 
1882 to 1883; the international effort performed continuous meteorological and geophysical 
observations over a period of two years. Eleven nations established twelve research stations in 
the Arctic, contributing to overall understanding of the polar regions and to internationalizing 
polar research.142
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The International Polar Year brought back a series of individual scientific data, but it was only 
moderately successful in terms of its main objective. No summarizing publications appeared 
afterwards.143 Nevertheless, the collected data provided a first climatology of the Arctic and 
provided buoyancy in Arctic research. Furthermore, the endeavor marked a paradigm shift in 
polar research towards collaboration, data exchange, and mutual assistance. The IPY can be 
regarded as highly significant to science policy and a major innovative force in practical and 
technical terms, which resulted from the agreement on methodology and standardization. 
Weyprecht and Neumeyer, more than anyone else, played leading roles in the project.
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In 1957-58 the International Geophysical Year took place, also referred to as the third IPY. In 2007-2009 the 
fourth IPY took place.
Considering the increasing international tensions at the turn of the century, the international 
cooperation that occurred through the first IPY worked remarkably well. For the first time, 
polar research proved to be a field of international cooperation.144 The second International 
Polar Year, which began July 31, 1932 and lasted thirteen months, was initiated by Johannes 
Georgi, although other leading German scientists, such as Hans Dominik, Walther Bruns, and 
Leonid Breitfuss, participated as well. Due to financial problems, Germany was not able to 
establish its own research station. Germany therefore only participated in two Russian 
Expeditions to Franz-Josef-Land and Novaya Zemlya. The Second Polar Year can still be seen 
as an accomplishment for Germany, as it had initiated the IPY. The second IPY achieved 
technical innovations, such as the use of airplanes in the polar environment and radiosondes. 
Forty-four countries participated, and more than forty observation stations were established 
throughout the Arctic.145
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3.2.5. The Tragedy of the Schroder- Stranz Expedition
Lieutenant Herbert Schroder-Stranz (1884-1912) aimed to discover a favorable Northern Sea 
Route from Spitzbergen across the Arctic Ocean and along the shore of Siberia. Instead, he 
initiated the greatest catastrophe in German polar exploration. Schroder-Stranz wanted to 
organize a large-scale German Arctic Expedition (deutsche Arktis Expedition/DAE) in search 
of the northeast passage. Although he had gained some expedition experience in South America 
and on the Kola-Peninsula, the polar region was new territory for him. Lacking scientific 
experience, Schroder-Stranz had difficulty finding financial support for his expedition. Hence, 
he planned a preliminary scientific expedition to Spitzbergen in the summer of 1912, during 
which he would test the suitability of the equipment and crew. He planned to carry out the 
actual expedition one year later. Initially the expedition did not include an overwintering. It was 
not until the participants of the pre-expedition went on board the vessel Herzog Ernst in 
Tromso, that Schroder-Stranz informed the crew that he anticipated overwintering. After this 
surprising opening, two participants withdrew from joining the expedition.146 On August 5, 
1912 the pre-expedition left Tromso. The group consisted of ten German and five Norwegian 
expedition members, mainly inexperienced scientists and adventurers.
146 Cornelia Lüdecke, “Wissenschaft und Abenteuer in der Arktis, Beispiele deutscher Polarexpedition,” Journal 
of Northern Studies 1-2 (2007): 60.
147 Hans Steinhagen, “Forscher, Abenteurer, Retter - die Spitzbergenexpedition von Kurt Wegener, Herbert 
Schroder-Stranz und Theodor Lerner 1912/1913,” Schriftenreihe des Instituts far Geodasie der Universitat der 
Bundeswehr München, Heft 88 (2012): 49.
On August 15, 1912 Schroder-Stranz and three companions disembarked between North Cape 
and Cape Platen in northern Spitzbergen. The group envisaged traversing North Eastland from 
north to south, traverse the Hinlopen Strait and finally join the Herzog Ernst again on the west 
cost of Spitzbergen latest in December 1912.147 Schroder-Stranz, above all, wanted to prove to 
polar researchers at home in Germany his ability to conduct a successful expedition in the Arctic 
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environment. This would prove his competence and attract investors for future ventures. Due 
to complete misjudgment of the situation and lack of experience in the Arctic environment, 
however, Schroder-Stranz and his companions disappeared, never to be found.148
148 Ludecke, “Wissenschaft und Abenteuer in der Arktis, Beispiele deutscher Polarexpedition,” 61.
149 Steinhagen, “Forscher, Abenteurer, Retter - die Spitzbergenexpedition von Kurt Wegener, Herbert Schroder- 
Stranz und Theodor Lerner 1912/1913,” 51-52.
150 Lüdecke, “Wissenschaft und Abenteuer in der Arktis, Beispiele deutscher Polarexpedition,” 61-64.
Thick pack ice trapped the ship Herzog Ernst and its remaining crew in the Sorgfjord on west 
Spitsbergen for the entire winter of 1912. When Schroder-Stranz and his expedition members 
did not arrive at the agreed meeting point, the crew faced the propsect of overwintering in the 
Sorgfjord or reaching Advent Bay (now Longyearbyen), about 300 kilometers (186 miles) 
away, to return to Germany on a different vessel as quickly as possible. Trying to reach Advent 
Bay on foot to avoid wintering in Spitsbergen's polar night cost four participants their lives, and 
one member suffered severe frost bite and returned disabled. Only Captain Ritscher reached 
Advent Bay on December 27, 1912 after a harrowing solo march. Captain Ritscher suffered 
from severe frostbite on his limbs, but was able to give a report on the fate of the expedition, 
so that relief operations could be initiated.149
Several rescue expeditions set out the following spring, including efforts led by Kurt Wegener, 
Theodor Lerner, and Arve Staxrud, who brought back the remaining expedition members of 
Schroder-Stranz, as well as those of the Lerner expedition, whose ship was crushed by pack 
ice.150 Schroder-Stranz and his crew had little polar experience and knowledge. Furthermore, 
the starting date of the expedition was too late and too close to the Arctic winter, so that a return 
to the vessel Herzog Ernst was hardly possible. The decision to leave the ship by the end of 
September 1912 as the polar winter approached to reach Advent Bay, which was 300 km away, 
contributed to the injury and deaths of expedition members. The reasons for the failure of the 
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Schroder-Stranz expedition are manifold. The main blame for the largest German polar 
catastrophe was therefore attributed to Schroder-Stranz “who, by overestimating his own 
abilities and underestimating the dangers, risked so many lives and did little credit to the 
German name,” as August Petermann explained.151
151 August Petermann, Mittheilungen aus der Justus Perthes' Geographischer Anstalt, Erganzungsheft Nr. 179, 
H, Philipp, Ergebnisse der W. Filchnerschen Vorexpedition nach Spitzbergen (Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1914).
152 Cornelia Lüdecke, Die deutsche Polarforschung seit der Jahrhundertwende und der Einfluss Erich von 
Drygalski (Munchen: Kamloth, 1995), 42-45.
153 Cornelia Ludecke, “Zum 100. Geburtstag von Max Grotewahl (1894-1958), Grunder des Archivs fur 
Polarforschung,” Polarforschung 65, no. 2 (1995): 105.
3.2.6. Max Karl Grotewahl (1894-1958)
Max Karl Grotewahl (1894-1958), a minor explorer himself, contributed more broadly to 
German polar research through his vision and recognition of the need for an archival institution 
to promote polar exploration.
In the summer of 1925, the geophysicist Grotewahl led a small expedition to the northwest of 
Spitzbergen with three team members to carry out geophysical and biological research. Based 
on his Spitzbergen experience, Grotewahl recognized the need for an institute to collect 
documents on polar research, prepare new expeditions, and evaluate the results of expeditions. 
In 1926, he established a private archive for polar research in Kiel.152 After his death, the 
archive, which had been run as a private enterprise, came under the oversight of the Geophysical 
Institute of the University of Münster, Germany. Grotewahl laid the foundation for the society 
of polar research, but it was the founding of the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar Research in 
1981 that truly institutionalized polar research in Germany.153
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3.2.7. Erich von Drygalski (1865 - 1949)
The geographer, geophysicist and polar explorer Erich von Drygalski (1865-1949) led two 
expeditions to Greenland during the years 1891-1893. Furthermore, Von Drygaksi conducted 
the first German South Pole expedition (Gauβ-Expedition in 1901-1903), earning himself 
international recognition for his polar research.154 In 1891 and 1892/93 von Drygalski led two 
expeditions to Western Greenland. During his scientific based overwinter in western Greenland 
(May 1892 to October 1893) Von Drygalski collected data on climate, inland ice, and glacier 
movement, which were published in numerous volumes. In 1898 he habilitated in Berlin in 
geography and geophysics.155 Subsequently Von Drygalski turned to south polar research, 
believing that only residual problems remained to be solved in the north.156 Von Drygalski 
made a name for himself as the leader of the Gauss expedition, which brought forth many new 
insights from the little unexplored region and was therefore deemed a great scientific 
achievement.157 Drygalski's publications following his expedition to the Antarctica ranked 
among the fundamental scientific works of all polar literature of the time.
154 Ludecke, Die deutsche Polarforschung seit der Jahrhundertwende und der Einfluss Erich von Drygalski, 34­
38.
155 Cornelia Ludecke, Verborgene Eiswelten. Erich von Drygalskis Bericht über seine Gronlandexpeditionen 
1891, 1892-93 (Munchen: Dreesbach Verlag, 2015).
156 Ludecke, Die deutsche Polarforschung seit der Jahrhundertwende und der Einfluss Erich von Drygalskis, 51.
157 Lüdecke, Die deutsche Polarforschung seit der Jahrhundertwende und der Einfluss Erich von Drygalskis, 73.
3.2.8. Germany's Greatest Polar Explorer -- Alfred Wegener
3.2.8.1 The scientist Alfred Wegener
The German meteorologist, polar explorer and geoscientist of global dimension Alfred Lothar 
Wegener (1880 -1930) is best known for his theory of continental drift, his greatest contribution 
to science. In addition, he earned recognition as a polar explorer. He conducted four expeditions 
to Greenland, bringing back numerous scientific results. His four expeditions concluded 
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Germany's heroic polar exploration age. Wegener carried out the last great Arctic expeditions 
in the classical style, a style in which a man's moral and physical strength - or weakness - 
determined and limited the success of an expedition, whereas technical aids played a 
subordinated role.158 Wegener's expeditions marked the zenith of German polar exploration. 
He certainly ranks as Germany's most heroic figure in polar history, remembered for risking 
his life to rescue his comrades.
158 Johannes Georgi, Im Eis vergraben. Erlebnisse auf Station „Eismitte“ der letzten Gronland-Expedition 
Alfred Wegener 1930-1931 (Leipzig: Brockhaus Verlag, 1955), 13.
159 Ulrich Wutzke, Durch die weiβe Wüste, Leben und Leistungen des Gronlandforschers und Entdeckers der 
Kontinentaldrift Alfred Wegener (Gotha: Justus Berthes Verlag, 1997), 15-22.
160 Wutzke, Durch die weiβe Wüste, Leben und Leistungen des Gronlandforschers und Entdeckers der 
Kontinentaldrift Alfred Wegener, 24-25.
161 Andree's hand atlas was a major cartographic work using cooper plate engraving, named after Richard Andree.
162 Mott T. Green, Alfred Wegener, Science, Exploration, And the Theory of Continental Drift (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2015), 215.
Alfred Wegener was born in Berlin on November 1, 1880. After graduating at the top of his 
high school class, he studied numerous disciplines, such as physics, astronomy, and 
meteorology, at universities in Berlin, Heidelberg and Innsbruck. He earned a doctorate in 
astronomy in March 1905 at Humboldt University in Berlin.159 In addition to the study of 
physics, the young scientist pursued research on the higher layers of the atmosphere. He 
conducted several balloon flights, some with his brother Kurt, who also developed an interest 
in meteorology and polar research. On April 5, 1906, the two brothers achieved a new world 
record in ballooning by remaining aloft for 52.5 hours, while also undertaking meteorological 
investigations.160
In 1910 Andree's Atlas161 attracted Wegener's attention. Not only the congruency of the 
continents' margins, but also the oceanic depth contours circumscribing the continental maps 
of South America and Africa intrigued him.162 In 1912 Wegener gave a lecture and published 
several articles arguing that the continents had gradually drifted apart. The American geologist 
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Frank Burley Taylor had arrived independently at similar views a few years earlier. 
Nevertheless, Wegener's theory touched off a global scientific controversy and was initially 
met with skepticism from geologists, who viewed Wegener as an outsider. In 1915 Wegener 
published a book The Origin of the Continents and Oceans (Die Entstehung der Kontinente und 
Ozeane), which laid the foundation for modern plate tectonic theories.163 Despite the 
significance of this scientific contribution, Wegener did not pursue this research further. Instead 
he turned his attention to further Arctic exploration.
163 David Thomas Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World: A History, 1870-1940 (London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2002), 129.
164 Wutzke, Durch die weiβe Wüste, Leben und Leistungen des Gronlandforschers und Entdeckers der 
Kontinentaldrift Alfred Wegener, 38.
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3.2.8.2. The Greenland Expeditions
Wegener's famous balloon flight provided him an entree into polar exploration. In 1906, he 
participated in the Greenland expedition led by the Dane Ludvig Mylius-Erichsen, who hired 
Wegener as meteorologist and physician. This first polar expedition served as an important 
learning experience for Wegener, providing him insight into technical and logistical challenges 
in conducting research in the Arctic. Wegener took part in the first sledge expedition led by 
Europeans during the polar night.164 Following his return, in 1908 Wegener decided to continue 
his career in academia. The University of Marburg appointed him lecturer in meteorology, 
applied astronomy and cosmic physics.165
In 1911 Johann Peter Koch, who had participated in the first Greenland expedition with 
Wegener, proposed another Greenland expedition: exploring the unknown ice sheet of inner 
Greenland. This would require an overwintering on the edge of the ice sheet, followed by a 
crossing at its broadest point. The expedition would answer decisively the question of whether 
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inner Greenland was completely covered with ice. The distance of the crossing stretched 1,000 
km (621 miles), twice as long as the crossing of south Greenland conducted by Fridtjof Nansen 
in 1888.166
166 Wutzke, Durch die weiβe Wüste, Leben und Leistungen des Gronlandforschers und Entdeckers der 
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169 Green, Alfred Wegener, Science, Exploration, and the Theory of Continental Drift, 221.
170 Green, Alfred Wegener, Science, Exploration, and the Theory of Continental Drift, 312-313.
The four-man expedition left June 14, 1912 and suffered danger and hardship. Calving glaciers 
nearly killed the entire team; as they attempted to ascend to the inland ice cap, temperatures 
dropped to -50°C (- 58°F); Koch fractured a leg; the sun burned their skin; and the horses 
perished. The team suffered continual drenched clothing, exhaustion, cold and frostbite.167 In 
July 1943 the Danish pastor Chemnitz of Upernavik, who just happened to be visiting the 
remote community at the time, found the exhausted group close to the village. The trek 
represented a milestone in Arctic travel.168 Greene calls the journey “one of the most heroic 
stories of polar exploration.”169 The feat increased Wegener's international reputation as a polar 
traveler and scientist, and it produced numerous volumes of scientific work.170
Buoyed by the success of the second Greenland expedition, Wegener planned additional 
expeditions to Greenland. First, he planned a preparatory summer trek in 1929 followed by a 
full year expedition in 1930-31. With the full year journey, Wegener aimed to establish three 
stations across Greenland at latitude 71° north. Most importantly, Wegener planned to measure 
the full ice cap thickness, thereby enabling a survey on the dynamics of ice sheets for the first 
time ever. The primary station would be located on the western rim of the ice sheet, with another 
station on the eastern rim, and an “Ice Central” station located hundreds of meters above sea 
level, four hundred kilometers from each coastal station. The team would thereby obtain 
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comparative readings for an entire year for the first time. The most difficult logistical obstacle 
would be the transport of equipment, scientific instruments, fuel, food, and building material 
across the Greenland ice cap at nearly three kilometers (1.86 miles) altitude.”171
171 Green, Alfred Wegener, Science, Exploration, and the Theory of Continental Drift, 561.
172 The Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft (Emergency Association of German Science) was founded 
in 1920 and was renamed in 1929 Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research association). The basic 
idea was to facilitate raising and distributing funds for German sciences and humanities.
173 Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World: A History, 1870-1940, 135.
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175 Green, Alfred Wegener, Science, Exploration, and the Theory of Continental Drift, 541; Murphy, German 
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Wegener submitted his plans to the Emergency Society for German Science 
(Notgemeinschaft).172 In the wake of the New York Stock Exchange crash of 1929, German 
scientific ideals, nationalism, and cultural values convinced the committee to support the 
Greenland expedition. As historian David Thomas Murphy wrote, the Notgemeinschaft 
financed Wegener's expeditions because “German absence from the polar competition meant 
surrendering the nations's place among the great peoples.”173Wegener himself wanted to 
display Germany's technological achievement. He emphasized that Germany had a chance to 
take the lead in the use of propeller-driven sleds, an innovative technical aid in polar 
exploration. Wegener promoted the expedition as vital to Germany's interests in participating 
in international polar research, rather than standing aside. Germany's expedition to Greenland 
would be the first land-based scientific effort outside Germany since an Antarctic expedition in 
1912.174 Wegener harbored additional motives for undertaking this expedition: his personal 
ambitions and fascination with Greenland, as well as his interest in science, economic gain and 
national prestige.175 The crew, who conducted the preparatory expedition form April until early 
October 1929 comprised of Wegener, Georgi, Ernst Sorge, Fritz Loewe, Johan Davidson and 
seven hired Greenlanders. The main aim of this expedition was to find a way onto the inland 
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ice, to test methods of measuring ice thickness, as well as food and equipment. They returned 
with their aims accomplished.”176
176 Green, Alfred Wegener, Science, Exploration, and the Theory of Continental Drift, 564-565, 568, 569, 572.
177 Green, Alfred Wegener, Science, Exploration, and the Theory of Continental Drift, 578-579.
178 Christian Kerth, “The Wegener Diaries: Scientific Expeditions into the Eternal Ice,” Virtual Exhibitions, no.
2. Bavarian State Ministry of Sciences, Research and the Arts (2013), accessed January 2018, 
http://www.environmentandsociety.org., Expedition 1930-1931.
179 Green, Alfred Wegener, Science, Exploration, and the Theory of Continental Drift, 582-586.
On April 1, 1930 Wegener launched his fourth and final Greenland expedition from 
Copenhagen, Denmark.177 Once the expedition went ashore in West Greenland, they faced the 
logistical challenge, never attempted in a polar region before, of moving the equipment onto 
the inland ice. By the end of August, the crew had tested the propeller sleds. Wegener's detailed 
diary entries from August and September 1930 capture the enthusiasm and drama surrounding 
the difficulties expedition members faced. On the one hand Wegener believed the expedition 
represented a new age, a new epoch of polar exploration. In August 30, 1930, he wrote in his 
journal: “Yes, and now the dream has become reality...but I have the strong feeling that we are 
approaching a new era of polar exploration characterized by the successful utilization of new 
technologies in a rational manner... This new method is surely the future of polar exploration. 
How wonderful that we are the ones who get to make these ground-breaking. redeeming 
steps!”178 The propeller sleds occupied a central role in the achievement of the expedition's 
goals. However, the sleds proved to have limited capability; the motors were too weak to propel 
the sleds to high terrain.179 The failure of the propeller sleds seemed to foreshadow the failure 
of the mission in general.
In October 1930 Wegener, along with Loewe and Rasmus Villumsen, traveled from the western 
station to visit Georgi and Sorge at Ice Central and supply the station with the food they would 
need to overwinter. Loewe, who had lost several toes due to frostbite on the trip to Ice Central, 
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stayed with Georgi and Sorge at the station, as he was unable to return. The five men celebrated 
Wegener's fiftieth birthday on November 1, and the same day, Wegener and Villumsen 
departed with sleds and seventeen dogs for the station on the west coast. The men knew they 
had too little food for five men to overwinter in Ice Central. As winter approached and 
temperatures dropped, Wegener and Villumsen raced for their lives toward the west coast. They 
never reached the western station. Wegener collapsed, presumably of a heart attack caused by 
the immense stress of skiing at high altitude. Villumsen buried Wegener, took his diaries with 
him and disappeared into the ice. His body has never been found.180 Wegener's men continued 
their work to its scheduled conclusion in August 1931. Kurt Wegener traveled to Greenland to 
oversee the completion of his brother's work.181
180 Green, Alfred Wegener, Science, Exploration, and the Theory of Continental Drift, 586-593.
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In scientific terms the expedition was a great success. His final expedition provided the first 
measurement of the thickness of the Greenland inland ice, as well as important details on the 
composition of the Arctic atmosphere. Wegener and his team also were the first to cross 
Greenland at its widest point. Furthermore, his team achieved the first overwintering on the 
inland ice, exploring the hitherto unknown northeastern part of Greenland. After his fourth 
expedition, for the first time, climatological cross-sectioning up to high altitude terrain could 
be determined with a full year of meteorological and glaciological measurements. Wegener 
conducted the first long-term study ever in Greenland, collecting valuable data from the depths 
of the ice. Wegener also was among the first to identify correctly the formation of tornados.182 
He had wanted to revolutionize climate research, and he inaugurated kite and balloon flights in 
pursuit of polar climate research. Nearly a half century passed before Wegener's continental 
drift theory became the foundation of modern plate tectonic theory. His thoughts on the 
69
formation of planets so preceded his time that he received little credit for his work in this 
field.183
183 Wutzke, Durch die weiβe Wüste, Leben und Leistungen des Gronlandforschers und Entdeckers der 
Kontinentaldrift Alfred Wegener, 226.
184 Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World: A History, 1870-1940, 148-149, 153.
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3.2.8.3. Wegener's Legacy
Alfred Wegener devoted his entire life to research and science. Wegener's expeditions marked 
the end of the great age of heroic exploration. He ranks with the other great Arctic explorers 
who died in the midst of their polar work: Sir John Franklin, Roald Amundsen, Robert Scott, 
and Ernest Shackleton.
Although glaciology, meteorology and geology meant little to the German public, Wegener's 
heroic death made him an instant international celebrity. Murphy wrote of the accolades he 
received: “Both Greenland expeditions attained a level of international acclaim for German 
polar research that had neither precedent nor successor. Wegener, more than any other German, 
has left a lasting impression on the global image of the polar explorer.”184 The expeditions 
claimed great scientific achievements. Wegener was epochal, achieving numerous 
breakthroughs in the North and leaving a lasting impression on the international world of polar 
exploration. German national pride surged with Wegener's achievements in the harsh and 
dangerous Arctic environment. Not only had Germany reentered the polar competition after so 
many years of absence, but it now ranked with the leading exploring nations.185 The expedition 
marked the revival of German Arctic exploration.
On February 22, 1908 Wegener noted in his diary: “I came up with the following idea today: if 
a money man wanted to spend millions on polar research, he would best do so in the form of a 
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foundation. He would have to found an institute for polar research.”186 Today the German 
institute for Polar and Marine Research (Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz Zentrum fur Polar- 
und Meeresforschung) honors his achievements. In Greenland four locations bear his name: 
“Alfred Wegener Peninsula,” just to the north of the Kamarajuk Glacier in Greenland; 
“Wegener's Peninsula,” on the Jameson Land on the eastern coast of Greenland; “Cape 
Wegener,” which lies close to Peary Land in the north of Greenland; and the “Wegener Islands” 
in the Ingolf Fjord on the northeast coast. Furthermore, the “Wegener crater” on the moon 
attests to Wegener's contributions to atmospheric science.187 The March 29, 1999 issue of Time 
magazine ranked Wegener among “the 100 greatest minds' of the 20th century.”188
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3.2.9. Zeppelin's Polar Journey
The story of the Zeppelin expedition to the Arctic in 1931 reflects the business interests of an 
individual, German national interests in restoring national pride during the traumatic years of 
the Weimar Republic following the Great War, and national interest in scientific advancement. 
The Zeppelin expedition marked Germany's first expedition into the Arctic by air.
71
3.2.9.1. The Count of Zeppelin (1838 - 1917)
Ferdinand Adolf Heinrich August Count of Zeppelin (Graf von Zeppelin) was an aircraft 
manufacturer who founded the Zeppelin airship company.189 The first successful Zeppelin 
flight took place on July 2, 1900 with the Airship Zeppelin- LZ1 (Luftschiff Zeppelin 1) over 
Lake Constance near Friedrichshafen in southern Germany. As he worked to improve his 
airships technologically, the Count of Zeppelin began to consider the use of airships for 
scientific and geographical research in the Arctic. In 1910 Zeppelin conducted several 
exploratory journeys to Spitzbergen to study the usefulness of an airship in the Arctic. Members 
of the Ministry of the Interior, Erich von Drygalski, Hugo Hergesell, Prince Heinrich of Prussia 
and others accompanied Count Zeppelin.190 These preparatory expeditions demonstrated to 
Zeppelin the feasibility of his airships in the Arctic.
189 The term Zeppelin refers to airships manufactured by the German Zeppelin Company, which constructed and 
operated the first rigid airship.
190 Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World, A History, 1870-1940, 109.
3.2.9.2. Aeroarctic
In 1919 Walther Bruns (1889-1955), a retired Zeppelin captain, acted upon the Count of 
Zeppelin and his predecessors' idea to use the airship as a means of transportation between 
Europe and the Pacific by the shortest trans-Arctic route. His motive was more economic than 
scientific. Bruns invited a group of interested aviation specialists, technicians, and scientists to 
form a committee to examine the possibility of an airship traffic route, which led to the 
formation of the "International Study Society for the Exploration of the Arctic by Airship" 
(Internationale Studiengesellschaft zur Erforschung der Arktis mit Luftfahrzeugen), better 
known as Aeroarctic, in 1924. He attracted the most prominent domestic and foreign scientists 
and engineers to this society, eighty-three signatories representing twenty-two countries. The 
founding president was the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen, one of the world's best-known Arctic 
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explorers, and a recent Nobel Peace Prize laureate. Bruns himself acted as general secretary.191 
The Aeroarctic's main goal was Arctic research with the use of an airship. When Aeroractic 
was founded, Germany was excluded from the League of Nations192 and was going through 
difficult economic times. Therefore, Germans welcomed any opportunity to cooperate with 
other states as a step forward to end German isolation after World War I.193
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Nansen approached Hugo Eckener in 1928 with the proposal to use the airship Graf Zeppelin, 
named after the company's founder, for an Arctic expedition.194 After Nansen's sudden death 
in 1930, Eckener succeeded him as president of the Aeroarctic society. Eckener revived 
Germany's interest in the Zeppelin project and can therefore be called the “protector of the 
Zeppelin legacy,”195 the most influential and responsible person for the realization of the 
Zeppelin flights to the pole.
Eckener felt a moral obligation towards Nansen to continue the Arctic Zeppelin project, but he 
lacked the financial means.196 Eckener therefore gave lectures throughout Germany to raise 
money for the Arctic journey. In promoting his project, Eckener turned the expedition into a 
marketing tool, and believed that “science had to be served, but it could serve as well.”197 
Finally the Australian Arctic explorer Sir Hubert Wilkins offered a plan. Wilkins wanted to 
take the submarine Nautilus from Spitzbergen to the North Pole, surface at the Pole and make 
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contact with the airship. The proposal drew the support of the American Hearst press, which 
funded the activities of the airship. Eckener signed a deal with William Randolph Hearst:198
198 Hearst was newspaper publisher and founder of the largest newspaper chain and media company.
199 Eckener, Im Zeppelin über Lander und Meere, Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen, 200.
200 Eckener, Im Zeppelin über Lander und Meere, Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen, 198-203.
“If the airship and the submarine succeed in getting to the North Pole and in exchanging 
passengers and mail, the Hearst Cooperation will pay $150,000 for reporting rights on 
board the airship. If the airship and the submarine merely succeed in meeting at the 
North Pole, the Hearst Cooperation will pay $100,000. On the other hand, if there is 
merely a meeting somewhere in the Arctic, the cooperation will merely pay $30,000.”199
The signing of the agreement generated tremendous publicity, but technical difficulties kept the 
Nautilus from participating in the expedition. Hearst nevertheless remained interested in the 
Arctic project and the parties altered the agreement to support a meeting between the airship 
and the large Russian icebreaker Malygin. The Russian government agreed both to the 
encounter and an exchange of mail.200
On July 24, 1931, the airship Graf Zeppelin (LZ-127) left Berlin for a one-week flight. The 
Zeppelin traced the following route: Berlin - Leningrad-Arkhangelsk - Franz Josef Land - 
Severnaya Zemlya - Taimyr Peninsula - Novaya Zemlya - Arkhangelsk - Berlin. The airship 
carried a team of scientists from Germany, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Sweden. 
Hugo Eckener commanded the flight, with the Russian Professor Rudolf Lazarevich 
Smoilovich serving as the scientific leader of the expedition. Thirty-six hours after departing 
from Leningrad, the Graf Zeppelin sighted the Russian ice breaker Malyign at Franz-Josef- 
Land. The encounter took place and mail was exchanged in a matter of twenty minutes, due to
74
Eckener's growing concerns regarding ice drift and approaching icebergs. After the encounter, 
the principle scientific tasks of the expedition began: meteorological observations in the Arctic, 
including the launching of several radiosondes, measuring variation in the earth's magnetic 
field; mapping and geographic exploration of previous unknown or poorly charted Arctic areas 
such as the islands of Severnaya Zemlya and Novaya Zemlya; and photographing unmapped 
regions using a special panoramic camera.201
201 Eckener, Im Zeppelin über Lander und Meere, Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen, 198-203.
202 Kohl-Larsen, Die Arktisfahrt des „Graf Zeppelin,“ Im Auftrag der internationalen Gesellschaft zur 
Erforschung der Arktis mit Luftfahrzeugen, 195.
203 Kohl-Larsen, Die Arktisfahrt des „Graf Zeppelin,“ Im Auftrag der internationalen Gesellschaft zur 
Erforschung der Arktis mit Luftfahrzeugen), 194. Translated by author.
204 de Syon, Germany and the Airship, 1900 — 1939, 168.
In just eight days, rich scientific material had been gathered under calm and quiet conditions, 
data that otherwise might have been collected only by several expeditions in at least two years 
of strenuous work.202 The geographic results changed the map of the Arctic region with the 
information obtained during the flight. The Arctic was now so thoroughly mapped that for the 
first time a complete picture of the region had emerged. Politicians described the expedition “as 
a triumph of science and technology.” Further they stated that the airship was a symbol of “a 
new German rise, that was achieved through hard will.”203
The Zeppelin expedition to the Arctic contributed not only to numerous scientific discoveries, 
but also to the symbolic value of the airship by providing hope and a new sense of German 
national pride. “Technological achievement thus came to represent a measure of the German 
soul, the product of hard work, relentlessly carried forward despite difficult conditions,” wrote 
historian Guillaume de Syon. The limits of scientific knowledge were extended and obstacles 
were proven to be “political and not technological.”204
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3.2.9.3. Germany's interests in the airship flights to the Arctic
Some consider the Zeppelin's flight to the Arctic one of Germany's most successful expeditions 
since 1870.205 The Zeppelin journey brought home numerous scientific results with little 
financial support, no technical or logistic difficulties, and no threat to the lives of any of the 
crew members. The Zeppelin proved itself to be a flying research station able to cover long 
distances. From the beginning, scientists and political figures considered the airship a scientific 
breakthrough and therefore a demonstration of Germany's potential for scientific achievements. 
The German public, on the other hand, neither understood nor appreciated the scientific 
achievements, nor did the majority understand the scientific aims of the expedition. The 
German public viewed the effort as the resurrection of the Zeppelin program and a symbol of 
national pride and strength.
205 Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World, A History, 1870-1940, 125.
206 Eckener, Im Zeppelin über Lander und Meere, Erlebnisse und Erinnerungen, 220-221.
207 de Syon, Germany and the Airship, 1900 - 1939, 166.
208 de Syon, Germany and the Airship, 1900 - 1939, 156.
Eckener himself emphasized that the German population remained faithful to the “thought of 
Zeppelin” and that the airship had a political value and meaning. He therefore said that the 
Zeppelin fulfilled an “inner mission.”206 On the other hand, Eckener's primary interest was 
technological advancement in aviation. As a businessman, he wanted the airship factory to 
thrive. Therefore, his primary goal was the development and advancement of the airships, as 
opposed to the furthering of other fields of science.207 Eckener thus pursued scientific 
achievements to further his business interest in the Zeppelin program. He knew that scientific 
achievements were necessary to garner funding for the expedition; science therefore was a 
necessary by-product of his efforts. But for Eckener, “technological power took priority over 
scientific endeavor,” according to Syon.208
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The project also claimed an international character owing to all the scientists from different 
countries who participated in the project. The fact that other countries, such as Russia, joined 
together in a scientific expedition, shortly after World War I, certainly helped to raise 
Germany's image and reputation around the world. The Zeppelin expedition to the Arctic thus 
reflects a mixture of political interest in uniting the nation and raising Germany's stature in the 
world, Eckener's economic self-interests in keeping the factory running, popular fascination 
with the project, and interest in scientific progress.
3.2.10. Germany's Interest in the Arctic during World War II
With the outbreak of World War II in Europe, the Arctic, although seemingly peripheral, took 
on great strategic significance for both the Allies and the Axis Powers. A large number of ships 
traversed the North Atlantic; therefore, the need for meteorological information to predict 
weather patterns increasingly gained importance.
The German occupation of Norway began on April 9, 1940. Germany quickly overran the 
neutral Norway and continuously occupied the country until the war's end. Operation “Weser 
Exercise” (Weserubung) was conducted with little resistance, although the Royal Norwegian 
Navy destroyed and sank several German ships. The occupation of Denmark met with even less 
resistance and took effect within twenty-four hours.209
209 Martin Kitchen, A history of modern Germany 1800 to the Present (Chicester, United Kingdom: Wiley- 
Blackwell, 2006), 285.
One of the reasons for the German invasion of Norway was the occupation of a number of 
Norwegian airfields, which would be vital to the German air force's aims in the North Atlantic. 
Germany also wanted to secure the many ice-free harbors on Norway's coast. Furthermore, 
Germany wanted to protect the ore fields and secure the transport by rail of iron ore and other 
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minerals from northern Sweden through Narvik, Norway; access to these minerals was vital to 
Germany's war economy.210 Occupation of Norway would also serve Hitler's aims of 
expanding the Aryan race; he sought to incorporate Norwegians into the Greater German 
Reich.211 212From the German perspective, the naval war in the Arctic was part of the war on the 
eastern front.
210 Christ Mann and Christer Jorgensen, Hitler's Arctic war. The German campaigns in Norway, Finland and the 
USSR 1940-1945 (South Yorkshore, England: Pen & Sword, 2002), 32-61.
211 Mann and Jorgensen, Hitler's Arctic war. The German campaigns in Norway, Finland and the USSR 1940­
1945, 188.
212 Franz Selinger, Von Nanok bis Eismitte, meteorologische Unternehmungen in der Arktis 1940-1945 
(Hamburg: Convent Verlag, 2001), 15-16, 46.
3.2.10.1. The Weather War
Aside from Germany's occupation of Norway, another war took place in the Arctic - the 
weather war. The outbreak of World War II in 1939 severely restricted the free international 
exchange of weather data between adversaries. Atmospheric conditions in the Arctic shape 
weather patterns in Europe and the Atlantic; therefore, both the Allies and Germany continually 
observed weather conditions in the Arctic. As the war progressed, each side needed weather 
reports from areas now under enemy control. Long-range forecasts helped the militaries to plan 
and execute operations and engagements at sea and on the European mainland. Without the 
weather data from the Arctic, the belligerents' air and naval operations would have been 
stymied. Thus, the Arctic, which had hitherto been peripheral to the theaters of war, gained
212strategic importance.
Germany's Naval Meteorological Service (Marine-Wetterdienst) and Weather Service of the 
Air Force (Wetterdienst der Luftwaffe) conducted its weather operations, relying on long-range 
weather reconnaissance flights to the Arctic. They also established automatic weather stations 
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and small weather observation posts at remote places in the high North.213 Germany launched 
many of its weather data gathering operations from the northern region of occupied Norway.
213 Franz Selinger, and Werner Schwerdtfeger, Wetterflieger in der Arktis 1940-1944, Erlebnisse und 
Erfahrungen der Wettererkundungs-Staffeln im Hohen Norden (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1982), 7.
214 Selinger and Schwerdtfeger, Wetterflieger in der Arktis 1940-1944, 7.
215 Selinger, Von Nanok bis Eismitte, meteorologische Unternehmungen in der Arktis 1940-1945, 43.
216 Selinger, Von Nanok bis Eismitte, meteorologische Unternehmungen in der Arktis 1940-1945, 221.
217 Selinger, Von Nanok bis Eismitte, meteorologische Unternehmungen in der Arktis 1940-1945, 316.
218 Selinger, Von Nanok bis Eismitte, meteorologische Unternehmungen in der Arktis 1940-1945, 30-33.
With the outbreak of the war and the cessation of regular international weather reports, weather 
flights became essential.214 The Weather Squadron 5 (Wettererkundungsstaffel 5, known as 
Westa 5) under the command of Captain Oelze and operating out of Trondheim-Vaernes and 
Banak (Norway) made regular twice-daily flights for the next five years across the Atlantic to 
Iceland, Greenland, and Jan Mayen.215 By November 1943 the Westa 5 had conducted more 
than 2,000 weather reconnaissance flights to the Arctic.216 By the autumn of 1944, severe 
scarcity of fuel in the Luftwaffe led to curtailment and finally abandonment of the daily weather 
reconnaissance flights, and the squadrons Westa 5 and 6 disbanded almost simultaneously.217
By the summer of 1940, Germany began to use weather ships. Few of these operations 
succeeded in fulfilling their missions; most failed for a variety of reasons including bad weather 
or capture by Allied forces. The Germans used fishing trawlers, favored for their presumed 
ability to escape Allied detection, while at the same time supplying vital meteorological data, 
but this tactic proved unsuccessful. The escalating threat posed by Allied sea and land forces 
caused the German military to establish land-based stations that could report the accurate 
weather data.218
In view of the growing Allied surveillance of the Arctic sea and the numerous losses of weather 
vessels, Hans-Robert Knoespel, chief German meteorologist, suggested the establishment of a 
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stationary meteorological site on Spitzbergen. The weather stations were code-named with a 
reference to the leader's name. In 1941, the first station, code-named Knospe (bud in German), 
after its leader Knoespel, began operations in Spitzbergen.219
219 Selinger, Von Nanok bis Eismitte, meteorologische Unternehmungen in der Arktis 1940-1945, 67.
220 Franz Nusser, “Die Arktisunternehmen des deutschen Marinewetterdienstes in den Jahren 1940-1945,” 
Deutscher Wetterdienst, Seewetteramt, Einzelveroffentlichung, Nr. 96 (1979): Introduction.
221 Selinger, Von Nanok bis Eismitte, meteorologische Unternehmungen in der Arktis 1940-1945, 258-259; 
Nusser, Die Arktisunternehmen des deutschen Marinewetterdienstes in den Jahren 1940-1945, 89-98.
222 Wilhelm Dege, War North of 80, The last German Arctic Weather Station of World War II (Colorado: 
University Press of Colorado, 2004), 297-301.
The German Navy and Air Force (Luftwaffe) secretly established several manned weather 
stations in East Greenland, Svalbard, Franz Josef Land, and Hopen Island. While these 
operations involved less risk than many others, numerous lives were lost through both enemy 
action and accidents.220 The stations sent regular weather reports until eventually the Allied 
Forces discovered and destroyed most of the stations. The crews usually managed to escape by 
U-boat or aircraft; only a few went into captivity or died.221
Against the backdrop of the worsening war situation and threatened resources, which rendered 
weather forecasting work increasingly difficult, Germany considered the implementation of 
stationary automatic weather reporting stations. The Navy (Kriegsmarine) developed and 
deployed both floating weather buoys (Wetterfunkgerat See - WFS) and land stations 
(Wetterfunkgerat Land - WFL), which were designed to be deployed by U-boats and by landing 
parties, respectively. At the same time the Luftwaffe deployed only land stations, code-name 
toad (Krote). Land units were used either to fill the summer gap between evacuation of one 
party from a manned station and its re-occupation in the fall, or to provide weather data in an 
area where a manned station was likely to be discovered.222
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Of the forty weather buoys (WFS) the Navy intended to use, up to May 1945, twenty-four units 
were transported on U-boats, but only fifteen were deployed. The rest were either lost or 
destroyed on the boats or brought back due to changes in the operational plans or expired 
storage time. Only three buoys (WFS) were deployed in the Arctic, between Iceland and 
Novaya Zemlya.
The Luftwaffe deployed thirteen WFL units and seven Krote units between 1942 and 1945. The 
WFL units were deployed from Labrador to Novaya Zemlya and the Gulf of Bothnia. One of 
the WLF units, code-named Kurt, was erected in northern Labrador, Canada in October 1943.223 
After the war, most stations were destroyed by unknown persons or scrapped in the course of 
clean-up by Norwegian authorities.
223 Dege, War North of 80, The last German Arctic Weather Station of World War II, 297-301.
224 Nusser, “Die Arktisunternehmen des deutschen Marinewetterdienstes in den Jahren 1940-1945,” 69.
225 Franz Selinger, “Deutsche automatische Wetterstationen in der Arktis 1942-1945.” Mitteilungen: 
Polarforschung 55, no. 1 (1985): 67.
The establishment of both floating weather buoys and land-based stations to detect 
meteorological conditions played a vital role in Germany's abilities to prosecute its war aims. 
Germany made numerous noteworthy technological advancements during the war,224 including 
the development and construction of automatic weather stations, which reached their peak in 
development by the end of the war. Years later, other countries adopted the use of such German 
automatic weather stations.225
3.2.10.2. Scientific advancements
Beginning in 1943, when German stations were accompanied by military personal, the soldiers 
developed an interest in doing scientific research, time permitting. They then fulfilled a double 
function: soldier and scientist. Their contribution to the war effort was immense. Nevertheless, 
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they knew that they would not come home with glory and fame, and the general public would 
hardly take notice of their expeditions. They fought a different kind of war - the weather war. 
Despite their discovery, the manned operations can be considered successful in reporting 
weather observation and in planning, organizing, establishing and operating these remote 
weather stations.
The interests of the German government and the scientists who manned the weather stations in 
the Arctic differed. The government sought weather reports for the strategic planning. 
Individuals, on the other hand, fulfilled their duties in the far North by operating weather flights 
and stations, but they pursued additional scientific interests in the region, including geological, 
microclimatic, ice, and geomagnetic research, as well as research on Northern Lights.226
226 Nusser, Die Arktisunternehmen des deutschen Marinewetterdienstes in den Jahren 1940-1945. Deutscher 
Wetterdienst, 113.
From a scientific point of view, groundbreaking achievements took place in the Arctic during 
the war. German scientists and technicians gathered data in greater density and integrity from 
these remote areas than had previously been collected, however most data were lost during and 
after the German surrender.
The broader public only learned after the war of the achievements of engineers, meteorologists, 
sailors, and pilots involved in the development and use of the weather stations during the war. 
The war in the Arctic is often called the secret weather war; it was so secret, that quite a few 
automatic stations were discovered only decades after the war.
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3.2.11. Conclusion
Historian David Murphy asserts that German polar history represents each of the four German 
political systems. There was the competitive multi-stage Germany of the pre-unification, the 
aggressive and powerful Wilhelmine Reich, the pluralistic and international Weimar 
democracy of the interwar period and the Third Reich of Hitler and Nazi Germany.227 German 
polar explorers tried during each of these eras to establish their country as a leading exploring 
nation.
227 Murphy, German Exploration of the Polar World, A History, 1870-1940, preface.
While the century of whaling in the Arctic represented primarily the pursuit of economic aims, 
Germans also exhibited the urge to compete with other great seafaring nations. The German 
nation, which was very fragmented and lacked power and naval force, could only enter the field 
of polar research at a late stage. When the first German expeditions left for the far North in 
1868, Germany was under the rule of the Prussian Otto von Bismarck and King Wilhelm I. 
After the Prussian imperial wars, German territories were unified into a single Germans state 
in 1871. This newly founded Germany inflamed nationalist feelings throughout the country. 
Petermann took advantage of this new awakening by emphasizing German virtues, nation­
building and new national identity to garner support for the First German North Polar 
Expedition. The era of Koldewey and the first German Arctic exploration served as character 
formation, gaining Arctic experience, and pursuit of scientific progress. Alfred Wegener 
represented the heroic age of polar exploration. After his tragic death, he become Germany's 
most famous polar hero and demonstrated that Germany could withstand the international 
competition of polar exploration.
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After World War I Germany was isolated, a significant setback from a science point of view. 
The Weimar Republic experienced peace settlements with reparations and the surrender of 
German territories. Polar exploration seemed to move into the distance. Most Germans felt little 
enthusiasm for the new Weimar Republic, which failed to restore to the nation stability and 
economic vitality. In this context, many Germans looked to aviation, as exemplified by the 
Zeppelin, to express their nation's technological potential. The establishment of the 
International Society for the Aeroarctic led to international promotion of the Zeppelin 
exploration in the Arctic. By the time Hitler's Germany pursued his aims in the polar regions, 
science had become the most valuable German polar tradition.
Thus, from beginning of German polar exploration in 1860s to present, the pursuit of science 
has shaped the character of national expeditions. Science has been more than data gathering on 
expeditions with other aims; often the pursuit of science was the primary goal. German 
initiatives in the Arctic have played no small part in the history of science in the region and in 
the international cooperation that characterizes research in the region today. Today international 
pooling of resources, sharing of responsibility, exchange of information, and division of labor 
exemplify research in the Arctic.
3.3. After World War II
3.3.1. Introduction
Only a few years after the end of the Second World War, the United States and the USSR 
formed a western and an eastern alliance system, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, respectively. 
Due to their close proximity in the Arctic, the United States and the USSR faced each other 
directly with their nuclear weapons during the Cold War era. In the 1980s, significant political 
changes in the USSR, such as new leadership in the Kremlin, openness to economic 
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restructuring and increased political freedom paved the way for a more open Arctic. Mikhail 
Gorbachev's eagerness to begin a new era of peaceful relations with the West, most clearly 
expressed in his Murmansk speech in 1987, opened up the eastern part of the region and allowed 
for the first time the prospect of international cooperation, collaboration and common polar 
research.
After the Second World War, the Federal Republic of Germany slowly resumed polar research, 
with individual scientists conducting research through their personal relationships and contacts 
with foreign researchers. Investments in polar infrastructure made sense only on a long-term 
perspective, and German scientists simply could not amass the necessary resources in the 
immediate post war era. Consequently, West German polar researchers's ambitions generally 
failed during this era.228
228 Klaus Fleischmann, Zu den Kaltepolen der Erde - 50 Jahre deutsche Polarforschung (Bielefeld: Delius, 
Klasing & Co. KG, 2005), 160.
229 Carl Troll, “Julius Büdel und die moderne Geomorphology. Eine Wurdigung seines Werkes anlasslich seines 
70. Geburtstages,” Erdkunde, Band 27, Heft 4 (1973).
3.3.2. Stauferland Expedition
However, between 1959 and 1967 Julius Büdel, a West-German geographer with a focus on 
geomorphology, conducted three expeditions to Spitsbergen (Barents0ya - Edge0ya) to 
investigate the influence of climatic conditions on landscape design. He belonged to the old 
family of the “Staufer” and therefore named the expeditions the “Stauferland Expeditions.” The 
project included a pre-expedition with three companions in 1959, and two main expeditions 
with a total of twenty-five participants in 1960 and 1967, generously funded by the German 
Research Association. The Stauferland Expeditions were the first genuinely German forays into 
the polar region in the post-World War II era.229
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3.3.3. Germany in the field of international scientific research
3.3.3.1. International Year of Geophysics (1957-1958)
The International Year of Geophysics (IGY) in 1957-1958, now recognized as the Third Polar 
Year, marked a fundamental turning point for German polar researchers: the IGY was a 
worldwide international joint venture of all fields of geosciences. The ambitious program 
allowed German scientists to rejoin the international community of polar researchers.
Under the IGY flag, West German researchers participated in a first truly international research 
project, the EGIG-I 1957/1960 (Expedition Glaciologique Internationale au Groenland) under 
French leadership together with France, Denmark, Austria and Switzerland. The project aimed 
to measure the dynamics and the mass balance of the Greenland inland ice. While France 
provided the entire expedition logistics, the scientific program was distributed, with the German 
groups taking geodetic and geophysical measurements. At EGIG-II 1967/1968, ice thickness 
measurements were carried out, as in Alfred Wegener's time, but with significantly improved 
logistics. The EGIG expeditions were important milestones which slowly brought German 
polar research back into the international polar research community and gave young scientists 
a chance to gain their first polar expedition experience.230
230 Reinhard A. Krause, “Daten statt Sensation. Der Weg zur internationalen Polarforschung aus einer deutschen 
Perspektive,” Berichte zur Polar- und Meeresforschung 609 (2010): 88-89.
231 Biological Investigations on Marine Antarctic Systems and Stocks.
German undertook several Antarctic expeditions and participated in international Antarctic 
research programs, such as the Biomass program.231 This promising and successful cooperation 
in Antarctica was politically implemented in the Antarctic Treaty, which has been in force since 
1961 and regulates peaceful cooperation between the states in this region. They were also the 
prerequisite for East German researchers to gradually become involved in polar research as 
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guest scientists on Soviet Antarctic expeditions. Both German states joined the Antarctic Treaty 
with a time lag of several years (GDR 1974, FDR 1979) and achieved consultative status in 
reverse time lag (FRG 1981, GDR 1987).232
232 Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, “Polarforschungsagenda 2030. Status und Perspektiven der deutschen 
Polarforschung,” Deutsches Nationalkomitee SCAR/IASC (2017): 8.
233 Fleischmann, Zu den Kaltepolen der Erde - 50 Jahre deutsche Polarforschung, 28, 190.
234 Fleischmann, Zu den Kaltepolen der Erde - 50 Jahre deutsche Polarforschung, 76-81.
3.3.3.2. The Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum fur Polar- und Meeresforschung
In 1979 the West-German cabinet approved the establishment of a polar research institute in 
Germany, an important milestone in German polar research. Ultimately, the driving force was 
a foreign policy objective: the admission of the FRG to the consultative round under the 
Antarctic Treaty. To achieve consultative status, a comprehensive Antarctic research program 
was needed as well as permanent contribution to Antarctic research. Only as a member of the 
Antarctic Treaty is it possible to participate actively in the design and definition of future 
activities.233 For the first time in history Germany now established an institutionalized long­
term polar research program. The Alfred-Wegener-Institute for Polar Research, today Alfred- 
Wegener-Institut Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research (AWI), was founded in 1980 
as a national scientific center for polar research. With the foundation of the AWI in 
Bremerhaven in 1980, the completion of the Georg von Neumayer Research Station on the 
Ekstrom Ice Shelf in Antarctica in March 1981 and the commissioning of the ice-breaking 
research and supply vessel Polarstern in December 1982, Germany fulfilled the prerequisites 
for consultative status under the Antarctic Treaty.234
The AWI today is the national center for German Arctic and Antarctic research. It is responsible 
for the scientific tasks of multidisciplinary polar and marine research, the coordination of 
German polar research and its logistical support on a national and international level. With the 
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opening of the Arctic regions to the international community in the mid-1980s, German 
research programs were expanded to include Arctic issues and the establishment of 
corresponding research stations. The Koldewey Station in Ny-Alesund on Spitsbergen, founded 
in 1991, has been operated by the AWI together with the French Institute Paul Emile Victor 
(PEV) as an extensive Arctic research base since 2003. The German-Russian research station 
Samoylov Island, established in 1998, is mainly dedicated to permafrost research in the Lena 
Delta. Furthermore, the AWI's research platforms include the above-mentioned vessel 
Polarstern and the two-research aircraft Polar 5 and Polar 6. The AWI supports initiatives to 
further international cooperation in logistics, in order to improve access and joint operation of 
research stations in polar regions. For almost thirty years the German polar research program 
with its infrastructure is closely internationally linked. It has contributed to major research 
programs and holds a significant share of the current in-depth understanding of the role of the 
polar regions within the Earth system.235
235 Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum fur Polar-und Meeresforschung, accessed April 30, 2018, 
https://www.awi.de.
3.3.3.3. GDR (German Democratic Republic)
Research of the GDR, or East Germany, mainly focused on Antarctica. From 1959 scientists 
from the GDR participated in Soviet Antarctic expeditions as guest scientists. Their 
participation was organized by the National Committee for Geodesy and Geophysics of the 
GDR. In 1969 the Central Institute for Physics of the Earth in Potsdam took over the 
organization of Antarctic research and in 1974 the GDR joined the Antarctic Treaty. In 1976 
the GDR founded the Georg-Forster-Station near the Russian station Novolasarevskaya in 
Antarctica. Since 1985, ozone soundings of the atmosphere have taken place there. In 1987, the 
GDR was finally admitted to the consultative round of the Antarctic Treaty states. After the 
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reunification of Germany in 1990, the AWI brought together German polar research, which had 
previously been conducted on two different tracks.236
236 Hans-Jurgen Paech, “Die DDR-Antarktisforschung - eine Retrospektive,” Polarforschung 60, no. 3 (1990): 
199.
237 Since 1976, the BGR has also begun geo-scientific Antarctic research. In response to Germany's accession the 
Antarctic Treaty in 1979, the BGR responded to the resulting obligations with two major long-term geological and 
geophysical field works in the summer of 1979/80 called the GANOVEX I program (German Antarctic North 
Victoria Land Expedition). The expeditions carried out by the FRG since 1978 contributed to the fact that the FRG 
was accepted into the round of consultative states in 1981.
Solveig Estrada, Detlef Damaske, Andreas Laufer, and Karsten Piepjohn, “30 Jahre Terrestrische Polarforschung 
der Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe - ein Ruckblick,” BGR (2011): 9, accessed from May 1, 
2018,
https://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Themen/Polarforschung/Historie/historie_node.html.
3.3.3.4. Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR)
As part of the project “Geo-scientific investigations in the North Atlantic” (1973-1977) funded 
by the (West German) Federal Ministry of Economics and Labor, the Federal Institute for 
Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) began polar research as well. In the years 1974 to 
1977, the BGR began large-scale geophysical investigations in the Arctic, the results of which 
helped to initiate industrial exploration, for example, in the Barents Sea.237
The initial development phase of German polar research came to an end in the mid-1980s. In 
addition to technical innovations, further developments of polar infrastructure, evoked a change 
in the content of research. While the initial focus of the expeditions was on biological and geo- 
scientific findings, oceanographic and meteorological topics drew more attention.
3.3.4. History of the AEPS/AC
Prior to the negotiations for the establishment of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS), the predecessor of the Arctic Council, the Arctic region was dominated by strategic 
calculation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Many saw the region as the hot
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spot of the Cold War, as the geographical distance between the two superpowers was closest in 
the Arctic. The first important transformation of the Arctic began in the late 1980s and early 
1990s with the end of the Cold War and the downfall of the former Soviet Union.238
238 Timo Koivurova, “Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty - Evaluation and a New Proposal,” Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law 17, no. 1 (2008): 14.
239 Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Speech in Murmansk,” Moscow: Novostoi Press Agency, 1987, 24.
240 Douglas C. Nord, The Changing Arctic. Creating a Framework for Consensus Building and governance 
within the Arctic Council (New York: Palsgrave Macmillan, 2016), 28.
In 1987, President Mikhail Gorbachev held the famous “zone of peace” speech in Murmansk, 
which paved the way for the institutional development of Arctic governance. In this speech 
Gorbachev outlined the Soviet Union's Arctic foreign policy emphasizing the promotion of the 
Arctic region as a zone of peace and asking to bring down barriers that had so far frustrated 
efforts to create cooperative arrangements in the region. With the rapid series of events that 
followed, the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, opening a new era when 
international consultation and cooperation on common concerns in the Arctic was possible. A 
wide range of cooperative initiatives ensued, including the establishment of the International 
Arctic Science Committee (IASC) and the AEPS that later culminated in the creation of the 
AC.239 A major disaster that took place during the final years of the Cold War, a serious leak 
of radioactive material at a Soviet nuclear power station in Chernobyl, Ukraine in 1986, had 
highlighted the urgency of such cooperative endeavors. The resulting plume of radioactive 
contamination stretched northwest, eventually reaching portions of Sweden and Finland.
The end of the Cold War and the Chernobyl disaster fostered a movement toward Arctic regime 
building. The global community became concerned about protection of the global environment, 
and scientists, policy makers and the public increasingly viewed the Arctic as a central focus 
for this new environmental awareness.240 During the Cold War, no true scientific circumpolar 
Arctic co-operation took place, but after the hardened fronts of the Cold War era began to melt, 
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a series of meetings took place. In July 1988, the eight Arctic states met in Moscow and drafted 
a document entitled “Proposal for an Organizational Structure of an International Arctic 
Science Committee (IASC).”241 At a meeting in Resolute Bay, Canada in August 1990 all 
Arctic states signed the founding document for the establishment of IASC.242 This non­
governmental international organization, the first association of all Arctic states active in Arctic 
research, contributes to planning and coordinating research projects relating to the Arctic. For 
the first time in history the scientific community had an international organization covering all 
Arctic science.
241 Odd Rogne, Volker Rachold, Louwrens Hacquebord, and Robert Corell, “IASC after 25 Years. Special Issue 
of the IASC Bulletin” (2015): 17, 22, accessed July 4, 2018, https://iasc25.iasc.
242 Department of the Environment Canada, “Brief Report from Founding Meeting, IASC Meeting 1” (1990): 22, 
accessed July 5, 2018, http://iasc25.iasc.info/images/history/historical-docs/15-Report-from-Resolute- founding- 
meeting.pdf.
243 Rogne, Rachold, Hacquebord, and Corell. IASC after 25 Years. Special Issue of the IASC Bulletin, 22.
244 Rogne, Rachold, Hacquebord, and Corell. IASC after 25 Years. Special Issue of the IASC Bulletin, 25.
Non-Arctic countries, however, felt excluded, amongst them the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Therefore, in March 1989, the governments of France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK 
sent written applications to the Arctic States' foreign ministries for membership on the IASC 
Council.243 These applications included brief statements of the countries' interests in and 
contributions to Arctic science, as well as present activities and organizations with respect to 
Arctic research. In January 1991, during the first official IASC meeting in Oslo, polar research 
organizations from France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK were 
admitted full members of the IASC as the first non-Arctic States.244
IASC inspired further initiatives to international co-operation in the Arctic and marked the 
beginning of a new era of collaborative efforts in the region. Numerous negotiations within 
IASC contributed to intergovernmental cooperation in the Arctic. From 1991 to 2006 IASC 
was headquartered in Oslo. Then it relocated to Stockholm for two years (2006 to 2008), before 
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moving in 2008 to Potsdam, Germany. This noteworthy move signaled the Committee's 
recognition of Germany's international standing in polar research. Today the secretariat is 
located in Iceland.
3.3.5. The Formation of the Arctic Council
Spurred by the Chernobyl disaster and other environmental concerns, and inspired by the 
opening of communication between the USSR and the rest of the Arctic nations, the Finnish 
government started a process of establishing an international pollution and contamination 
monitoring regime for the Arctic region in 1989. This became known as the “Finnish Initiative” 
and eventually established the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991.245 
The AEPS was a multilateral, non-binding agreement among the eight Arctic states on 
environmental protection in the Arctic with special focus on radioactive materials and other 
hazardous substances in the region. To cope with the environmental challenges it identified, the 
AEPS established four working groups, which carried out the actual work. The four working 
groups, which still function as part of the AC are: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme (AMAP), Conservation of Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment (PAME), and Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response 
(EPPR).246
245 Piotr Graczyk, and Timo Koiurova, “The Arctic Council,” in Handbook of the politics of the Arctic, ed. Leif 
Christina Jensen, Geir Honneland (Elgar Publishing Limited, 2015): 298-300.
246 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (Rovaniemi, Finland, 1991), accessed July 23, 2018, 
http://library.arcticportal.org/1542/1/artic_environment.pdf.
247 Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (Rovaniemi, Finland, 1991).
The official declaration stated that Germany, as well as the Netherlands, Poland, and the United 
Kingdom, assisted the eight Arctic countries in the preparation of the strategy, and therefore 
granted Observer status to these four countries.247 Member states also were interested in the 
92
inclusion of non-Arctic countries with histories of strong polar research in the Arctic. Moreover, 
these non-Arctic states sustained large industries and were considered as the main generators 
of pollutants that affected the Arctic environment. Additionally, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Great Britain could contribute financially to the AEPS programs and working groups 248 This 
bargaining process, called the “Rovaniemi Process,” led to the adoption of the Declaration on 
the Protection of the Arctic Environment and the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS) in June 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland.249
248 Hakon R. Nilson, “Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS): Process and organization, 1991-97. An 
assessment,” Rapportserie 103 (1997): 6, 32.
249 Nilson, “Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS): Process and organization, 1991-97. An 
assessment,” 6, 32.
250 Graczyk and Koiurova, “The Arctic Council,” 298-300.
251 Arctic Council, “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council” (Ottawa, Canada, 1996), accessed 
January 30, 2018, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/85/EDOCS-1752-v2- 
ACMMCA00_Ottawa_1996_Founding_Declaration.PDF?sequence=5&isAllowed=y.
At nearly the same time as the AEPS was established, Canada initiated a second effort at Arctic 
regime building, with a broader focus. During a visit to the Soviet Union in November 1989, 
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney delivered a speech at the USSR's Arctic and 
Antarctic Institute in which he suggested a council of Arctic countries to co-ordinate and 
promote cooperation in the region. This proposal laid the cornerstone of what was eventually 
to become the Arctic Council.250 Canada sought to merge the existing AEPS working groups 
into a new organization that would address wider issues of sustainable development. 
Representatives of the eight Arctic States signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the 
Arctic Council in Ottawa on 19 September 1996.251
The first material meeting took place in September 1998 in Iqaluit, Canada. The Declaration on 
the Establishment of the Arctic Council lists the following as the Council's main objectives:
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a. provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the 
Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other 
Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable 
development and environmental protection in the Arctic.
b. oversee and coordinate the programs established under the AEPS on the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP); conservation of Arctic Flora and 
Fauna (CAFF); Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME); and 
Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPPR).
c. adopt terms of reference for and oversee and coordinate a sustainable development 
program.
d. disseminate information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related
252issues.
The Arctic Council has continued the tradition under the AEPS of extending invitations to 
outside organizations and non-Arctic states with significant expertise and experience in the 
Arctic who could contribute to the work of the AC by participating as Observers. Certain states 
and organizations had been active under the AEPS and were grandfathered in under the AC 
Rules and thus, retain their Observer status, 252 53 among them, Germany.
252Arctic Council, “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.” These objectives are quoted directly 
from the Declaration.
253 Arctic Council, “Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.”
254 Piotr Graczyk, “Poland and the Arctic: Between Science and Diplomacy,” Arctic Yearbook (2012): 141.
The four non-Arctic states which demonstrated their engagement and interest in the 
implementation of the AEPS, later became “permanent” Observer states at the AC. This status 
was officially confirmed in the declaration of the September 1998 first ministerial meeting in 
Iqaluit, Canada and reinforced in the Council's Rules of Procedure.254 For Germany it was 
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important to have connections with the emerging structures that could affect science activities 
in the Arctic.
Even in the first years of being an Observer country in the AEPS and later the AC, the Observers 
already felt frustration over the limitations placed on their participation. Despite their 
significance as polar research nations and as an industrial state with a heavy impact on the 
Arctic environment, these four countries are only offered marginal roles in the new process. 
Due to this reduced possibility of influencing any policy processes, within both the AEPS and 
the AC, the Observer countries have concentrated their efforts on the Working Groups, where 
they can contribute through highly valuable scientific resources.255
255 Nilson, “Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS): Process and organization, 1991-97. An 
assessment,” 6.
256 Arctic Council, “Arctic Council Rules of Procedure. First Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting” (Iqaluit, 
Canada, 1998), accessed July 23, 2018, https://oaarchive.arctic- 
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1783/EDOCS-3688-v2- 
ACMMUS02_BARROW_2000_6_SAO_Report_to_Ministers_Annex1_Rules_of_Procedure.pdf?sequence=1 .
Observer status in the Arctic Council is open to non-Arctic states, inter-governmental and inter­
parliamentary organizations, and non-governmental organizations that the Council determines 
can contribute to its work, knowledge and expertise in multiple ways. The Observers are by far 
the largest and most diverse group of the AC, but also the least influential group. According to 
the AC Rules of Procedure, their role is to “observe” the work of the AC and make “relevant 
contributions” to its work, primarily at the working group level. Observers can also deliver 
statements on their views “at normal conversations during meetings of the AC or its subsidiary 
bodies.”256 They can propose, sponsor and participate in Council projects with the permission 
of member states. State delegations re-approve all Observers every two years in Ministerial 
Meetings. Like the Permanent Participants, who represent Indigenous peoples of the Arctic 
region, Observers also lack individual votes in all decision-making processes of the AC.
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Observers can only participate in meetings upon the invitation from the chair and may make 
statements at meetings at the discretion of the chair. In addition, Council meetings typically 
include “ad hoc Observers” who can attend with special permission. They have the same rights 
as permanent Observers, although the member states need to re-approve their participation 
before every Council meeting.257 The European Union frequently acts as an ad hoc Observer. 
Typically, new Observers attend Council meetings for two to five years before the member 
states approve their status as permanent Observers.
257 Arctic Council, “Arctic Council Rules of Procedure. First Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting,” Article 36-38.
258 Oran R. Young, “The Arctic in Play: Governance in a Time of Rapid Change,” The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 2 (2009): 427.
By the beginning of the 21st century, the Arctic region was widely perceived as a region with 
a policy agenda of its own, involving a broad network of transnational cooperative activities. 
The Arctic Council became the prime meeting ground for representatives of all these 
stakeholders.258
3.4. Conclusion
Germany has come a long way from first being a “bystander” in the Arctic to becoming one of 
the leading countries in the region, enjoying a high reputation especially regarding polar 
research. Due to Germany's political circumstances following WWII, it renewed pursuits in 
the Arctic slowly. The IGY in 1957-1958, marked a fundamental turning point for German 
polar researchers, as the IGY represented worldwide international cooperation of all fields of 
geosciences and allowed German scientists to rejoin the international community of polar 
researchers.
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Since Germany was admitted to the Antarctic consultative round, polar research has been 
systematically expanded. For the first time, German polar research has been given continuity 
and a secure basis as a research program. The establishment of the AWI in 1979 marked another 
corner stone for Germany, as of now Germany possessed its own Arctic institution organizing 
polar expeditions and contributed to international science thanks to its elaborated infrastructure. 
Today, Germany has become an international leader in polar research, German polar 
researchers are respected members of an ever-growing international scientific community and 
play a leading role in many multinational projects. In addition to basic research, which today 
accounts for a high focus on climate change, Germany also has economic and political interest 
in the region.
The next chapter examines Germany's contemporary interests of Germany in the Arctic Region. 
In September 2013, the Foreign Office published the “Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines” 
with a subtitle proclaiming “Assume Responsibility, Seize Opportunities.” In these Guidelines, 
the German government emphasizes the growing importance of the Arctic for the global 
community in the light of climate change. These guidelines aim to make the Arctic a central 
focus of German policy. Like all the other stakeholders, Germany is faced with the challenge 
of reconciling its economic interests, which would favor increasing exploitation of the region's 
resources, with protecting the unique Arctic environment. With the melting of the Arctic sea 
ice during the last decades due to global warming, the Arctic is becoming ever more important 
for Germany in geopolitical and in geo-economic terms. Access to the region's raw materials 
is drawing ever closer, which creates great economic opportunities. The reduction in sea ice 
facilitates traffic through the polar sea routes. Therefore, the Federal Government actively 
backs the opening of new shipping routes in the Arctic and has a strong interest in new 
passageways to East Asian trading cities. However, these opportunities carry substantial risk 
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for nature and the environment. These new developments in the region touch upon 
environmental, economic, research and safety issues.
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Chapter 4 Germany's Interests in the Arctic in the Contemporary Era
In recent years, interest in the Arctic region has increased significantly. Since awareness of 
climate change has risen, much more attention has been paid to the Arctic on an international 
scale. Consequences of climate change include increased shipping due to melting ice caps, 
resource exploitation, and expanding tourism, as well as ecosystem changes that threaten 
indigenous lifeways. Thus, these changes have both positive and negative implications.
4.1. German resource interest
4.1.1. Introduction
Historically, the search for biological and mineral resources was an important motive for 
entering research in the polar regions. In the twentieth century, scientists demonstrated the 
limited growth and infinite nature of raw material reserves. As a result, the Arctic attracts 
Germany, along with many other countries outside the region, with its immense reserves of raw 
materials, such as oil, gas and hydrocarbon, many of which are yet unexploited. In its Arctic 
Policy Guidelines, the Federal Government underscores “the great potential for the economies 
of Germany and Europe that Arctic resources hold,” while emphasizing the importance of 
access to a secure and sustainable supply of raw energy materials, which are needed to supply 
Germany with resources. The guidelines also stress the importance of adhering to the highest 
environmental standards in extracting these resources.1
1 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities” 
(Berlin, 2013): 14,18, accessed July 23, 2018, 
https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/International/Leitlinien- 
Arktispolitik.pdf?blob=publicationFile.
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4.1.2. Importance of raw material for Germany
With the largest population and the strongest economy in the EU, Germany requires access to 
raw materials, especially oil and gas, to maintain its competitiveness. As a major consumer of 
raw materials that lacks sufficient domestic reserves, Germany is highly dependent on 
importing energy resources, minerals and raw materials.2
2 Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, "Deutschland-Rohstoffsituation 2016” (Hannover, 2016): 
20, accessed January 5, 2018, https://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Themen/Min_rohstoffe/Downloads/rohsit- 
2016.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4.
3 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, “Energie in Deutschland. Trends und Hintergrunde zur 
Energieversorgung” (Berlin, 2013): 15, accessed January 5, 2018, 
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Energie/energie-in-
deutschland.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3.
4 Volkmar Damm, and others, “Der Arktische Ozean aus Rohstoffwirtschaftlicher und Völkerrechtlicher Sicht,” 
Commodity Top News. Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (BGR) (Hannover, 2016): 4-5, 
accessed January 5, 2018, 
https://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Gemeinsames/Produkte/Downloads/Commodity_Top_News/Rohstoffwirtschaft/52 
_arktis.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4.
Oil remains Germany's most important energy resource. According to the Federal Institute for 
Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR), about 98 percent of Germany's primary energy 
consumption of mineral oil was imported in 2016. Russia is Germany's key supplier of oil and 
gas, delivering almost 40 percent of oil imports in 2016.3 If this trend continues in the future, 
Germany's dependence on Arctic energy resources, especially from Russia, will likely increase, 
which keeps Germany in a vulnerable position. Some major German energy companies such as 
Wintershall, BayernGas and DEA Deutsche Erdoel AG, hold shares in exploration and 
production licenses in the Barents Sea. Both Wintershall and EON have shares in Russian 
natural gas fields (Urengoy/Achimgaz and Yuzhno Russkoye respectively) in Western Siberia.4
Germany also has close bilateral energy relationships with Norway, the second largest supplier 
of German energy demand. Gas imports from Norway rose from 26.1 percent to 34.4 percent 
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between 2000 to 2011.5 In 2013, German chancellor Angela Merkel, during a visit in Oslo, 
emphasized the importance of the German-Norwegian energy partnership and promoted an 
expansion of the already intensive cooperation with Norway in the energy sector. The planned 
direct current cable from Norway to Germany is “a very important and also symbolic 
investment for a close connection with the energy industry in the coming years,” said Merkel.6
5 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, “Energie in Deutschland. Trends und Hintergründe zur 
Energieversorgung,” 15.
6 German Government, “Stippvisite bei guten Freunden” (Berlin, February 20, 2013), accessed January 5, 2018, 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Reiseberichte/2013-02-20-oslo.html.
7 Helga Haftendorn, “Der Traum vom Ressourcenreichtum der Arktis,” Zeitschrift für Auβen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik 5 (2012): 455.
Germany's energy vulnerability toward Norway and Russia is expected to continue to increase. 
Besides oil and gas, Germany's export-oriented economy is also highly dependent on imports 
of minerals and metals, especially rare earths. As a “high tech” producing nation, Germany 
relies on a sufficient supply of these raw materials, minerals and metals, which are 
indispensable for industrial production.7 Against this backdrop, the German export sector has 
become more vulnerable to supply disruption.
4.1.3. Future Outlook
Germany's dependency on foreign resource imports, especially gas form Russia, will make 
Germany vulnerable and could have negative political consequences, as much of the 
undiscovered oil and gas reserves are expected to lie within Arctic territories. Therefore, 
maintaining warm relationships with Russia has gained increasing importance. The recent 
developments in the Ukraine have strained the relationship between the two countries and the 
EU, resulting in increased focus on a secure energy supply in Germany and Europe. The conflict 
has highlighted the need to engage more intensively with geopolitical forces influencing energy 
security in Europe.
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Owing to Germany's growing energy imports and rising energy prices, the German government 
has become more active in coordinating Germany's energy policy. It implemented the “Raw 
Materials Strategy,” in 2010 “to shape appropriate policies in order to help limit market 
distortion and to alleviate its effects,” such as cutting the consumption of primary raw materials 
via recycling, research and development.8 Accordingly, Germany is in the process of 
completely transforming its energy sector. A policy shift towards renewable energy, such as 
solar, wind and biological sources, intensified after Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011. 
This crisis led to Chancellor Angela Merkel's decision to end the production and use of atomic 
energy by 2022, in favor of renewables. Germany aims to produce as much as eighty percent 
of its electricity from renewable sources by 2050.9 Despite the “Energiewende” (energy 
transition), Germany remains heavily dependent on imports of fossil fuels, as its domestic 
resources are largely depleted or extraction is too costly.10 Moreover, in the short and medium 
term, Germany expects to increase its consumption of traditional energy resources, such as oil, 
gas and coal. Therefore, Arctic hydrocarbon reserves and shipping routes interest the German 
government greatly.
8 Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, “The German government's raw material strategy” (Berlin, 
2010): 6, accessed January 5, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/eip-raw- 
materials/en/system/files/ged/43%20raw-materials-strategy.pdf.
9 Federal Ministry of Education and Research, “German Energy Transition” (Berlin, 2018), accessed January 5, 
2018, https://www.bmbf.de/en/german-energy-transition-2319.html.
10 Hardy Grauper, “What exactly is Germany's 'Energiewende?” (2013), accessed January 5, 2018, 
http://www.dw.com/en/what-exactly-is-germanys-energiewende/a-16540762.
11 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, “Rohstoffe - unverzichtbar für den Zukunftsstandort 
Deutschland” (Berlin, 2019), accessed January 10, 2019, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Dossier/rohstoffe- 
und-ressourcen.html.
4.1.4. Conclusion
The German economy needs to import raw materials to maintain and grow its economy. Access 
to raw materials requires not only technological means, but also favorable economic and 
political conditions.11
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Germany depends on a stable and secure global raw material market, and therefore wants to 
strengthen international cooperation (e.g. bilateral raw materials partnerships). In addition, 
engagement in the AC allows for opportunities to build trust and nurture efficient and secure 
trade relations.
Due to Germany's dependency on the import of energy resources, minerals and raw materials, 
the country relies on global stability. Besides the import of energy resources, Germany is also 
an export-oriented country and needs secure shipping lanes in order to maintain competitive.
4.2. German shipping interests
4.2.1. Introduction
The navigability of both the Northeast Passage and the Northwest Passage are increasing, and 
if this trend continues, the Transpolar Route, currently inaccessible to regular vessels, may 
open. Along with other industries, the Arctic transport system and maritime industries must 
quickly adapt to mitigate potential negative consequences.12 It is important to recognize that 
these projections remain uncertain since the pace of global warming has not followed previous 
projections; in fact, warming has occurred faster than expected.
12 Yevgeny Aksenov and others, “On the future navigability of Arctic sea routes: High-resolution projections of 
the Arctic Ocean and sea ice,” Science Direct, Marine Policy 75 (2017): 312.
With the world's maritime transport system at the forefront of globalization, the emergence of 
new sea lanes would have global consequences. The major trading powers of Europe and Asia, 
particularly Germany and China, are preparing their strategies and capabilities in anticipation 
of the possible opening of one such new sea lane to regular commercial transit. Current trends 
in the melting of the sea ice on the Arctic Ocean, the predicted increase in commercial maritime 
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traffic, and potential political instability along the existing routes elsewhere contribute to the 
interest in new shipping lane alternatives.13
13 Margaret Blunden, “Geopolitics and the northern sea route,” International Affaires 88, no. 1 (2012): 115.
14 Marinekommando, “Jahresbericht 2017. Fakten und Zahlen zur maritimen Abhangigkeit der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland” (Hamburg, 2017): 122, 126, 130.
15 Marinekommando, “Jahresbericht 2014. Fakten und Zahlen zur maritimen Abhangigkeit der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland” (Rostock, 2014): 8.
16 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, “Fakten zum Deutschen Auβenhandel" (Berlin, 2017): 2, 
accessed July 23, 2018, https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Aussenwirtschaft/fakten-zum- 
deuschen-aussenhandel.html.
4.2.2. Fact and Figures
In 2017 Germany ranked among the world's largest shipping nations in terms of container ships, 
Germany has the fourth largest merchant fleet in the world and has one of the major export- 
oriented economies. As a result, Germany's economic development is to a large extent 
dependent on the maritime domain and maritime trade routes.14
More than 90 percent of global trade in long-distance goods is carried by sea, making safe sea 
routes essential to the global economy, as well as national economies About 60 percent of 
Germany's imported natural resources and exported goods are transported by sea, a clear 
indication of Germany's dependence on the maritime domain and on well-functioning global 
supply chains.15
In 2016, Germany maintained its position as the world's third largest exporter (behind China 
and the United States) and importer (behind the United States and China). Germany's share of 
world trade (goods exported and imported in U.S. dollars) rose to 7.3 percent in 2017. China 
has become increasingly important as a trading partner for Germany and was the second most 
important market for German exporters outside Europe, after the United States.16 An export- 
oriented country like Germany naturally prizes short, safe maritime trade routes. German 
policy-makers recognize that a potential shorter maritime trading route through the Arctic 
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would promise higher profits with shorter shipping times. German transport vessels already 
supply western Siberia, and German shipyards build more ships capable of navigating the 
northern routes than ever before. 17 When regular traffic along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) 
becomes possible, Germany will be eager to use the NSR to connect with the fast-growing 
Asian economies.
17 Blunden, “Geopolitics and the northern sea route,” 122.
18 Tom Di Liberto, “Northwest Passage clear of ice again in 2016,” accessed January 5, 2018, 
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/event-tracker/northwest-passage-clear-ice-again-2016.
19 Di Liberto, “Northwest Passage clear of ice again in 2016.”
20 Miaojia Liu and Jacob Kronbak, “The Potential Economic Viability of Using the Northern Sea Route (NSR) 
as an Alternative Route between Asia and Europe,” Journal of Transport Geography 18, no. 3 (2009): 436.
4.2.3. Arctic Sea Lanes
In the Arctic, the annual average temperature has been warming at twice the rate of lower 
latitudes. As a result, the melting sea ice is opening the Northwest Passage through northern 
Canada. According to records from Environment Canada, since roughly 2006, the southern 
route of the Northwest Passage has been navigable in the summer almost yearly.18
The Northwest Passage, if navigable, would present a significant shortcut for shipping from 
Rotterdam to Seattle, for example. Usually, ship traffic must go through the Panama Canal or 
around Cape Horn, the southern tip of South America. Passing through the Canadian Arctic 
would cut shipping distances by more than four thousand miles (at least seven thousand km).19 
Likewise, the route from Shanghai to Rotterdam would be 40 percent shorter through an open 
North-East Passage along the Russian northern Arctic than along the route through the Chinese 
Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean.20
Considering canal fees, fuel costs, oceanic transit time, and other variables that determine 
freight rates, these shortcuts could save shipping companies billions of dollars. The savings 
would be even greater for container ships too large for the Panama or Suez Canal. Moreover, 
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these northern Arctic sea routes would also allow the vessels to avoid sailing through politically 
unstable Middle Eastern waters or avoid the danger of going through the South China Sea or 
the Gulf of Aden, where pirates threaten ships and travelers.21
21 Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown. The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming,” 
Foreign Affairs 87, no. 502 (2008): 70.
22 Jerry Norton, “German Ships successfully make Arctic Passage,” Environment (September, 2009), accessed 
March 5, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-shipping-arctic/german-ships-successfully-make- 
arctic-passage-idUSTRE58B01K20090912.
The first non-Russian commercial vessels to traverse the Northeast Passage from Asia to 
Europe were the German merchant ships MV Beluga Fraternity and MV Beluga Foresight 
owned by the Beluga Shipping GmbH. In 2009 they traveled from Ulsan, South Korea, in late 
July to Siberia by way of the Northeast Passage.22
4.2.4. Security
Any disruption to Arctic shipping could restrict global trade in goods and merchandise. The 
Arctic shipping routes must therefore be protected from political tension and military crises by 
means of a stable and effective governance structure that promotes cooperative measures 
among Arctic residents and non-Arctic residents and is based on a clear legal status. 
Cooperation is needed to develop maritime surveillance, common mapping, predictable 
weather forecasting and emergency infrastructure.
Given the advantages of open northern sea routes, Germany's main interests are open and 
secure maritime transport routes, as well as the settlement of territorial disputes and the 
establishment of a search and rescue system. Energy security related topics will play an 
increasing role in German security policy in coming years. Germany therefore has a great 
interest in developing a comprehensive sea rescue system for the region. In 2011 the Arctic
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Council signed an Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue. Berlin wanted to participate in the agreement; however, its wish was rejected by the 
members of the AC supervisory board.23
23 Helga Haftendorn, “Zaungast in der Arktis: Deutschlands Interesse an Rohstoffen und Naturschutz,” 
Internationale Politik 4 (2011): 77.
24 Federal German Government, “White Paper on German Security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr” 
(Berlin, 2016): 50, accessed July 23, 2018, https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Other-Documents/The- 
2016-German-White-Paper-Strategic-Review-and-Way-Ahead.
25 Federal German Government, “White Paper on German Security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr,” 8.
The nexus of maritime trade and security has received increased attention in German security 
and defense discourse in recent years. In 2016 Federal Minister of Defense Ursula von der 
Leyen stated in her introduction in “The White Paper“ on German defense that “securing 
maritime supply routes and ensuring freedom of the high seas is of significant importance for 
an exporting nation like Germany.“ Furthermore the document emphasizes that, due to 
Germany's high dependence on unimpeded maritime trade, “disruptions on supply routes 
caused by piracy, terrorism and regional conflicts can have negative repercussions on 
Germany's prosperity.”24 Germany is willing to take responsibility in security issues, according 
to von der Leyen, and these efforts can only be successful if Germany is interconnected with 
international alliances and organizations and with its allies and partners.25
In the German Arctic Policy Guidelines, published in 2013, Germany promotes “freedom of 
navigation in the Arctic Ocean in accordance with high safety and environmental standards.” 
Furthermore, the document acknowledges “the significant opportunities an opening of the NSR 
would create for Germany.” In cooperation with the Arctic countries, Germany aims to improve 
“the bureaucratic, infrastructure-related and legal framework conditions,” in the Arctic. It 
acknowledges existing shipping regulations, such as the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), but suggests “that environmental and safety standards must be re-examined on a regular 
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basis.” The guidelines underscore Germany's interest in new shipping routes in the Arctic as 
“one of the world's largest importing and exporting nations, the third-largest merchant marine 
in the world and the world's largest fleet of container ships,” noting that the new Arctic sea 
routes could “create significant opportunities for the German shipping.” These pronouncements 
illustrate the German government's interest in “free, safe and peaceful passage through Arctic 
waters.” On several occasions, the document emphasizes Germany's leading position in the 
maritime sector.26
26 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
9.
4.2.5. Conclusion
Despite the fact that the prediction about continued commercial use of the polar sea lanes 
remains vague, Germany already states its interest in safe and peaceful passages through the 
Arctic oceans. Germany emphasizes its eagerness to take responsibility in security issues, 
which can only be achieved through cooperation and international alliances. Germany's wish 
to participate in the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and 
Rescue of the AC was turned down, but in its Policy Guidelines Germany expresses the desire 
for more participation and speaking time in the AC. Being one of the leading export-oriented 
countries, Germany favors the free use of the Northern shipping lanes, as they significantly cut 
costs and therefore increase profits. Germany wants to take advantage of these economic 
opportunities by using its technological capacities.
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4.3. German economic interests
4.3.1. Introduction
The rapid melting of the ice covering the Arctic Ocean not only opens new sea lanes but has 
opened access to the region's raw materials. Experts have identified massive reserves of oil and 
gas within the Arctic region, and Germany, like other industrialized counties, has an interest in 
accessing these reserves to meet its long-term energy needs. In light of the opportunities and 
challenges surrounding these energy reserves, Germany positions itself as a vital participant in 
their responsible development. Its Arctic Policy Guidelines highlight that “harsh climatic 
conditions and the technical challenges that need to be mastered to access Arctic raw materials, 
as well as the particularly sensitive Arctic environment, are leading to an increased need for 
specialized technology and know-how.”27
27 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
6.
28 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,”
4.3.2. Germany's expert knowledge
In the document, Germany emphasizes its vast expert knowledge in the areas of research, 
technology and environmental standards in the Arctic region, which will allow it to contribute 
to sustainable economic development in the North. The special climatic conditions in the Arctic 
and the resulting technical challenges to access raw materials require such specialized 
technology and know-how.28 As a result of the increasing navigability of the sea lanes, German 
maritime technologies and innovative ship-building industries, such as ship propulsion systems 
and special vessels, including ice class ships, can be put to use. Against this background, 
German companies are seeking new economic opportunities in the Arctic region. Germany 
envisions its industries becoming vital suppliers of high-technology products, services and 
6.
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knowledge needed in the Arctic to ensure the highest environmental protection standards for 
sustainable economic development of the region. In stating that only by “adherence to the 
highest environmental standards, economic activities shall be allowed,” the German 
government seeks to make cutting edge technology mandatory for the Arctic region. As German 
companies possess these technologies, the government anticipates new export opportunities in 
the future.29 In its policy guidelines Germany underscores its position as a global leader in this 
domain “especially through its shipyards and maritime contractors.”30
29 Stefan Steinicke, “Germany's Arctic Engagement - Between Environmental Responsibilities and Geo- 
Economic Interests” (PhD diss., Universitat der Bundeswehr, 2017), 287.
30 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
9.
31 Steinicke, “Germany's Arctic Engagement - Between Environmental Responsibilities and Geo-Economic 
Interests,” 287.
32 Steinicke, “Germany's Arctic Engagement - Between Environmental Responsibilities and Geo-Economic
Interests,” 287.
33 Steinicke, “Germany's Arctic Engagement - Between Environmental Responsibilities and Geo-Economic
Interests,” 287.
Furthermore, German economic interests in Arctic resources have expanded. First the interest 
lay primarily in access to raw materials for the production of high-technology products. 
Nowadays Germany sees these products “as a mean to profit from economic activities in 
resource extraction.”31 Thus supplying such high-technology products offers a double 
advantage. As Stefan Steinike writes: “First, new technologies might help Germany to secure 
its growing resource demand. Second, against the background of a growing global resource 
demand, an increase in the demand for new exploration and exploitation technologies is 
expected to increase, too.”32 Germany thus could export these high-technology products.
Therefore, in July 2011 the Federal Government published its National Masterplan for Maritime 
Technologies (NMMT), “which aims to unlock the full potential of these technologies.”33 The 
German Arctic Policy Guidelines highlight, that “by driving forward this cutting-edge maritime 
technology that meets high environmental standards, high-quality jobs are being created and 
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secured in a key future market that is of great strategic importance.”34 Among the key areas of 
maritime technologies are ice and polar technology, deep sea energy resources exploration 
technology, underwater technology, and marine mineral resource exploration technology.35
34 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
6.
35 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, “Nationaler Masterplan Maritime Technologien” (Berlin, 
2014), accessed October 5, 2018, http://www.bmwi.de/DE/Mediathek/publikationen,did=431034.html.
36 Aiswarya Lakshmi, “Germany's Nordic Yards Set to Build Shipyard in Russia” (2015), accessed November 6, 
2018, https://www.marinelink.com/news/germanys-shipyard-nordic386283.
37 Maxim Schwarz, “Linde masterminds the Norway to Sweden. LNG supply chain with mid-scale solutions,” 
Linde Engineering (Pullach, Germany, 2011), accessed December 5, 2018, https://www.linde- 
engineering.com/internet.global.lindeengineering.global/de/images/LNG%20Journal%20article%20about%20Li 
nde's%20Mid-Scale%20LNG%20activities20_117848.pdf?v=4.0
Today German industry is already quite active in the region with regards to supplying 
technology and infrastructure components needed for energy exploration and exploitation. In 
addition, German shipbuilding companies are among the world's leading producers of ice­
breaking ships. In December 2012, the Federal Agency of Sea and River Transport of Russia 
and the German company Nordic Yards signed a contract for the construction of two 
multipurpose salvage vessels designed to work in the Russian Arctic. Nordic Yards is a leading 
producer of highly specialized ships including ice-going ships and icebreakers.36 In another 
example of its expertise in technology suited for the high north, the German company Linde 
was crucial in supplying state of the art technology for the construction of Europe's only base 
load LNG (Liquified Natural Gas) plant at Hammerfest, Norway, which liquefies feed-gas 
delivered by pipeline from the Snohvit field in the Barents Sea.37
4.3.3. Conclusion
The vulnerable and sensitive Arctic ecosystem requires specialized exploration and exploitation 
technology and know-how. German possess the necessary expert knowledge in many different 
areas, from ship building to maritime technology. As a result, Germany envisions developing 
alliances to become a vital partner and supplier of high-technology products, services and 
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knowledge. Germany intends to use this knowledge while adhering to the highest 
environmental standards and thereby contributing to sustainable economic development in the 
Arctic. This “adherence to the highest environmental standards” while operating in the Arctic, 
illustrates Germany's environmental concern of the region. This strong commitment to 
mitigating climate change has contributed to Germany's interest in Arctic environmental 
concerns.
4.4. German environmental interests
4.4.1 Introduction
Germany stands among the leading countries in Europe and the world in terms of its renewable 
energy and climate change policies. In the last decades Germany has become a frontrunner in 
global climate protection with strong commitment internationally. These ambitious policy 
initiatives date back to the 1980s, when Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared climate change as 
the most important environmental problem.38 Chancellor Merkel has described climate change 
as one of the great challenges of the twenty-first century.39 With the Arctic warming at twice 
the global rate, the region functions as the earth's “early warning system.”40 Phenomena such 
as shrinking sea ice in the Arctic Ocean, increased melting of the Greenland ice sheet, thawing 
of permafrost and altered ocean currents affect not only the Arctic region, but the global climate.
38 Helmut Weidner, “Klimaschutzpolitik. Warum Ist Deutschland Ein Vorreiter Im internationalen Vergleich? 
Zur Rolle von Handlungskapazitaten Und Pfadabhangigkeit” (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2008): 6, accessed 
December 5, 2018, https://bibliothek.wzb.eu/pdf/2008/iv08-303.pdf, 5, 8.
39 Bundeskanzlerin. “Weltweites Klimaschutzabkommen weiter entwickeln” (Berlin, 2006), accessed July 23, 
2018, https://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Reiseberichte/gb-weltweites- 
klimaschutzabkommen-weiter-entwickeln.html.
40 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
40.
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Moreover, Germany recognizes a link between a changing climate and security developments 
in the region.
The impacts of climate change in the Arctic are dramatically increasing. According to the 
German Arctic Policy Guidelines: “The Arctic is therefore one of the first regions in which 
climate change is bringing a fundamentally new geographic constellation. The consequences 
are diverse: these developments generate both opportunities and risks, and their effect is felt far 
beyond the Arctic region as such. They touch upon environmental, economic, research and 
safety issues, and are becoming a focus of foreign and European policy.”41
41 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,”
4.
42 Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Combating Climate Change. 
The German Adaption Strategy” (Berlin, 2009): 13-14, accessed December 5, 2018, http://www.bmu. 
de/fileadmin/bmu-import/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/broschuere_dem_klima- wandel_begegnen_en.pdf.
43 Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Combating Climate Change. 
The German Adaption Strategy,” 13, 46.
4.4.2. Impacts on Germany
The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety describes 
in its document “Combating Climate Change, The German Adaption Strategy” how climate 
change is already affecting Germany. The annual temperature has risen by nearly 0.9 degrees 
Celsius since 1901. From 1990 to 1999 meteorologists recorded the warmest decade of the 
entire 20th century. Precipitation has increased by about 9 percent since the beginning of the 
twentieth century.42 A possible worst-case scenario is a global sea-level rise that would threaten 
German coastal regions in general, off shore wind farms and economic centers such as the 
seaport in Hamburg in particular.43
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Former Member of the German Bundestag Franz Thonnes44 emphasized in a speech given at a 
joint conference in Ottawa in 2010 that Germany has a coastline of just under 2,400 km (1,491 
miles) and that the EU is surrounded by four seas and two oceans. Therefore, neither Germany 
nor the EU can be indifferent to a region whose melting ice sheet, rising sea level and increase 
in temperature have a direct impact on Germany and Europe.45 The German government's 
Arctic Policy Guidelines highlight how climate change “directly impacts Germany.”46
44 Former Member of the German Bundestag, Former Member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Former 
Head of the German Delegation to the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference.
45 Franz Thonnes, “Governing the Far North: Assessing Cooperation Between Arctic and Non-Arctic Nations,” 
Ottawa, Canada, 2010. Ottawa joint conference of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
Washington D.C. and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Washington D.C.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/SpeechArktisEng.pdf
46 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,”
5.
47 Florian Gathmann, “Gronland-Reise. Merkel Auf Eis,” Der Spiegel (August 16, 2007), accessed November 1, 
2018, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/groenland-reise-merkel-auf-eis-a-500231.html.
Chancellor Angela Merkel, a physicist and the former Environment Minster of Germany, feels 
compelled to learn about the consequences of global warming first hand. Merkel and then 
Environment Minister Sigmar Gabriel began a two-day visit to Greenland, Ilulissat, in 2007, 
where she pointed out the consequences of climate change. She focused squarely on 
environmental challenges and the resulting responsibilities for Germany and the rest of the 
world in the fight against global climate change.47 In October 2014 at the opening of the Arctic 
Circle conference in Reykjavik, Iceland, Merkel appeared in a video message. As in Greenland 
seven years earlier, she underlined the region's symbolic character in the fight against global 
climate change, as nowhere else are the “dramatic effects of climate change” more evident. She 
further elaborated that changes in the Arctic are affecting large parts of the world, which leads 
to a shared international responsibility for the region. She emphasized that Germany is available 
as a partner with its know-how and research expertise and wants to expand its contribution to 
active Arctic policy. She declared: “we rely on cooperation and coordination to enable us to 
benefit from the economic opportunities whilst protecting the Arctic's sensitive ecosystem thus 
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promoting sustainable development.”48 Merkel has been prominent in the fight against climate 
change on the international arena, including in the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol 
agreement, which has led to her nickname “the climate chancellor.”
48 Angela Merkel, “Videobotschaft auf der Arctic Circle Konferenz Reykjavik.” (Reykjavik, 2014), accessed 
July 5, 2018, http://arcticcircle.org/video-2014. Translated by author.
49 Guido Westerwelle, “Climate Change, International Law and Arctic Research - Legal Aspects of Marine 
Research in the Arctic Ocean,” in Arctic Science, International Law and Climate Change. Beiträge zum 
auslandischen öffentlichen Recht und Volkerrecht, Veroffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts far 
auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 235, ed. Rainer S. Wasum, I. Winkelmann, K. Tiroch (Berlin, 
Heidelberg: Springer 2012).
50 Guido Westerwelle, “Climate Change, International Law and Arctic Research - Legal Aspects of Marine 
Research in the Arctic Ocean.”
51 Federal Ministry of Education and Research, “Rapid climate change. Polar Research as a Global 
Responsibility.” (Berlin, 2015): 14, accessed October 5, 2018, 
https://www.fona.de/mediathek/pdf/Rapid_Climate_Change_in_the_Arctic.pdf, 14.
Other German leaders also have been outspoken on the topic. Former minister of Foreign 
Affairs Guido Westerwelle highlighted Germany's long tradition and significant contributions 
in polar research during a speech at a conference organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in 2011, in which he advocated for free and open research activities in the Arctic, as “the 
challenges of climate change affect us all.”49 He pointed out that many states around the world 
produce emissions and that they “cannot be allowed to be just part of the problem but must 
become part of the solution.” He therefore encouraged efforts of the international community 
to continue scientific research on climate change.50
4.4.3. Climate Research
Because the German government considers the effects of climate change one of the greatest 
challenges of the 21st century, with global consequences, including in Germany, German polar 
research increasingly focuses on gaining a better understanding of the fluctuations and forces 
that shape regional and global climate patterns.51 The German Arctic Policy Guidelines 
emphasize the great importance on polar research. “The knowledge gained through these 
activities is a key factor in understanding the Arctic region and shaping Arctic policy. Enabling 
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free and responsible scientific research based on cooperation, as well as enhancing the 
conditions for research, should be a high priority of the international community.”52
52 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
18.
53 Federal Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Combating Climate Change. The 
German Adaption Strategy,” 6.
54 Federal Ministry of Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Combating Climate Change. The 
German Adaption Strategy,” 9.
55 Stefan Steinicke. “A Slow Train Coming: Germany's emerging Arctic policy,” in Perceptions and Strategies 
of Arcticness in Sub-Arctic Europe, ed Andris Sprūds, and Toms Rostoks, Riga: Latvian Institute of International 
Affairs (2014): 131, accessed December 1, 2016, http://liia.lv/site/docs/Paraugs_Artic_148x210.pdf.
Closely linked to the German government's prominent role in its fight against global climate 
change are concerns about aggravated conflict and competition for natural resources in the 
Arctic region. According to the German government, the pace of global climate change must 
be reduced; otherwise “experts expect far-reaching consequences for the environment, society 
and economy.”53 Global climate change can have ecological, social and economic 
consequences for millions of people, for example with regard to access to food or serious 
droughts in other areas. All these developments could further destabilize unstable countries and 
entire regions and in turn, can also have an impact on German and European security interests, 
thereby negatively affecting European stability.
Germany developed the German Adaptation Strategy (DAS), a medium-term process in which 
national and local authorities as well as other actors in society join forces to identify needed 
action to prevent adverse effects of climate change. For the German government, adaptation is 
therefore becoming an “increasingly important aspect of bilateral and international operation,” 
which also plays a “central role in cooperation on development, security and environmental 
policy.”54 Consequently, the country pursues various scientific research interests in the Arctic, 
seeking better understanding of “the complex interdependence between the Arctic and the 
global ecosystem and its possible implications for peace and stability across the globe.”55
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The German Arctic Policy Guidelines declare that, Germany has an environmental interest in 
the Arctic because of immediate concerns about the region's role in global warming and 
potential future strategic consequences of this interdependence between regional and global 
environmental processes.56 Germany has been committed in various ways to providing the 
international community with relevant data to enhance understanding of the climate system as 
well as with analyses of future potential developments for the polar regions.
56 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
28.
57 Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Eckpunkte fur ein 
integriertes Energie- und Klimaprogramm” (Berlin, 2014), accessed November 12, 2018, http://www.bmu.de/ 
service/publikationen/downloads/details/artikel/eckpunkte-fuer-ein-integriertes- energie-und-klimaprogramm.
58 Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum fur Polar-und Meeresforschung, “Das Alfred-Wegener-Institut; 
Annual Report. Facts and Figures” (Bremerhaven, 2014): 16, 27, accessed November 14, 2018, 
https://epic.awi.de/41055/1/BusinessReport2014Web.pdf;
4.4.4. German Arctic Research Institute
Germany invests heavily in polar research focused on environmental change in the Arctic and 
its implications for global climate change. It has initiated a number of national and international 
programs and initiatives aimed at fighting global climate change. In 2007 the Federal 
Government adopted the integrated climate and energy program, aimed at reducing 
consumption of conventional energy resources to slow global warming.57 It has launched 
several institutions to facilitate research in polar regions, especially to monitor climate 
conditions in the Arctic.
The primary German research institute focused on Arctic issues is the Alfred Wegener Institute, 
Helmholtz Centre for Polar and Marine Research (AWI), located in the north of Germany in 
Bremerhaven town. The AWI, founded in 1980, is Germany's national polar research institute 
and one of the world's leading research institutes. Situated within the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research (BMBF), the AWI has more than 1,000 employees and an annual 
budget of more than 100 million Euros.58 Largely owing to the internationally recognized 
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activities of the AWI and its research infrastructure, Germany is considered an “Arctic player“ 
in polar research.59 With its two research stations in Svalbard (German-French cooperation) 
and Samoilov (Russian-German cooperation) and its polar research vessel Polarstern, Germany 
possesses substantial research infrastructure. The AWI operates further research stations in 
Antarctica, ships and airplanes and carries out multidisciplinary marine and terrestrial polar 
expeditions in the Arctic and Antarctic.
Konsortium Deutsche Meeresforschung, “Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum fur Polar 
Meeresforschung.“ (Berlin, 2016), accessed October 5, 2018, http://www.deutsche-meeresforschung.de/de/awi.
59 Helga Haftendorn, “Zaungast in der Arktis: Deutschlands Interesse an Rohstoffen und Naturschutz,” 
Internationale Politik 4 (2011): 72.
60 Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, “Tatigkeitsbericht 2011.” (Hannover, 2012): 128, 
accessed October 5, 2018, 
https://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Gemeinsames/Produkte/Downloads/Taetigkeitsberichte/taetigkeitsbericht_2011.pd 
f;jsessionid=D330A56AB428C2BF55DD84D08FE70E2B.2_cid284?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.
61 Kathrin Keil, “German Involvement in the Arctic: Policy Issues and Scientific Research,” The Arctic Institute 
(IASS) (2015), accessed December 2, 2016, http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/german-involvement-arctic/.
The second most significant polar research entity in Germany is the Federal Agency for 
Geoscience and Resources (Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, BGR) which 
has been active in the Arctic since 1992.While the AWI focuses on marine polar research and 
earth system analysis, the BGR is the lead operator for the preparation and conduct of research 
projects in various regions, including the Arctic region. The BGR has considerable expertise in 
the field of polar geology and focuses on terrestrial polar research activities and the geological 
analysis of land areas as well as the appraisal of polar resources.60
The Federal Government supports international cooperation in all areas of Arctic research 
through the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC). Until 2017, IASC was based in 
Potsdam, Germany, which was the first time that a non-Arctic country hosted IASC. IASC is 
the leading forum for cooperation among all states and scientific bodies involved in Arctic 
research and serves as source of expert knowledge on Arctic issues, such as sustainability, 
governance, resources and air pollution.61
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In January 2017 Germany opened a German Arctic office in Potsdam. The Arctic Office aims 
to offer direct scientific advice to decision makers. It draws expertise from a network of 
scientists from all German research institutes working on Arctic topics and serves as an 
information and cooperation platform for German stakeholder's science, politics and industry 
on a national and international level.62
62 German Arctic Office, accessed November 5, 2018, http://www.arctic-office.de.
63 Federal Ministry of Education and Research, “Rapid Climate Change in the Arctic. Polar Research as a Global 
Responsibility,” 15.
German policymakers and researchers are becoming increasingly active in Arctic related topics. 
They are creating networks with other international policymakers and researchers as well as 
building collaborations and cooperation within the scientific and political sectors and within 
the general public.
4.4.5. International Cooperation
Research in the polar regions requires substantial logistical and infrastructure investments, 
which highlights the need for increased international cooperation. Therefore, Germany's polar 
research activities are deeply embedded in international research cooperation frameworks. 
Besides the German-French research collaboration on Svalbard, Germany's main partners in 
Arctic research are Russia and Norway. In the Fram Strait region between Spitsbergen and 
Greenland, Germany works closely with the Norwegians.63 Germany's cooperation with Russia 
takes place in the Laptev Sea as well as in the Lena Delta, where the common research station 
Samoylov is located. The Russian-German “Laptev Sea System” research program has allowed 
scientists from the two countries to conduct joint multidisciplinary expeditions and projects 
since 1991. This successful collaboration has become one of the key pillars of German Arctic 
research over the past twenty years and will be expanded through further cooperation in the 
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future.64 The increasing number of German polar research expeditions in recent years illustrates 
Germany's expanded engagement in the Arctic region. As an example of its collaborative 
endeavors in the Arctic, German scientists participated with scientists from Denmark, France, 
Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the UK and the United States to create a Tectonic 
Map of the Arctic (TeMAr).65
64 Federal Ministry of Education and Research, “Rapid Climate Change in the Arctic. Polar Research as a Global 
Responsibility,” 6.
65 Federal Ministry of Education and Research, “Rapid Climate Change in the Arctic. Polar Research as a Global 
Responsibility,” 17.
66Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum fur Polar-und Meeresforschung, “Ein Jahr eingefroren im 
Nordpolarmeer,” accessed November 12, 2018, https://www.awi.de/im-fokus/mosaic-expedition.html.
One of the greatest Arctic expeditions of all times will take place in the autumn of 2019 when 
the German research icebreaker Polarstern will drift frozen through the Arctic Ocean, in the 
first year-round expedition into the central Arctic to explore the Arctic climate system. The 
project, called MOSAiC (The Multidisciplinary Drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic 
Climate), has a total budget exceeding 120 Million €, and a total of 600 scientists from 17 
nations will participate in the expedition. The expedition aims to enhance understanding of the 
influence of the Arctic on the global climate. It will thus be a milestone for climate research, 
and its data will be valuable for generations to come. The mission under the direction of the 
Alfred Wegener Institute is associated with unprecedented challenges.66 An international fleet 
of icebreakers, helicopters and airplanes will supply the team during the expedition. 
Consequently, only an international consortium of leading polar research institutions can 
conduct such an expedition. The MOSAiC will take place under the umbrella of the 
International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), led by the Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz- 
Zentrum für Polar- und Meeresforschung (AWI), Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute
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(AARI) and the University of Colorado, Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental 
Sciences (CIRES).67
67 Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum fur Polar-und Meeresforschung, “Ein Jahr eingefroren im 
Nordpolarmeer.”
4.4.6. Conclusion
Germany is one of the leading countries in Europe, as well as globally, in terms of its renewable 
energy and climate change policies. In the last decades Germany has become a frontrunner in 
global climate protection with strong commitment and participation internationally. Germany 
already feels the effects of climate change, but a global sea-level rise would threaten Germany's 
coastal regions, such as Hamburg. German polar research always had a scientific background, 
and it comes to no surprise that German polar research today focuses on gaining a better 
understanding on global climate change. So far Germany has initiated numerous national and 
international programs and initiatives to fight global climate change with the AWI leading the 
way. As research in the remote polar region requires high investments due to substantial 
logistical and infrastructure, cooperation is needed to conduct immense projects, such as the 
MOSAiC. Germany has participated in various projects in the high North in recent decades, 
which clearly shows its newly discovered interest and care for the region. Germany even goes 
a step further by indicating that it wants to take responsibility, as the headline of the Policy 
Guidelines declares: “Assume responsibility, seize opportunities.” Germany stands as a reliable 
research partner, stressing its expertise and research capacities, as it pursues a more prominent 
role as an Arctic Council Observer.
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4.5. German political interests in the Arctic
4.5.1. Introduction
The consequences of climate change, including thawing sea ice in the region, have moved the 
Arctic to the center of global interest in recent decades. The Arctic Council has been the most 
important political institution in the region in addressing climate change, the growing 
geopolitical importance of the region, and emerging commercial opportunities such as shipping, 
and sustainable development of natural resources. However, not only the eight-member states 
of the Arctic Council view themselves as stakeholders in the region. Non-Arctic states have 
been present in the North through their scientific activities and expeditions long before the 
beginning of the region's image-transformation from a “frozen desert” to an “Arctic in 
change.”68 69
68 Timo Koivurova, “Limits and Possibilities of the Arctic Council in a Rapidly Changing Scene of Arctic 
Governance,” Polar Record 46, no. 2 (2009): 146.
69 Malgorzata Smieszek and Paula Kankaanpaa, “Observer States' Commitments to the Arctic Council: The 
Arctic Policy Documents of the United Kingdom and Germany as case Study,” The Yearbook of the Polar Law 6 
(2015): 377.
The growing political and economic importance of the Arctic has prompted Germany's Federal 
Government to take a closer look at German Arctic policy. Germany's presence in the Arctic 
was formerly driven by scientific, economic, strategic and perhaps to a certain extent also 
national pride motivation. When the new cooperation structures started to emerge in the region 
with the decline of the Cold War, Germany and the United Kingdom were among the first non-
69Arctic actors to join in.
As recognized Observers to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom, “inherited” their status from this precursor to the 
122
Arctic Council. They were approved as Observers to the AC in the Iqaluit Declaration of 1998.70 
Since then the number of Observer states has increased to thirteen, with a total of thirty-nine 
official Observers, including inter-governmental, inter-parliamentary, and non-governmental 
organizations.
70 Arctic Council, “Iqaluit Declaration. The First Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council” (Iqaluit, Canada 
1998), accessed July 23, 2018, https://oaarchive.arctic- 
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/86/01_iqaluit_declaration_1998_signed%20%282%29.pdf?sequence=1&is 
Allowed=y.
The increased attention paid to the region has best been evidenced by the number of applicants 
for Observer status received and reviewed by the Arctic Council during its Ministerial Meeting 
in May 2013 in Kiruna, Sweden. Participation as an official Observer within the Arctic Council 
is the only way to receive formal recognition and gain access to this high-level 
intergovernmental forum and its collaborative deliberations. Although Germany's political 
engagement in the region is a relatively new phenomenon, in recent years Germany has become 
a recognized international actor in the High North due to its high profile in polar research, 
commitment to environmental responsibility, increased political engagement, and active 
participation in discussions about the future and the sustainable development of the Arctic.
Against the background of a changing political and institutional context in the Arctic, Germany 
has continually sought to enhance its role as a permanent Observer within the AC. Due to the 
increasing geopolitical and geo- economic significance of the region, and the increased number 
of new Observers, the original Observer states want to make sure that their interests are 
respected and represented. Among other efforts, Germany has requested enhanced speaking 
time and seeks to ensure its permanent participation in AC working groups. Germany's 
government seeks to leverage its expert knowledge in research, technology, and environmental 
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awareness to increase its engagement within the AC and among its member states.71 So far, 
German delegates can only use informal contact within the context of AC meetings to discuss 
Arctic issues with their counterparts of the AC member states.
71 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Deutschland und der Arktische Rat” (Berlin, 2013), accessed October 5, 2018, 
http://www.auswaer- tiges-amt.de/sid_61B197A067BF05BE50A680C07E922B1C/DE/Europa/Reg- 
Nord/Arkt_Rat/Arkt_Rat_DE_node.html, accessed December 27, 2013.
72 Thomas H. Meister, Meister, Ambassador in Iceland's Contribution to the Panel: An Integrated Approach to 
Energy and Sustainable Development in the National Interest. Arctic Energy Summit, Akureyri, Iceland. 
(October 8, 2013). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YJpNykDL3Cc.
4.5.2. Voices of German Diplomats
In 2013 Thomas H. Meister, German Ambassador to Iceland at the time, explained his view of 
German Arctic policy during an Arctic Energy Summit in Akureyri, Iceland. He referred to 
Germany's recently published Arctic Policy Framework. He confirmed that Germany is an 
international actor in the high North “with a high profile in polar research, strong political 
engagement and active participation in discussions about the future and the sustainable 
development of the Arctic.” With regards to the Arctic Council, Meister pointed out that 
Germany sees the AC as the most central body for Arctic policy. He added that “Germany is 
prepared to do its share as an Observer country being widely acknowledged as a partner with 
substantial know-how in the areas of research, technology and environmental standards and is 
seeking to more strongly and creatively put this know-how to use.” He suggested “extending 
Observer countries' participation rights on a case-by-case basis, if an Observer can substantially 
contribute to resolving an issue.”72
In 2011 German foreign Minister at the time Guido Westerwelle gave a speech at the German 
Foreign Ministry regarding the country's activities in the Arctic. He pointed out that Germany 
has been proud of its Arctic involvement in the last decades and recited its three Arctic policy 
goals. First, he emphasized the importance of freedom of research and argued that research 
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must be open to all, because the challenges of climate change are affecting all of us and all 
states are contributing to climate change. Non-Arctic states must not only be part of the 
problem, but must become part of the solution, he said. Therefore, international co-ordination, 
communication and research must continue. Secondly, he expressed the importance of 
adherence to the highest environmental standards. Too much talk has been done about the 
Arctic rights and not enough about Arctic responsibilities, he declared. He took the Arctic 
countries to task, saying “sovereignty today means commitment.” Only compliance with 
environmental standards and fishing quotas brings acceptance and respect from partners (in this 
case other states), he declared, while urging the AC to become a “guardian of the environment.” 
The third goal Westerwelle identified was ensuring clear responsibility for any environmental 
damage occurring in the Arctic with polluters being held liable. Reserving the common heritage 
of mankind must be the paramount goal of any policy concerning the Arctic Ocean. Therefore, 
he said, AC members must not close their doors, but remain open to the world, and Germany 
counts on cooperation with the AC in this regard. He finalized his speech by offering help, 
wherever German can help.73
73 Guido Westerwelle, “Climate Change, International Law and Arctic Research - Legal Aspects of Marine 
Research in the Arctic Ocean,” in Arctic Science, International Law and Climate Change. Beitrage zum 
auslandischen öffentlichen Recht und Volkerrecht, Veroffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts far 
auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 235, ed. Rainer S. Wasum-Rainer, I. Winkelmann, and K. 
Tiroch (Heidelberg, Berlin: Springer, 2012). Translated by author.
Germany and the United Kingdom were the first countries to submit an official document to 
underline their statements of Arctic goals and interests in the fall of 2013. Germany's Arctic 
Policy Guidelines: “Assume responsibility, seize opportunities” constituted the first ever, 
explicit and coordinated German Arctic document and described German views and interests 
in the Arctic region. This was a significant step, the first effort to coordinate Germany's Arctic 
engagement formally. Stefan Steinicke, who wrote his doctoral dissertation on Germany's 
Arctic engagement, suggested that the German government recognized the need for such a 
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statement, given that all Arctic states and most of the Permanent Participants of the AC had 
already published their Arctic Strategies. Secondly, better coordination of German activities in 
the Arctic would strengthen the government's coherence and appearance in Arctic questions.74 
The German Arctic Policy Guidelines begin with an executive summary that lists the most 
important points of German Arctic policy. It states that the German Federal Government “aims 
to take the specific nature of the Arctic into account and to make it a central focus of German 
policy.” It recognizes the great potential for the German economy but stresses the importance 
of enforcing the highest environmental standards to protect the Arctic environment.
74 Stefan Steinicke, “Germany's Arctic Engagement - Between Environmental Responsibilities and Geo- 
Economic Interests.” (PhD diss., Universitat der Bundeswehr, 2017), 256.
75 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,”
5.
Furthermore, it stresses Germany's “vast expert knowledge in the areas of research, technology 
and environmental standards” and highlights the state's potential contribution to “sustainable 
economic development in the region.” It emphasizes its wish to cooperate Arctic countries, 
especially in the maritime-sector, such as in polar technology. Germany affirms its commitment 
to freedom of navigation in the Arctic Ocean as well as freedom of Arctic research, affirming 
that “scientific research is of fundamental importance for the Arctic.” Finally, it notes that 
Germany “favors multilateral cooperation on Arctic issues,” especially in the Arctic Council in 
which it seeks to “strengthen its Observers status.” In this context of interdependencies between 
Germany and the Arctic, Germany seeks to participate in the region's transformation. 
Therefore, it presents itself as a key Arctic partner and emphasizes its pursuit of “a high profile 
in polar research, strong political engagement and active participation in discussions about the 
future and the sustainable development of the Arctic.”75
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Besides its further commitment to use the Arctic for “peaceful purposes only,” Germany's 
political engagement is based among other things, on the following international treaties and 
declarations: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), the Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment and Biodiversity, and finally the Spitsbergen Treaty 
and Antarctic Treaty.
Germany's Arctic policy emphasizes multilateral institutions, agreements and solutions in 
dealing with Arctic challenges. The Federal Government stresses that it “maintains friendly and 
intensive bilateral relations with the member states of the Arctic Council and is particularly 
interested in cooperation on Arctic policy issues,”76 which it says should be discussed within 
existing bilateral structures and bodies.
76 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,”
16.
77 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,”
18.
78 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,”
6.
The document concludes by stating that “prospects for German companies are bright.” And that 
the government “is seeking to make the Arctic region an even stronger focus of German 
policy.”77 It proclaims, “With its know-how in cutting-edge research, sophisticated technology, 
and high environmental standards, Germany is in a position to support sustainable economic 
development in the Arctic.”78
4.5.3. The Arctic Council
As the region has moved into the focus of attention for international communities, there has 
been an increased interest in a system of governance for the Arctic. Most of the cooperation on 
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Arctic issues is done through the AC. Today the AC addresses some of the most urgent concerns 
of the region and strives to provide effective responses and solutions to these new challenges. 
Observer status provides opportunities for non-Arctic states and entities to participate in Arctic 
politics, in a limited way. According to the Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, the primary role 
of Observers is “to observe the work of the Arctic Council.” The AC encourages Observers to 
contribute to AC's activities primarily through its Working Groups.79 During the meetings to 
which they are invited, Observers may make statements at the discretion of the chair, “submit 
relevant documents and provide views on the issues under discussion.”80 Under the new rules 
adopted in 2013 Observers are invited to contribute to the body of work of AC subsidiary bodies 
by contributing to existing and developing projects through expert involvement and support, 
and financial contribution, such as project funding. Furthermore, they may host project­
specific, expert-level workshops.81 Today the AC is seen as a forum for international 
partnerships and scientific networks on Arctic related issues.
79 Arctic Council, “Arctic Council Rules of Procedure. First Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting.” (Iqaluit 
Canada, 1998): Part V, Other Matters, 36, accessed October 5, 2018, https://oaarchive.arctic- 
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1783/EDOCS-3688-v2- 
.ACMMUS02_BARROW_2000_6_SAO_Report_to_Ministers_Annex1_Rules_of_Procedure.pdf?sequence=1.
80 Arctic Council, “Observer Manual for subsidiary bodies.” (Kiruna Sweden, 2013): 4, 7, accessed October 5, 
2018, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/939/EDOCS-3020-v1B-Observer-manual- 
with-addendum-finalized_Oct2016.PDF?sequence=8&isAllowed=y.
81 Arctic Council, “Observer Manual for subsidiary bodies.”
82 Helga Haftendorn, “Zaungast in der Arktis: Deutschlands Interesse an Rohstoffen und Naturschutz,” 
Internationale Politik 4 (2011): 73.
83 Cecile Pelaudeix and Thierry Rodon, “The European Union Arctic Policy and National Interests of France and 
Germany: Internal and External Policy Coherence at Stake?” Northern Review 37 (2014): 77.
Not all Observers make use of their participatory rights, and in the end, some abstain from 
council meetings or participation in WG projects. Despite Germany's long polar history and 
involvement in Arctic science, and its status as an original AC Observer, it has been described 
as a “guest”82 that pursues a “more discrete strategy based on scientific research, technical 
expertise and promotion of commercial interest.”83
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Sebastian Knecht of the Berlin Graduate School of International Studies analyzed the 
participation level in international negotiation at the AC and found that the average attendance 
by Observers is rather low compared to the eight Arctic states. Knecht found that Germany had 
no delegation attending AC meetings for most of the time between 1998 and 2015. With an 
overall attendance of about 9 percent, Germany has the second-lowest attendance record of all 
state Observers. Germany has increased its participation, however, since 2013, the year when 
it published its Arctic Policy Guidelines. Knecht suggests that inadequate funding for German 
delegate attendance explains the low participation in earlier years, along with an overall lack of 
interest in pursuing national priorities in the region through the AC.84 Knecht perceives 
Germany as looking for opportunities in the Arctic and viewing the Arctic mainly as a store of 
resources to which the nation and its companies want to gain access. Furthermore, argues 
Knecht, Germany is not satisfied with its participatory rights as an Observer in the AC and 
therefore sees the AC as an “inappropriate forum to further its national interests in there 
region.”85 Germany expresses its dissatisfaction with its Observer rights in its Arctic Policy 
Guidelines, where it asks for more speaking time at AC meetings, as well as expressing its 
intention to increase its “ad hoc participation in Arctic Council working groups,” and 
suggesting “to extend Observer countries' participation rights on a case-by-case basis, if an 
Observer can substantially contribute to resolving an issue.”86
84 Sebastian Knecht, “Exploring Different levels of Stakeholder Activity in International Institutions: Late 
Bloomers, Regular Visitors, And Overachievers in Arctic Council Working Groups,” in Governing Arctic 
Change. Global Perspectives, ed. Kathrin Keil, Sebastian Knecht. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 174.
85 Sebastian Knecht, “Exploring Different levels of Stakeholder Activity in International Institutions: Late 
Bloomers, Regular Visitors, And Overachievers in Arctic Council Working Groups,” 175.
86 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
13.
As a consequence, according to Knecht, Germany is turning towards other diplomatic channels 
to be more engaged in Arctic issues, including bilateral relations with Arctic states and other 
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global powers such as China, but also other multilateral institutions.87 The German Arctic 
Policy Guidelines underscore that “for all issues concerning shipping in the Arctic, the IMO 
(International Maritime Organization) is the foremost body for multilateral cooperation” as is 
the EU in the area of environmental protection, research, industry, technology, energy and raw 
materials, transport, and fisheries. The aim is to make Arctic policy part of long-term strategic 
planning within the EU.”88
87 Sebastian Knecht, “Exploring Different levels of Stakeholder Activity in International Institutions: Late 
Bloomers, Regular Visitors, And Overachievers in Arctic Council Working Groups,” 176.
88 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
15.
89 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
1-2.
Germany attended only the first two SAO meetings during the first U.S. chairmanship from 
1998 - 2000. During Finland's and Iceland's chairmanships that followed the U.S. 
Chairmanship, Germany attended SAO meetings very irregularly. Its attendance increased 
when Denmark took over the chairmanship in 2009, and since then, Germany has attended 
almost every SAO meeting, perhaps because travel to Denmark, followed by Sweden, was more 
affordable. In 2013 Canada took over the chairmanship, and at this point Germany had 
published its Policy Guidelines, reflecting a stronger commitment to engagement in Arctic 
affairs, the AC, and its subsidiary bodies. 89
In May 2016 Michael Daumer, Former Officer for Baltic Sea Cooperation and Arctic Policy, 
stated in his Observer report to the AC, that Germany “has contributed continuously and 
substantially to the work of the Council and its subsidiary bodies for the past 20 years.” This 
has been done through sharing its expertise in research, science and technology. He noted that 
Germany participates regularly in the meetings of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAO) and that in 
2015, Germany introduced a substitute system to secure continuous attendance in all subsidiary 
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bodies of the AC. He also emphasizes Germany's cooperation with Arctic as well as non-Arctic 
countries in a variety of programs and projects in order to support the aims of the AC. In 
addition to bilateral scientific cooperation, Germany also supports international cooperation in 
all fields of Arctic research through the Alfred-Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum far Polar- 
und Meeresforschung (AWI) as the coordinating institution and cooperates with all Arctic 
Council Member States.90
90 Michael Daumer, “Germany Observer Review Report to the Arctic Council.” (Berlin, 2016), accessed October
5, 2018, https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/1874/EDOCS-3635-v1-2016-05- 
31_Germany_Observer_Review-Report.PDF?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
4.5.4. Conclusion
Due to its long polar history Germany became an Observer first in the AEPS and later in the 
AC during its first Ministerial Meeting. While Germany's participation in the AC meetings and 
working groups was limited in the early years, it now is seen as an active player regarding 
Arctic issues. Nevertheless, Germany remains unsatisfied with the limited role it exerts in the 
AC. As a result, German is pursuing multiple other paths to increase its opportunities to 
influence within the AC, as well as pursuing its interests in the Arctic, outside the forum. 
Besides Britain, Germany was one of the first Observers to publish Arctic Policy Guidelines, 
demonstrating a clear interest in the region as well as establishing clear aims and means to 
pursue them. These guidelines mark the establishment of a coordinated national effort in the 
northern region.
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Chapter 5 Theoretical Analysis - Neoliberal Institutionalism and Realism
This chapter analyzes the research findings through the theoretical framework Neoliberal 
Institutionalism, which international relations scholars often use to explain cooperation in 
international institutions, such as the Arctic Council. Neoliberal institutionalism emphasizes 
the important role that international institutions play in international relations. Institutions, such 
as the Arctic Council, provide structures and norms for solving interstate problems, as well as 
fostering exchange of information. Due to globalization and innovation in technology, the 
world is more connected than ever, hence creating greater interdependence among states. 
Institutions try to promote cooperation to resolve global economic and political challenges. 
Such institutions can reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs and solve collective action 
problems. Neoliberal institutionalism theory examines the ways in which institutions serve 
these ends, and how the benefits of engagement in such institutions serve as incentives to states 
to participate in them.
Neoliberal institutionalism expects states to establish and engage in institutions if they see 
themselves as benefitting from cooperation, as neoliberal institutionalism is concerned with the 
concepts of power and self-interest in the international system. Institutions, rules, and 
regulations allow for cooperation by decreasing transaction costs and increasing the credibility 
of state action.1 This is certainly true for the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum that 
serves as a coordination platform for its Member States, Observers, Permanent Participants, 
and auxiliary organizations, to advance economic and environmental cooperation. The 
institution reduces transaction costs by facilitating the exchange of scientific information. Most 
scientific expeditions are conducted as international expeditions, and research stations in the 
1 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 51-53.
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Arctic tend to be multi-lateral endeavors, as well. Germany, for instance, shares a research 
station with the French in Svalbard - AWIPEV.2
2 Alfred-Wegener-Institut, Paul Emile Victor.
3 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017).
Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013).
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011).
Neoliberal institutionalism demonstrates that institutions can help resolve problems and 
promote mutually beneficial outcomes, such as the three separate agreements the AC has signed 
so far.3 Scholars of neoliberal institutional theory, such as Keohane, Nye, and Morawski, further 
note that environmental problems cross national boundaries and therefore attract the attention 
of the whole world, generating cooperation among nation-states for their solution. Neoliberal 
institutionalism stresses the role of international institutions in overcoming environmental 
challenges through cooperation. Institutions can produce the framework for environmental 
cooperation.
The three AC-facilitated agreements illustrate the AC's mandate expansion, a function of the 
forum's demonstrated effectiveness in fostering cooperation and consensus building. 
Neoliberal institutionalist theory would point to this mandate expansion as evidence of Member 
States' and Permanent Participants' recognition of the benefits they gain from engagement in 
the forum - so much so that they have expanded its institutional capacity. All Arctic Member 
States and non-Arctic Observer states gain through the participation in the Council, even if in 
limited ways, especially for the Observers. The AC is expanding to take on economic issues, 
which neoliberal institutionalists say especially motivates state behavior.
One means through which international institutions, such as the AC, facilitate cooperation is 
their ability to provide information to states. According to Keohane, international policy 
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coordination and the development of international regimes depend not merely on interests and 
power but on expectations and information. Therefore, by one measure, a regime is effective if 
it provides high-quality information to policy makers.4 The AC as an intergovernmental forum 
facilitates exchange of high-quality information, especially through the Working Groups, in 
which Observers, such as Germany, take part. According to Kathrin Stephen,5 the WGs permit 
the best means for an Observer to assert influence in any AC Arctic project, because AC rules 
allow Observers' participation (although they cannot vote) in the WGs. The WGs have 
developed a family-like atmosphere, as members grow to know each other as they interact 
regularly during WG's meeting.6
4 Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes. International Organization.” International 
Regimes 36, no. 2 (1982): 346.
5 Scientific Project Leader at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies (IASS) and part of the German 
Observer delegation to the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) of the Arctic Council.
6 Telephone Interview with Kathrin Stephen, November 12, 2018. Translated by author.
7 Arctic Environment Ministers' Meeting Exploring Common Solutions for the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi, 
October, 11-12, 2018). Written statement by Germany Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety Eva Kracht, accessed December 18, 2018, https://oaarchive.arctic- 
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2204/EMMFI_2018_ROVANIEMI_Observer-Statement- 
GERMANY.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
German Federal Minister for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety Eva 
Kracht has noted Germany's input in the AC regarding environmental issues, particularly 
through increased and intensified participation in numerous WGs addressing environmental 
affairs: “Germany has submitted preliminary results of a black carbon measurement campaign 
carried out as part of one of the research projects to the International Maritime Organization. 
These results may help the IMO in its work to investigate appropriate black carbon 
measurement and emission control methods for international shipping.”7 Furthermore, 
Germany has nominated an expert from the Federal Environment Agency (UBA) to participate 
in the PAME project on marine litter in the Arctic. These examples illustrate Germany's 
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profound interest in Arctic environmental protection and in intensifying its cooperation on these 
issues together with the AC and its numerous WGs.8
8 Arctic Environment Ministers' Meeting Exploring Common Solutions for the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi, 
October 11-12, 2018. Written statement by Germany Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety Eva Kracht.
9 Robert O, Keohane and Jospeh S. Nye, “Power and Interdependence.” International Organization 41, no. 4 
(1987): 727,732.
10 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
(Berlin, 2013): 13, accessed July, 2018, 
https://www.bmel.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/International/Leitlinien-
Arktispolitik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
According to Keohane and Nye, interdependence among states, as well as institutional 
arrangements, facilitate cooperation through mutually beneficial agreements, even though 
states might have conflicting or overlapping interests.9 This can be seen in the Arctic, where 
Arctic and non-Arctic states cooperate through the AC, despite certain conflicting interests, for 
example Russia's policy towards Ukraine. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states are likely 
to co-operate if they expect all the countries to have to do so in the future, a scenario that applies 
to the Arctic Council. In this scenario, states overcome the Prisoner's Dilemma by playing the 
game multiple times and encouraging states not to cheat. Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines 
state that Germany wants to increase its participation in various bodies of the AC, illustrating 
that it wants to expand its cooperation and extend its Observer state participation rights.10 Its 
growing interest can be seen in its increased participation in SAO and WG meetings in recent 
years, as Knecht's and my own research show. Clearly Germany recognizes benefits from its 
AC engagement, which results in its desire for increased participation.
Despite the weakness of the Observer role, states seek to become Observers in the Arctic 
Council to benefit from the economic potential of the Arctic region and to contribute to 
environmental solutions of global importance. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the 
primary goal of states is to make absolute gains, and actors would want to join an international 
135
institution to “jointly benefit from cooperation.”11 The joint benefit through the AC can clearly 
be seen in the area of climate research, as only through cooperation, collaboration and joint 
scientific research this problem can be solved. Germany serves as an example here, as it 
maintains a joint research station with the French in Svalbard and the Russians in Siberia. 
Neoliberal institutionalists view economic interests as a potent motivator for state action. 
Therefore, neoliberal institutional theory suggests that economic interests are one of the driving 
forces in Germany's engagement in the Arctic. Germany's interest in the Arctic clearly includes 
economic opportunities, as policy documents, such as the German Arctic Guidelines and 
Observer reports demonstrate. Germany's participation as an Observer in the AC can only 
indirectly secure its absolute economic gains, as the AC is only an intergovernmental forum, 
which cannot issue any binding treaties and therefore is not the right forum to secure free access 
to resources or shipping lanes. From an economic point of view, Germany is also interested in 
selling its state-of-the-art technology and know-how, but German representatives in the AC are 
diplomats and scientific experts, not businessmen. Therefore, the AC serves as a forum to make 
contacts with other countries and to maintain good relationships with other state actors.
11 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory: Response to John 
Mearsheimer,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 42.
As a result, the analysis of Germany's expectations reveals two primary interests: On the one 
hand Germany seeks access to Arctic resources, which hold great economic potential for 
German industry. On the other hand, Germany prioritizes environmental protection and 
safeguarding the Arctic environment. The German Arctic Policy Guidelines note “the great 
potential for the economies of Germany that Arctic resources hold.” The German economy is 
already closely intertwined with the Arctic regions of Norway and Russia. Germany has a fast­
growing economy and depends on Arctic resources. Consequently, Germany must cooperate 
with states such as Norway and Russia to ensure access to oil and gas. Demand for energy is 
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likely to grow with Germany's decision to phase out nuclear energy and replace it to a large 
extent with renewables. One example of Germany's expertise in the region regarding resources 
is Siemens, which is renowned for its contributions to subsea installations that have made 
offshore resources accessible. Subsea processing allows for oil and gas recovery in deep and 
ultra-deep waters while using a more cost-efficient method.12
12 Siemens, “Enabling Subsea Processing,” Siemens Global Website, accessed December 18, 2018, 
https://w3.siemens.com/markets/global/en/oil-gas/pages/subsea.aspx.
Germany's commercial interests in the Arctic do not comprise its sole incentive for AC 
participation. Despite neoliberal institutionalists' contention that absolute economic gains, 
based on rational self-interested behavior, tend to be the primary motivation for international 
cooperation, evidence suggests that economic gain is not Germany's sole or perhaps even its 
foremost interest in participating in the AC. The dual interests likely owe to the AC's mandate, 
which primarily focuses on environmental protection including climate change, sustainable 
development and scientific research. The AC does not offer robust opportunities for advancing 
one's own commercial interests.
Neoliberal institutionalism assumes that Observers like Germany can be influential in the 
Council, especially if they can provide convincing information and ideas to states. Today 
Germany enjoys a strong reputation in Arctic affairs, partially due to the AWI's (Alfred- 
Wegener-Institut Helmholtz-Zentrum fur Polar-und Meeresforschung) being one of the world's 
leading polar research institutes. The AWI has led and still leads several important research 
operations in the Arctic. The most prominent example is the MOSAicC (Multidisciplinary 
drifting Observatory for the Study of Arctic Climate) project, the largest central Arctic 
expedition ever, under the leadership of the AWI, using the German icebreaker Polarstern, with 
seventeen other countries involved.
137
Neoliberal institutionalism would explain why states seek to become Observers in the Council 
to gain influence over the economic development of the region. The Arctic member states 
accept new Observers when they anticipate the prospective Observer's participation will 
improve economic conditions in the Arctic region by providing economic opportunities. 
Germany makes its case for this assumption in its Policy Guidelines, which state that Germany 
“can contribute to sustainable economic development in this region.”13 Germany sees itself and 
presents itself as an industrial country with state-of-the-art technology, especially in the field 
of shipbuilding.
13 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,”
1.
14 Telephone Interview with Kathrin Stephen, November 12, 2018. Translated by author.
15 Telephone Interview with Government Official November 7, 2018. Translated by author.
Kathrin Stephen states that Arctic resources represent only one of Germany's economic 
interests in the region. Shipping represents another focus within Germany's economic interests, 
although it remains questionable when or how soon the Arctic sea lanes will be navigable. 
Germany also has a vast interest in scientific research, which promises myriad positive benefits. 
Science, in fact, is the “ticket” to the Arctic, Kathrin Stephen claims. Member states leave other 
actors few options to influence governance in the Arctic. Climate change, however, is a global 
issue that requires cooperation and collaboration in order to address the challenges.14 Another 
government official I interviewed confirmed Stephen's statement, that access to resources was 
not the primary reason that Germany sought AC observer status, as the Arctic Eight own the 
resources.15
Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has assumed a more active international role fostered 
by an increase in self-confidence and self-expectations. Especially the role of the German 
military changed significantly and lastingly after the Cold War ended. For the first time since 
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the close of World War II, Germany was involved in military actions and flew the first combat 
mission as part of the NATO operations in Bosnia.16 In the last two decades Germany accepted 
greater international responsibility in accordance with its economic strength and with being less 
restricted in international affairs due to its military past.
16 Hanns W. Maull, “Deutsche Auβenpolitik: Orientierungslos," Zeitschrift far Politikwissenschaft 21, no. 1 
(2011): 100.
17 Hanns W. Maull, “Deutsche Auβenpolitik: Orientierungslos," 102.
18 Hanns W. Maull, “Deutsche Auβenpolitik: Orientierungslos," 119.
19 Federal Foreign Office, “Germany's foreign and European policy principles." (Berlin, 2017), accessed 
December 18, 2018, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/themen/-/229790.
Since the reunification, German foreign policy has intensified in the area of international 
engagement, focusing on transatlantic relations (including the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization - NATO), European integration and its engagement within the United Nations 
(UN).17 Hanns Maul, a German political scientist, describes the core elements of this newly 
identified role in foreign politics through reinforcement of international law: 1) Germany's 
attachment to multilateral principles and cooperation, in particular Germany's support for the 
European Union; 2) German decision-makers' priority of establishing Germany as a reliable 
and trustworthy partner to the West; and 3) a deeply held skepticism of power politics and the 
use of military force.18 The basis of Germany's successful foreign policies relies on old and 
enduring German qualities such as predictability, reliability and confidence in German foreign 
policy. These qualities led to the German pillars of foreign policy, as described by the German 
foreign office: “Europe, transatlantic partnerships, fostering peace and security around the 
world, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and commitment to fair and sustainable 
globalization and rules-based international order.”19
Regarding the theory of neoliberal institutionalism, Germany has increased its international 
involvement and cooperation, while also pursuing an egoistic and self-regarding foreign policy 
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that places greater emphasis on domestic political interests. This approach has allowed 
Germany to take over leadership roles in international politics, such as the leadership role within 
the European Union (EU), the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program, and the Ukraine 
crisis.20 Germany asserts itself both to pursue domestic and regional interests, while also 
willingly taking on responsibility for greater international good.
20 Klaus Brummer and Kai Oppermann, “Germany's Foreign Policy after the End of the Cold War: Becoming 
Normal?” Oxford Handbooks Online / Scholary research reviews: Oxford University Press (2016): 2.
21 Oyvind 0sterud is a Professor at the department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, Norway. Geir 
H0nneland is a research Director at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Norway.
22 Oyvind Osterud and Geir Honneland, “Geopolitics and International Governance in the Arctic,” Arctic Review 
on Law and Politics 5, no. 2 (2014): 161.
While neoliberals favor international organizations and regimes for cooperation, from which 
all participants gain, realists on the other hand favor a view that explains state behavior as tense, 
uncertain, distrustful, and uncooperative. Survival and a focus on military power motivate these 
actors. Oyvind Osterud and Geir Honneland21 argue that there is a new power game in the 
Arctic, with western disagreement about questions of jurisdiction, and competing interests in 
transport routes and resources, which could potentially lead to rivalry between the Arctic 
states.22 As there is no guarantee that the Arctic region will remain peaceful, realism can still 
be a useful explanatory model to understand state behavior in the Arctic, especially in issues of 
security dynamics. Therefore, I want to know how Germany defines its security and self­
interests. Meanwhile, today there is little or no conflict in the Arctic. On the contrary, the Arctic 
has been a stable region for decades; states have increased their cooperative efforts and most 
sovereignty claims have been settled.
According to realism, national security and state survival are clear interests in the Arctic. 
According to realists, conflicts in the Arctic arise as a consequence of different interests, which 
will become more evident in the future due to the melting of sea ice. In this case, realists assume 
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that existing institutions, such as the UN or the AC, will fail to provide a strong authority that 
gives clear guidance. Therefore, these institutions will fail to prevent the outbreak of an armed 
conflict because the anarchic system allows states to act upon their own will. Realists further 
argue that if non-member-state actors, such as Germany and China, continue to increase their 
interest and activities in the region and want to enhance participation in Arctic issues, this will 
likely lead to more strained relations in the region. With resources gradually decreasing in the 
future, realists believe in a possible race for resources, resulting in conflict, and increased 
military activity in the region.
Although scientists predict a shortage of resources in the future, most agree that all actors 
dealing in the Arctic try to avoid competition for resources or a “race for resources” by all 
means, as it could have destructive and irreversible consequences. Most of the findings of new 
resources lie in areas where national jurisdiction is undisputed. There have been hardly any 
signs of political conflict in the Arctic, and therefore it can be assumed that cooperation will be 
the primary choice of the Arctic states. The AC does not address any security related issues, as 
its mandate includes issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the 
Arctic, while explicitly excluding security issues. Most Arctic states comply with the UNCLOS 
(United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) to deal with sovereignty issues, which is 
one explanation why political tension in the North is low. Therefore, there is good reason to 
believe that states will continue to cooperate. Germany states in its Arctic Policy Guidelines 
that it “remains committed to international and regional conventions, ..., which form the 
legally-binding framework for states' rights and obligations with respect to the Arctic.”23
23 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,”
1.
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Germany maintains good relationships with other Arctic states. In 2013, for example, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel traveled to Oslo to meet with Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg to 
discuss energy issues, including cooperation in the Arctic.24
24 Mia Bennett, “Norway and Germany discuss Arctic energy cooperation,” February 22, 2013, accessed January 
12, 2019, https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/02/22/norway-and-germany-discuss-arctic-energy-cooperation.
25 Julian Borger, “Germany slowly comes to terms with sending its armed forces abroad,” The Guardian, 
September 18, 2012, accessed January 12, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/18/germany- 
military-modernise-foreign-intervention.
Today, cooperation in the Arctic is displayed through state reliance on international law, such 
as UNCLOS, multilateral cooperation, and bilateral treaties, many of which deal with 
environmental protection and cooperative research. Therefore, it can be stated that since the 
end of the Cold War, Arctic governance has evolved towards cooperation where all 
stakeholders agree that the environment needs to be protected, and this can only be achieved 
through cooperation and joint scientific research.
Realists promote military power in order to survive, as cooperation is difficult to achieve, 
especially when stakes are high. Germany has a horrific military history. It initiated two world 
wars, and since then has had to deal with its military past. Since the Treaty on the Final 
Settlement with Respect to Germany of 1990, also called the Two Plus Four Agreement, the 
FRG, FDR, and the four countries which occupied Germany at the end of the war (France, 
Soviet Union, United Kingdom and the United States) renounced all rights they held in 
Germany, finally allowing a united Germany to become fully sovereign. Germany agreed to 
reduce the strength of its combined armed forces to no more than 370,000 men. As British 
journalist Julian Borger wrote in 2012, “Germany has gone from a special case to a normal 
military. It used to be an outlier.”25 Germany is burdened by its military past, and the genocidal 
legacy of National Socialism, and is therefore very unlikely to encourage or engage in any 
armed conflict in the Arctic region. Although Germany has slowly returned to participate in 
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offensive conflict since the NATO war in former Yugoslavia in 1999, military operations still 
have a bitter taste among the general public.
In recent decades Germany has promoted cooperation in the world and in the Arctic. Especially 
in the field of environmental protection Germany has been a leader since global warming 
became a global issue. In the Arctic Policy Guidelines Germany promotes the Arctic as an area 
of peace, stating that NATO is the wide-ranging partnership providing a suitable forum for 
dealing with Arctic security policy issues.26
26 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
17.
27 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
17.
28 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,”
2.
Although Germany's Arctic Policy Guidelines recognize that “security issues do arise in 
conjunction with developments in the Arctic, and that possible security risks need to be 
addressed,”27 the government favors cooperation throughout the policy document. The Policy 
Guidelines state, “the Federal Government favors multilateral cooperation on Arctic issues, first 
and foremost in the Arctic Council, which is the highest-ranking decision-making body for the 
Arctic.”28 Furthermore, the German Government is committed to ensuring that the Arctic (like 
Antarctica) is used for peaceful purposes only.
As the future of the Arctic region remains uncertain, there is an unlikely possibility of future 
conflict in the region. For the last decades, the Arctic region has been a region of cooperation. 
The same is true for Germany's behavior in the Arctic and as an Observer in the AC. Therefore, 
the theory of neoliberal institutionalism, a theory that focuses on cooperation, best explains 
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Germany's behavior in the region. The theory of realism, which emphasizes conflict and 
security, does not explain Germany's behavior in the Arctic.
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Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusion
For centuries, Germany has demonstrated its interest in the Arctic, beginning with exploration 
in the context of whaling. The century of whaling represented primarily the pursuit of economic 
aims, and it can be considered a successful era for German polar expeditions, as Germans 
benefited from whaling through an increase in employment. Due to significant competition with 
other great seafaring nations, cooperation at this stage was not common. Although scientific 
research was conducted during the whaling period, by Friedrich Martens for example, scientific 
research was just beginning in the region. The period following the whaling era, from the 
middle of the eighteenth century until WWII, was characterized by expeditions in the search of 
fame, geographical discovery, scientific political gain. Most German expeditions returned with 
these hopes unfulfilled achievements and. Karl Koldewey stands out as one of the most famous 
early German Arctic explorers. His two early Arctic expeditions returned with great quantities 
of scientific data, but served more as character formation and to develop first Arctic 
experiences. Alfred Wegener, Germany's most famous Arctic explorer, gained his first Arctic 
experience as a member of a Danish expedition led by Luvig-Mylius-Erichsen. During his own 
expeditions, Wegener cooperated with other foreign expedition members, such as the 
Greenlandic Inuit Rasmus Villumsen. Wegener not only came home with scientific data, but 
proved that Germans could compete in scientific discovery on an international level. Notably, 
he displayed Germany's technological achievement by using propeller-driven sleds for the first 
time in the Arctic region. Although this innovation failed, he brought attention to Germany's 
scientific and technological capacities in Arctic exploration.
The founding of the International Polar Year (IPY) in the 1870s comprises Germany's most 
lasting achievement in Arctic cooperation. Weyprecht recognized the enormous size of the 
Arctic region and realized that only a series of Arctic stations operated by scientists from 
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multiple nations could accomplish the immense task of exploring, monitoring and recording a 
variety of phenomena of interest to the scientific world. Therefore, Weyprecht and Neymayer 
suggested that multiple nations conduct scientific research in several simultaneous expeditions 
around the North. While the first IPY only brought back a series of individual scientific data 
and there was no summarizing publication afterwards, this marked a first important step 
towards cooperation in the Arctic. The first IPY represented a shift in polar science from 
individual research towards collaboration, data exchange, and mutual assistance. For the first 
time, polar research proved to be a field of international cooperation.
The Arctic expedition of the Zeppelin is one of the most successful German expeditions to 
the North, brought home numerous scientific achievements with little financial support and 
no threats to life. This German-led international expedition pioneered the use of complex 
aerial photography techniques and equipment. Scientists from Germany, the United States, 
the Soviet Union and Sweden participated. Hugo Eckener commanded the flight, while the 
Russian Professor Rudolf Lazarevich Smoilovich served as the expedition's scientific leader. 
Cooperation with Russia enabled the exchange of mail in the Arctic. In another breakthrough, 
Walther Brun founded Aeroarctic to examine the possibility of airship traffic route over the 
Atlantic. Aeroarctic was an international organization based on cooperation with scientists 
and engineers from all over the world.
After WWI Germany was eager to regain its status in the world following the disaster of the 
war and the Treaty of Versailles. The achievements of Wegener's expeditions allowed Germany 
to reassert itself as a leader in polar exploration, in terms of science, and technological 
advancement. After the WWII, the new democratic Germany had to reestablish its footing in 
the new world order. It recognized the benefits of international cooperation and collaboration, 
as illustrated in its leadership role in multiple international regimes, including the EU and the 
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United Nations, where Germany was elected as a non-permanent member of the Security 
Council for the 2019-20 term.
Eventually, Germany developed a role in international Arctic politics, a role that emphasized 
economic cooperation, exploration and scientific collaboration as well as diplomacy. 
Furthermore, Germany become an international leader in the fight against climate change. 
The German government worked hard to ensure that the international community negotiated 
new climate agreements and has provided essential impetus for the Kyoto II or the Paris 
Agreement.29 The Federal Government is aware of Germany's role and responsibility 
regarding global warming. With the German Sustainability Strategy and the Climate 
Protection Plan 2050, it is orienting itself towards the goal of greenhouse gas neutrality by 
the middle of the century and is developing concrete models for the specific fields of action 
for the year 2050.30
29 Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Klimaschutzbericht 2018 
zum Aktionsprogramm Klimaschutz 2020 der Bundesregierung/Climate Protection Report 2018 on the Federal 
Government's Climate Protection 2020 Action Programme." (Berlin, 2018): 27, 63, accessed December, 18, 
2018, 
https://www.bmu.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Klimaschutz/klimaschutzbericht_2018.pdf.
30 Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, “Klimaschutzbericht 2018 
zum Aktionsprogramm Klimaschutz 2020 der Bundesregierung/Climate Protection Report 2018 on the Federal 
Government's Climate Protection 2020 Action Programme," 10.
6.1. Germany's Arctic Council Observer Role
After the Cold War ended, Artic politics changed dramatically, as communication opened up 
and East-West tensions waned. This period is characterized by the establishment of multiple 
circumpolar international cooperative agreements, regimes, and institutions to address various 
issues confronting the North. Several events contributed to a paradigm shift in the Arctic. 
Gorbachev's famous 1987 Murmansk speech set in motion the diplomatic activities, resulting 
in first steps of political cooperation. Other circumstances, such as the nuclear power plant 
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accident in Chernobyl in 1986, the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, and severe 
environmental damage in Finland from the smelters on the Kola Peninsula, increased the need 
for research on the Arctic environment.31 The fall of the Soviet Union, finally opened up Arctic 
research cooperation in the vast terrestrial and maritime regions of the former Soviet Arctic to 
Western scientists for the first time since the beginning of the century. From 1998 until 2013 
Germany, for example, maintained a research station with Russia in the Siberian tundra.32
31 Annika E. Nilsson, “A changing Arctic Climate. Science and Policy in the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment.” (PhD diss., Linkoping University, 2007), 83.
32 Alfred-Wegener-Institut, “Research Station Samoylov Island,” accessed November 5, 2018, 
https://www.awi.de/en/expedition/stations/island-samoylov.html.
33 Hakon R. Nilson, “Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS): Process and organization. 1991-97. An 
assessment.” Rapportserie, no. 103 (1997): 32.
One major step towards Arctic cooperation took place in an attempt to manage common 
environmental problems, such as persistent organic pollutants, through the foundation of the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). With Finland taking the lead, the eight 
Arctic states signed the AEPS, which created a more comprehensive political structure for 
collaboration around transboundary environmental issues. Economic, scientific, and strategic 
interests, as well as national pride, drove Germany's historical presence in the Arctic. When 
the new cooperation structures began to emerge in the region with the decline of the Cold War, 
Germany was among the first non- Arctic actors to join in, owing to its history of exploration 
and research in the Arctic. External actors conducting sound research in the Arctic could 
provide environmental cooperation institutions with valuable data.33 Therefore, Germany, 
Poland, the Netherlands, and Great Britain, were invited as observers, first to the AEPS and 
soon thereafter to the Arctic Council. Kathrin Stephen explains that this new Arctic institution 
offered Germany an opportunity to escape rigid Cold War constraints. It allowed peaceful 
cooperation in a field that did not threaten anyone, the field of environmental protection and 
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science. Germany could participate in a low-stakes endeavor that offered great possibilities for 
expansion and furtherance of peace in the Arctic.34
34 Telephone Interview with Kathrin Stephen, November 12, 2018. Translated by author.
35 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
2.
36 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
13.
Germany has thus been an Observer in the Arctic Council from its inception. Initially 
Germany's participation in ministerial meetings and Working Groups was rather low. 
Germany's interest and participation in AC meetings increased significantly after more 
Observers, including China, joined the AC in 2013. In 2013 Germany published its Arctic 
Policy Guidelines, illustrating its having developed a stronger sense of mission in its Arctic 
engagement. Germany has not yet appointed an Arctic Ambassador, as some other non-Arctic 
Observers have, but since 2017 it maintains an Arctic Office. In its Arctic Policy Guidelines 
Germany states that it favors multilateral cooperation on Arctic issues, first and foremost in the 
Arctic Council. The Federal Government further emphasizes that it aims to strengthen 
Germany's Observer status in the Arctic Council.35
Germany points out that it is committed to doing its share as an Observer country; it wants to 
take responsibility, to use and share its expertise.36 Kathrin Stephen explains that Germany's 
objectives in participating in the AC stem from its long polar history and notes that its interests 
are manifold. These include shipping, technology transfer, and climate change concerns, as well 
as economic interests. Germany sees opportunities in the Arctic, which are not particularly 
concrete and detailed, although German industries engage quite actively in the Arctic. In 
general, Stephen explains, it is important for Germany to have a “foot in the door.” One major 
149
goal is responsibility in the field of climate change, not necessarily as the leading nation, but to 
contribute.37
37 Telephone Interview with Kathrin Stephen, November 12, 2018. Translated by author.
38 Guido Westerwelle, “Climate Change, International Law and Arctic Research - Legal Aspects of Marine 
Research in the Arctic Ocean,” in Arctic Science, International Law and Climate Change. Beitrage zum 
auslandischen öffentlichen Recht und Volkerrecht, Veroffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts fur 
auslandisches öffentliches Recht und Volkerrecht 235, ed. Rainer S. Wasum-Rainer, I. Winkelmann, and K. 
Tiroch (Heidelberg, Berlin: Springer, 2012). Translated by author.
39 Małgorzata Smieszek and Paula Kankaanpaa, “Observer States' Commitments to the Arctic Council: The 
Arctic Policy Documents of the United Kingdom and Germany as Case Study,” Yearbook of Polar Law (2015): 
393, 395.
40 Hans Kundani, “Germany as a Geo-Economic Power,” The Washington Quarterly34, no. 3 (2011): 37.
Germany uses its AC Observer status to further its interests in the region. It aims to remain a 
respected world leader on various fronts, such as climate change mitigation and other scientific 
research. It goes a step further than other countries by trying to push AC member states to raise 
their standards. For instance, former German foreign minister Westerwelle has reminded the 
Arctic states that “sovereignty means commitment” and urged the AC to “become a guardian 
of the environment.”38 The same is true for the Germany Arctic Policy Guidelines. The 
document does not correspond clearly to the Nuuk rules for the AC observers in that it contains 
many concrete proposals and references that might please some Arctic states, but not all of 
them.39 For example, Germany disagrees with the Canadian position regarding the Northwest 
Passage (NWP), as Canada considers the NWP to be internal waters, while Germany argues 
that these waters constitute an international strait. Taking this controversial position in its policy 
guidelines illustrates Germany's tendency to stretch the Nuuk guidelines for Arctic Council 
Observers in pursuit of its own interests.
Kundani argues that Germany is increasingly using its influence to impose its own economic 
preferences on others within the European Union.40 The same might be true for the AC, where 
Germany uses its reputation as a global and scientific leader to influence others, as seen in 
Westerwelle's comments.
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6.2. Germany's contemporary interests in the Arctic
The challenges and opportunities the Arctic now faces exemplify the complexity and 
interdependence of twenty-first century global politics. Climate change is likely to increase in 
the coming years; as a result, the interdependencies between environmental conditions and 
public policy will increase as well. Furthermore, a shift in balance of power and an increased 
interest in the Arctic region might have the potential for a more challenging situation in the 
North. Finally, growing interdependence between the Arctic and global affairs might also make 
the region more vulnerable to spill-over effects of political and security-related conflicts in 
other parts of the world.41 For the time being, however, the Arctic remains a zone of peace, 
where cooperation prevails.
41 Tobias Etzold and Stefan Steinicke, “Regionale Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in der Arktis- und 
Ostseeregion,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Berlin, 2015): 161.
As a resource poor country, Germany has always been interested in a stable and secure supply 
of natural resources, mainly oil and gas from Russia and Norway. Germany also expects metals 
found in the Arctic such as copper, nickel and zinc and rare earth metals to cover the raw 
material requirements of its domestic industries, such as high-technology products. In return, 
Germany offers the Arctic states the technology and know-how needed for the regional 
development of raw materials and for research.
These circumstances place Germany in a vulnerable and dependent position. As Germany is an 
exporting nation, it has strong interests in the development of mineral and energy resources, as 
well as free shipping in the Arctic. Therefore, Germany benefits from globalization and a 
functioning international political order, including access to international trade routes and raw 
materials. Conversely, Germany, in economic and political terms, depends on the functioning 
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of this order and is thus vulnerable to disturbances in the international political order. Hence, 
Germany wants to preserve and further develop this international political order to benefit 
economically and politically.42 Recent stresses on the international political order include a 
shifting balance of power in the post-Cold War era, climate change, migration flows, and 
increasing competition for scarce resources, food and access to trade routes and technologies. 
Germany is particularly vulnerable to these developments.43 44
42 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), and German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), “Neue 
Macht Neue Verantwortung. Elemente einer deutschen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik fur eine Welt im 
Umbruch” (Berlin and Washington: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik und The German Marshall Fund oft he 
United States, 2013): 6, accessed December 15, 2018, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/neue-macht-neue- 
verantwortung-neue-aussenpolitik/.
43 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), and German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), “Neue 
Macht Neue Verantwortung. Elemente einer deutschen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik fur eine Welt im 
Umbruch,” 12.
44 Stefan Steinicke, “Germany's Arctic Engagement - Between Environmental Responsibilities and Geo- 
Economic Interests” (PhD diss., Universitat der Bundeswehr, 2017), 306.
45 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
1.
According to Steinicke, Germany's interest in the region and its Arctic engagement have not 
been driven by an interest in the region itself, but instead by international and domestic 
developments, including the need for a peaceful international order and Germany's domestic 
economic needs, which highlight Germany's vulnerability. He concludes that these geo- 
economic threats, rather than commitment to environmental responsibility, drive Germany's 
44Arctic engagement.
Yet, the German Arctic Policy Guidelines emphasize the importance “of protecting the Arctic 
environment through circumspect and precautionary action.”45 Although Germany is interested 
in Arctic resources, it also emphasizes global environmental protection through the highest 
environmental standards. Furthermore, Germany stresses that “safeguarding the unique 
environment and living conditions of the Arctic, and protecting the region's biodiversity, are of 
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the highest priority.”46 As a non-Arctic country, Germany assumes responsibility and makes 
concrete contributions to environmental and climate protection in the Arctic, primarily through 
the participation of experts and scientific institutions in relevant working groups of the Arctic 
Council, for example the AMAP or PAME WGs. During the 12th Arctic Dialogue, which took 
place in November 2018 in Berlin, Federal Environment Ministry, Federal Environment 
Agency, Federal Agency for Nature Conservation and AWI experts addressed audiences on 
their contributions to climate protection in the Arctic, to limit marine waste and to protect 
biodiversity in the Arctic.47 Examples of this commitment include collaboration in a study by 
the AC's PAME Working Group on Marine Waste and Microplastic in the Arctic and efforts 
under OSPAR48 to establish a marine protected area in the high seas of the Arctic Ocean.49
46 Federal Foreign Office, “Guidelines of the German Arctic Policy. Assume responsibility, seize opportunities,” 
7.
47 Arctic Office, “12th Arctic Dialog. Environmental protection in the Arctic,” accessed December 18, 2018, 
https://www.arctic-office.de/en/information-platform/news/arctic-dialogue-addressing-environmental-issues/.
48 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic
49 Arctic Office, “12th Arctic Dialog. Environmental protection in the Arctic.”
Already today, climate change impacts have reached Germany in the form of rising 
temperatures and extreme weather such as storms and draughts. Germany therefore is highly 
interested in research regarding climate change and in mitigating the effects of the change. 
Furthermore, Germany sees great potential for national companies - especially in the 
environmental sector and marine technology. Germany is a global leader in the fight against 
climate change and therefore promotes binding regulations for environmental protection and 
Arctic security though bilateral agreements. Germany offers its scientific expertise and 
experience in polar research to support the peaceful and sustainable development of Arctic 
resources.
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In summary, Germany's recent Arctic engagement started with an emphasis on mitigating 
climate change and has shifted to include pursuit of geo-economic opportunities. In recent 
years, Germany became vulnerable to the effects of global warming and energy shortages. 
Therefore, Germany depends on the Arctic: on a reliable energy supply, stable markets, and 
free access to shipping routes, as well as to the Arctic climate, which drives the global climate. 
My findings thus support a neoliberal institutionalist explanation of Germany's participation as 
an Observer of the Arctic Council. Scientific research is a high priority for Germany and a 
means to participate in the Arctic. Germany stands as an environmental leader, and the German 
polar research institute AWI enjoys the reputation of being one of the world's leading polar 
research institutes. Germany has anticipated absolute economic gains, as well as indirect 
benefits from collaboration to protect the Arctic environment and to engage in scientific 
research. Germany pursues self-interests in the Arctic, as well as environmental protection, both 
of which coincide with the theory of neoliberal institutionalism. As neoliberal institutionalists 
argue, Germany is motivated by economic gains to engage in Arctic affairs. Furthermore, 
through the AC, Germany participates in numerous projects and WGs of the AC, and therefore 
supports the fight against climate change. In short, Germany pursues AC Observer status to 
collaborate with others to further its domestic economic goals, as well as environmental and 
research interests. Therefore, my findings and analysis regarding Germany's engagement and 
behavior in the Arctic and the AC clearly align with neoliberal institutionalism.
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